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ABSTRACT 
 
The construction industry is challenged to improve its work processes and reduce 
costs. Contractors have the clearest view of work done and how costs are incurred 
as they estimate the cost of work to be carried out, agree costs to a client and then 
carry out the work. However, in construction subcontractors’ undertake around 70% 
of a project and so work done and project costs must be considered as a supply 
chain. This being the case, improvements in site operations and a reduction in costs 
require working collectively between the main contractor and their supply chain. The 
advent of Building Information Modelling (BIM) has been presented as enabling more 
detailed information and analytical modelling capabilities. In BIM, cost is just another 
item of information that can be created and manipulated within the model giving 
advantages of automation, detail and rich data access. However, to take advantage 
of BIM, the nature of the costing process needs to be clarified and made robust. This 
encouraged an exploration of “cost as information” in the construction project supply 
chain by analysing current practices of creation of cost information deep within the 
supply chain; the flow of cost information through the supply chain and the effect of 
cost information on recognising improvements in site operations. 
 
Supported by a UK main contractor, the project was given access to their estimating, 
operations and supply chain. The research firstly investigated, via non-participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, document reviews and workshops, how cost 
information is created and flows from forecasts of work to be carried out, to costs to a 
client. The research then investigated the effects of contractors’ current costing 
practices on decision-making about improvements through the supply chain.  
 
The study provides data on the actual practices of estimating and cost control in a 
unique investigation that makes connections between costing practices within 
individual organisations and across the supply chain. The findings reveal that despite 
cost information being presented in formal cost models, detailed estimates of costs 
created in organisations are lost and corrupted as cost information flows through the 
supply chain. People recognised that, despite being presented as hard information in 
formal cost models, cost information is used in a soft negotiable world in which 
subcontracting is run as a set of commercial decisions in which price bargaining is a 
key aspect in bidding for projects and in delivering projects. The findings also 
revealed that project scheduling also involved much negotiation in which planning 
and re-planning of work packaging and construction methods was undertaken in the 
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delivering of projects. Participants viewed formal cost models as effective for 
tendering and payment purposes. But the incompatibility between the formal and 
informal routines of cost handling and project delivery mean that formal cost models 
are not trusted for reflecting improvement. This has implications for immediate moves 
to automate the current process of costing in BIM, as this may produce non-viable 
results and so cannot be justified for the assessment of improvement.  
 
This thesis uses the information-use model of Beynon-Davies (2011), involving the 
data aspects of cost (forma), the communication of costs (informa) and the system of 
costing (performa), to interpret both the methods of costing and the system of 
costing. Through the lens of “cost as information” this thesis proposes a systemic 
change in costing processes and the use of new representations of cost that better 
represent work done in the supply chain to provide meaningful, manageable and 
measureable. The softness and negotiability inherent in the process means that hard 
representations such as cost are surrogates for evaluations and actions. Thus, for an 
effective representation in BIM research needs to refocus from the pursuit of greater 
detail in current formal cost models towards finding and agreeing a new surrogate. 
 
This thesis proposes an information ontology, which represents costing of the system 
of construction delivery. This will be called a systems ontology of costing. The 
ontology includes measurement of dependencies that can support collaborative 
decision-making, using soft system approaches, about improvements deep in to the 
supply chain. This systems ontology of costing in the supply chain is argued to be of 
value in developing new analytical models of costing in BIM that can link design, 
programming and management for identifying, evaluating and costing real 
improvement in work done. As the thesis found that project scheduling also involves 
much negotiation, future work to analyse and evaluate “construction planning as 
information” would provide data for specifying the nature of future measurements of 
dependencies in the continually changing conditions of construction projects, that 
would better link costs to work done.  
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 4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research scope and background 
 
The construction industry has been heavily criticized over a long time for poor 
performance and high costs. Egan (1998) in the UK and Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) 
looking internationally, write that the perception of poor performance comes from 
high profile projects suffering from cost overruns, programme delays and poor 
productivity. In the UK, both government and contractors agree on the need for 
improvement. Government interest is driven by the political importance of the 
construction industry to the wealth of the UK and by government spending. 
Construction is a major contributor to economic output (6.5% of the total economy in 
2014); a major employer (6.2% of the total in 2015) and a major contributor to growth 
(Rhodes, 2015). Government is also a major client for buildings and infrastructure 
with an interest in spending tax revenue efficiently.  
 
Requirements for improvement similarly come from the industry itself in response to 
the competitive requirements of the market and shareholders’ requirements to 
become more profitable (Lansley, 1987 and Hillebrandt et al.,1995). The 
dissatisfaction with the status quo by government and contractors has motivated a 
broad and long debate on construction improvement. The debate has most often 
been driven by government-backed reports. The Cabinet Office (2011) in the 
‘Government Construction Strategy’ called for a reduction of construction costs of 
20%. BIS (2014) in ‘Construction 2025, The Industrial Strategy of Government and 
Industry, then called for a 33% reduction in both the initial cost of construction and 
the whole life cost of assets (from 2010/09 levels). Farmer (2016) in ‘The Farmer 
Review of the UK Construction Labour Model’ sees the industry at a “critical juncture” 
at which deep-seated structural problems and poor outcomes on productivity and 
predictability need to be addressed together.  
 
The industry is faced with these calls to deliver projects to tighter budgets and 
shorter timescales at a time of increasing pressures from the growing complexity of 
construction projects. Complexity is arising from new technologies, new specialist 
trades and the more complex organisational structures that result. This diversification 
is a problem in all industries. However the extent of subcontracting and its use in 
construction to reduce costs makes an integrated delivery more difficult. Thus 
collaboration is more of a problem in the construction industry where many small 
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local firms work together in short term project-based relationships with separation 
between design and construction, in which the project relationships between the 
many firms are mediated by market-based transactions with an overriding adversarial 
culture (Hillebrandt, 1984; Hughes and Hillebrandt, 2003) 
 
In recent decades, successive government-backed reports have put forward 
solutions to bring about improvements. Before the millennium a series of reports built 
on each other. Latham (1994) in ‘Constructing the Team’ advised the construction 
industry to adopt a less adversarial culture by embracing more cooperative and 
trusting relationships, with “partnering” as a solution. Egan (1998) in his report 
‘Rethinking Construction’ went further than partnering and advised the construction 
industry to adopt “supply chain management”, “lean construction” and 
“benchmarking”, a set of standard goals across construction projects. He also 
advised the industry to adopt a less short-term focus by forming “long-term alliances” 
instead of one-off project partnering. Egan (2002) in his subsequent report 
‘Accelerating Change’ built on the preceding reports, specifically suggesting that it is 
possible to achieve better “value” by integrating clients and suppliers.  
 
Since the term BIM entered the industry around 2003 (Eastman et al. 2011) 
successive government reports (Cabinet Office, 2011; BIS, 2014 and Farmer, 2016) 
all advocate BIM as an enabling technology for improvement. Building Information 
Modelling (BIM), is a term used in may ways to cover a technological step change 
from computer-aided design to computer modelling and an organisational change 
towards increased collaborative working. New computer modelling applications can 
provide visualisation and simulation of project designs and construction processes. 
They also have the capability to contain analytic decision support tools. It requires 
and assists a change in relationships between project participants, from adversarial 
to more collaborative working (Succar, 2009; Eastman et al. 2011). BIM has already 
diffused across the UK construction industry. The Government Construction Strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2011) has brought BIM to all public sector projects. BIM is just one of 
many emerging digital technologies with potential applications to the construction 
industry. Across all industrial sectors Information and Commutation Technology (ICT) 
is developing rapidly and different technologies are converging. The ‘UK Digital 
Transformation Strategy’ (Brown, 2017) promotes ICT and other digital technologies 
in the drive to speed up work and provide new products and services. McKinsey and 
Company (2017) argue that the construction industry is “ripe for disruption” and is 
playing catch-up with other industries. PWC (2016) foresees BIM converging with 
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other contributing digital technologies encompassing big data, the internet of things, 
wearable technology, survey drones, gaming technology, artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and 3D printing. This is part of a groundswell of interest from 
contractors for technology that disrupts the sector, boosts productivity and changes 
the way the industry works. Thus also mitigating against a skills shortage and 
providing an environment that attracts young, technologically skilled people to join 
the industry. 
 
Amongst the digital disrupters, BIM is promoted as a solution to achieve greater 
efficiencies through increased collaboration. The use of BIM technologies and the 
inherent collaboration difficulties in the industry therefore need to be addressed hand 
in hand. This is not easy. Dossick and Neff (2009) (2011) found that the introduction 
of BIM technologies “tightly-couple” information from project participants in a single, 
online “consolidated models” (BIS, 2010) and make organisational connections 
visible. They argue that although organisational connections are made visible, the 
organisational connections themselves remain “loosely-coupled” as participants 
retain competing obligations between project goals and their firm’s own goals. They 
conclude that, in order for BIM to achieve its aims of better collaboration, 
organisational goals need to be accounted for alongside the introduction of 
technologies. 
 
Organisational goals in relation to money generate an extremely strong obligation to 
a firm’s financial requirements. Construction is project focused, but delivered through 
firms. From supply chain management, the relationship between the firms that deliver 
projects on the supply side is known as the supply chain. Several tiers of firms are 
common in construction project delivery. To distinguish between the different firm-to-
firm relationships, the first tier firm with a direct relationship with the client is known 
as the main contractor. The term subcontractor then is used to distinguish the set of 
firms who do not have a direct relationship with the client. Several layers of 
subcontractors are common in the multi-tiered supply chains that deliver construction 
projects. In individual projects, individual contractors prioritise profit maximisation but 
individual contractors also continuously balance resources and profitability across 
different projects.  
 
The profit margins and liquidity of construction firms, compared to other industries, 
are low (Boukendour and Hughes, 2014). This limits the money available in the 
industry. This business model is also self-reinforcing. Contractors predominantly 
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operate on a credit-based business model in which they fund work in progress, 
eased by staged payments to provide working capital. Nevertheless there is a lag 
between outlay and income and this model incentivises lowest price and latest 
payment of subcontractors throughout the supply chain (Boukendour and Hughes, 
2014). Latham (1993) in his interim report ‘Trust and Money’ recognised the problem 
of the effects on downstream subcontractors. In his final report ‘Constructing the 
Team’ Latham (1994) condemned delays in making payments, including pay when 
paid terms, in which contractors hold subcontractor payments until they themselves 
have been paid. He also condemned delays in releasing retention money, 
percentages of money due held back under contracts for security for contract 
performance. Progress has been made on tackling this example of bad practices in 
the industry. But Latham (1993) was also making a bigger point that money has a 
fundamental role in any industry and the flow of money is more of a problem in the 
construction industry where cashflow predominantly provides contractors with 
working capital. Dossick and Neff (2009) similarly make the point that money has a 
fundamental role. They conclude the ability to balance profit obligations to the firm 
against obligations to a project is one of the “sharpest conflicts” within project teams.  
 
Thus, an exploration of money in the construction industry is fundamental to a better 
understanding of the working better in projects and an assessment of the relevance 
of money for the more integrated, collaborative decision-making that will be possible 
in BIM to support change.  
 
1.2 Research rationale 
 
The link between technological tools and the people and organisations that use them 
is of increasing interest to academics working in information theory (Mingers, 2014; 
Floridi, 2011; Beynon-Davies, 2011). This link between technology and organisations 
is of critical interest in construction projects (Dossick and Neff. 2011); where multi-
organisational teams come together temporarily in projects and where the work of 
many individual people and organisations is imported and exchanged in integrated 
computer systems, known as consolidated models (BIS, 2010); digital models that 
consolidate 3D drawings from different design disciplines. 
 
In the UK, construction project cost models are traditionally and still predominantly 
presented in the form of detailed bills of quantities. As cost information moves into 
BIM, it is valuable to take an information view of cost. This research uses the terms 
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‘cost’ and ‘costing’, not in their technical accounting sense, but in the sense that they 
are used in construction projects, to apply to budgets as well as costs incurred. The 
literature on cost management in BIM shows that costing applications in BIM have to 
date focused on BIM’s ability to automate current practices. The nature of cost 
information that is produced by current practices is therefore important. Current cost 
information needs to be understood against its purposes, which are threefold; 
estimating, cost control and supporting analytic decisions on improvement. 
 
A body of research exists into how cost information is created and used for the first 
two purposes. This research is contained in literature on the formal cost estimating 
and cost control processes of contractors (Towey, 2012; Greenhalgh, 2013; Kirkham, 
2015; and Brook, 2017) and some research covers cost control practices of main 
contractors (Brook, 2017; Ross and Williams 2013). However, very little research has 
considered the cost estimating and cost control practices of subcontractors in the 
multi-layered supply chains of construction projects. Main contractors operate in tier 
1 of construction project supply chains and typically subcontract around 80% of their 
work. This makes subcontractor’s costing practices critical to understanding how 
overall costs are built up and controlled in construction projects. Specialist trade 
subcontractors, such as mechanical and electrical services subcontractors operating 
in tier 2 of construction project supply chains also typically subcontract around 60% - 
70% of their work. So the costing practices of their subcontractors in tier 3 of a 
supply chain and below are also critical to understanding how overall costs are built 
up and controlled. In addition, little research has documented contractors’ 
commercial practices in estimating and cost control. Research that does, such as 
Brook (2017), Ross and Williams (2013) and Laryea and Hughes (2010), recognise a 
wider range of forces acting on cost information than literature on contractors’ formal 
routines report. This literature suggests that the cost information presented in bills of 
quantities is ‘corrupted’, in the sense that it is changed by many assumptions, so that 
it does not well represents work done. In cost management in general, Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987) drew attention to the shortcomings of conventional management 
accounting in the same way, arguing that it had become uninterested in direct 
measures of activities in the firm, relying instead on what they call ‘surrogate’ 
financial numbers, thus reducing the instrumental value of cost information in 
providing management with a tool to better manage a business.  
 
There is little research into how cost information is created and used in construction 
for the third purpose for cost information, that of supporting analytical decisions on 
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improvement. The improvement debate in the business of commerce in general and 
in construction projects in particular is wide-ranging and contentious. From the array 
of improvement interventions across industries, supply chain management and lean 
thinking potentially draw directly on the expertise of contactors in mobilising 
resources in construction projects. The introduction and uptake of these models in 
their originating industries and their importation into construction are widely covered 
in literature (Mentzer et al., 2001; Pryke, 2009).  
 
Across disciplines, an understanding of systems is seen as fundamental to 
developing complimentary interventions. In today’s world it is very common for a vast 
array of problems to be described loosely as ‘systemic’, including many management 
situations. The systems movement provides a general way to study situations 
through a set of principles. The Soft Systems movement, which considers systems 
that involve human activity in dynamic situations, is relevant to the multi-tiered supply 
chain of organisations and people who deliver construction projects. Gunderson and 
Holling’s (2001) understanding of the construction system as a complex adaptive 
system provides a metaphor to understand how the construction system transforms 
and hence how complimentary improvement remedies are, or are not. 
 
Under any model of improvement, an associated requirement for cost information to 
account for improvements becomes critical. Demonstration projects in construction 
have used the new pricing basis of Target Costing (Kato, 1993; Ansari et al. 2006) 
supported by Open Book Accounting, in which firms share information on costs and 
margins. In theory open book accounting is used to establish actual costs and works 
by reimbursing contractors for actual costs incurred.  Open book accounting is 
underpinned by cost information created by contractors. Only Nicolini et al. (2000) 
and Zimina et al. (2012) have looked at how contractors’ current cost information 
motivates improvements under Target Costing and both report significant limitations.  
 
In management accounting across commerce in general, there is a body of theory on 
standard costing and on new methods of costing to support analytic decisions on 
improvement. A wave of new costing methods arose out of the increased competition 
from the globalisation of supply chains in 1980s. The principle methods are Activity 
Based Costing (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998), Lean Accounting (Maskell and Kennedy, 
2007), Resource Consumption Accounting and Throughput Accounting. They each, 
in different ways, seek to more ‘accurately’ trace resources; through work done, to 
products. These new methods of costing have been used within firms and have also 
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been adopted for inter-firm accounting across supply chains (Surowiec, 2013). The 
aims, limitations and uptake of these models in other industries is of interest for their 
introduction and uptake in construction.  
 
Better information on costs is presented as an end point for developments in BIM. 
Developments in contractors’ cost modeling in construction projects have traditionally 
encompassed more ‘accurate’ cost estimating of work done and increased 
predictability of costs. But how contractors currently build up a price and control costs 
across the supply chain is not simple and not well articulated in literature. As cost 
information moves into BIM, this encouraged an exploration of the nature of current 
use of ‘cost as information’. 
 
To gain access to the costing practices of a main contractor and their supply chain 
for empirical investigation, this research arose out of a collaboration that was set up 
between the research institute and the Midlands regional division of a UK national 
main contactor. The collaboration involved the main contractor’s sponsorship of a 
three year PhD studentship, which was formally established in February 2013. The 
collaboration provided a vehicle for accessing data and drive for creating a practically 
relevant outcome. The ethical issues that the collaboration raised and the decisions 
taken about research design to overcome the ethical issues will be discussed in 
detail in section 3.3. 
 
The Collaboration Agreement with the main contractor is attached in Appendix A1.1 
and identified the research aims and objectives that are set out in section 1.3 below.  
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1.3 Research aim and objectives 
 
This research aims to develop a framework of costing that supports more efficient 
work in the supply chain through the use of BIM. In order to achieve this aim the 
following objectives were set: 
 
1. Determine how current approaches to supply chain costing affect supply 
chain operation and overall construction costs in a project. 
 
2. Determine how different approaches to costing of supply chain operation can 
be used to deliver efficiency and cost savings in projects. 
 
3. Examine costing through the lens of information theory to identify different, 
more useful costs of supply chain operation throughout projects. 
 
4. Develop a schematic information model of costing that represents the whole 
system of costing in the supply chain to inform the development of 
information approaches such as BIM. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
As set out above, formal methods are prescribed for how contractors should estimate 
and control costs in construction projects. However the realties of how contractors 
deep into the supply chain create cost information and how cost information flows 
through a project supply chain in not simple and little articulated in literature.  
 
Chapter 2 explores the literature of others on formal models for contractor cost 
estimating and control and a comparatively small amount of literature on contractor’s 
commercial practices that explore the actual processes of contractor costing. In 
seeking to establish how cost information can be used to incentivise improvement 
across the supply chain, the chapter reviews the small amount of literature that has 
looked at incentive contracts and conclude contractor’s lack of basic knowledge on 
costs is a major barrier to rewarding improvements through incentivising pain / gain 
sharing agreements. Chapter 2 then explores the literature on the contentious 
subject of construction improvement; from pull from the demand side of the industry 
(clients and their advisers) and push from the supply side of the industry (main 
contractors and their supply chain). Supply chain management and lean construction 
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are identified as the two main improvement remedies on the supply side, both 
originating in manufacturing. Literature on the development and uptake of each is 
presented from manufacturing, before literature is presented on the development and 
uptake in construction. Chapter 2 then looks at alternative cost models in 
manufacturing and their limitations. Chapter 2 switches focus to the arrival of BIM in 
construction and the move of cost information into BIM. It focuses on how BIM 
models the world of construction and deals with approaches to construction 
improvement and costs. The chapter then pans out to take a broad outlook on 
systems modelling and its implications for information requirements in BIM. The 
chapter finally focuses in on information theory in order to better understand 
information models and their relationship to problems in the real world. 
 
Chapter 3 shifts emphasis to the primary research. The chapter explains the 
methodology adopted for the primary research. The philosophical perspective is 
discussed and the ethical issues addressed. The chapter describes and critiques the 
case study approach and the interviews, observations and workshops undertaken. It 
describes how the empirical research with a main contractor and subcontractors 
provided a single case study of a notional supply chain. The chapter describes the 
abductive approach taken to the case study research using Dubois and Gadde’s 
(2002 and 2014) systemic combining logic. The research framework, against which 
the case was mapped out, is described. The influence of both the empirical findings 
and theory on the direction of the research is described. Finally in this chapter the 
research journey is described, outlining the direction and redirection of the research 
and the learning of the researcher. 
 
Chapter 4 deals comprehensively with the primary research. The results of the 
research are presented in quotations that show data on the realities of contractor 
costing deep into the supply chain. The quotations are presented against the 
research framework providing the analysis of the findings, which identifies problems 
with the nature of cost information created. It presents a picture of information that is 
created on costs and retained within firms in the supply chain that is disconnected 
from the information that is passed between firms in formal cost models. It also 
presents a picture of cost bargaining in construction bidding and delivery. The 
findings show that commercial buying is the cornerstone of supply chain operations. 
It also shows the extent of planning and preplanning of work packaging and 
construction methods that was undertaken in the delivering of projects. Construction 
delivery was found to be negotiable as well as construction costs.  
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Chapter 5, the discussion, provides a confrontation between the primary research 
and relevant theory. Drawing on information theory and soft systems theory it 
theorises the problems of the nature of cost information created and explores better 
accounting for improvement through BIM. Using Beynon-Davies (2011) idea of 
forma, informa and performa it analyses both the methods of costing and the system 
of costing. It concludes that data distortion in cost information results from a mixture 
of direct measures, standard rates, bargaining, judgements and intentional errors in 
the creation and use of cost information. It thus reveals the problematic nature of the 
cost information created in the supply chain as information that is not agreed on to 
account for improvement, even though it is agreed on for establishing a price and 
making payments. This prompts a description of the costing system and its feedback 
loop, and the conclusion that the feedback loop in the current system of contractor 
costing creates stability but maintains the status quo. The discussion compares the 
reality of contractors’ cost information with improvement views and their associated 
methods of costing from literature. This leads to a redefinition of the problem from the 
pursuit of greater detail in cost models to simpler cost models that are more useful 
for improvement deep into the supply chain. A new approach then is presented. 
 
Chapter 6 brings the thesis to a conclusion, providing a summary of the thesis, 
reflecting on the research’s achievements of its original aims, identifying the research 
contributions, identifying limitations of the study and finally making recommendations 
for future research. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Information is a key ingredient in the organisation of societies and in today’s world 
information technology is a key channel for the presentation and flow of information 
and a key driver of change in society. Information on cost appears everywhere in life. 
In life in the construction industry, Best and Meikle (2015) observed that construction 
project cost models differ around the world, but construction everywhere is criticised 
for its high cost. Cost reduction is a frequently cited, but not uncontentious, aim in the 
improvement debate in construction. Although there is no universal agreement in the 
improvement debate about what improvement looks like, the idea that there is room 
for improvement is agreed across the industry.  
This chapter starts by drawing on literature on the sources of the cost information 
created by main contractors and their supply chain and the use of the information 
created. This draws on literature on the theory of construction project estimating and 
tendering and its associated formal project cost models. Literature more influenced 
by practice is then presented on the commercial cost management practices of 
contractors and subcontractors and its influence on formal project cost models.  
 
This chapter then looks at the role of the construction improvement debate in 
motivating contractors to achieve improvements and the ability of the industry to cost 
and reward for those improvements. Literature is presented that shows that the 
construction improvement debate appears to be geared more towards pull from the 
demand side of the industry through new forms of procurement and design 
decisions, than push from the supply side of the industry: main contractors and their 
supply chain. Literature suggests that in manufacturing the concepts of Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) and lean thinking are the main interventions towards 
improvement in manufacturing supply chains. Literature is presented on the uptake 
of these two interventions in manufacturing industries. Literature is then presented 
their application and uptake in construction. Finally literature from construction is 
presented that points to the nature of cost information created as a limiting factor on 
efforts to cost and reward improvements through SCM or lean practices. 
 
In this light, it is relevant to see how other industries have developed cost information 
associated with SCM and lean. Literature is presented from management accounting 
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standard costing methods and refinements through Activity Based Costing, Lean 
Accounting, Resource Consumption Accounting and Throughput Accounting. Costing 
design led change through Value Engineering and Target Costing is then presented. 
Costing process led change through ABC, Lean Accounting, Resource Consumption 
Accounting and Throughput Accounting is then presented. Lastly literature from 
supply chain costing is presented to aid strategic decisions across supply chains. 
These stem from Transaction Cost Economics and include, ownership costs, 
customer response costs, and overhead cost (through activity based costing).  
 
The chapter moves on to the arrival of Building Information Modelling (BIM) in 
construction. Literature is presented on how BIM models the world of construction 
and deals with approaches to construction improvement. Literature is also presented 
on how cost management in BIM fits into this picture. 
In order to better understand the nature of the situations that BIM is seeking to 
intervene in, this chapter looks upwards and introduces literature from the field of 
management science on the idea of systems thinking and its associated metaphors 
of hard and soft as two different ways to model the world and approach change. 
Literature is then presented that has used the distinctions of hard and soft systems in 
the improvement debate in construction. 
 
Finally, this chapter looks forward and literature from the field of information theory is 
presented that explores the nature of information, in order to better understand 
nature of measurable information in general and the value of computer modelling in 
working on problems of construction improvement and motivation of improvement 
through financial reward. 
 
2.2 Contractors’ costing practices 
 
2.2.1 Standard project costing methods 
 
Ashworth et al. (2013) explain that in the UK, there are detailed and specialised 
accounting conventions to measure construction projects. They explain that today’s 
measurement conventions first emerged in the industrial revolution when contractors 
compiling competing bids for a project started to jointly employ a surveyor to 
measure quantities from the drawings. This eliminated the previous duplication of 
effort by competing contractors. Subsequently, construction clients took on the task 
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of measuring quantities themselves by employing a measurement surveyor, a 
practice that continues to this day. Davis et al. (2009) explain that measurement 
conventions arose and today projects are measured in accordance with either formal, 
detailed, standardised methods of measurement presented in a bill of quantities; 
more informal, less detailed, methods of measurement that are specific to a firm; or a 
mixture of both. The formal and detailed conventions for the measurement of work as 
the basis of a project cost model, reside substantially in quantity surveying textbooks. 
In the sphere of quantity surveying measurement, textbooks such as Seeley (1997), 
Cartlidge (2017), Ashworth (2013) and Ostrowski (2013) draw on UK’s industry 
standard methods of measurement such as The Royal Institutution of Chartered 
Surveyors, New Rules of Measurement 2 (RICS, 2012) or its predecessors. Ross 
and Williams (2013) point out that although formal bills of quantities are in decline, 
most contractors adopt measurement conventions that are at least loosely based 
around standard methods of measurement. Winch, (2010) notes that the 
measurement conventions set out in standard methods of measurement take the 
form of a Product Breakdown Structure (PBS): a breakdown of a project into 
individual, measured items (also referred to as objects or components) that together 
make up the whole building. Ross and Williams (2013) argue that what is significant 
is that, irrespective of the type of measurement conventions used, the resulting 
priced document is given the functions of establishing a price to the buyer, a budget 
to the seller and an agreed payment schedule. 
 
The conventions by which competing contractors estimate the costs of the measured 
work is explained substantially in estimating and tendering textbooks. In the sphere 
of estimating and tendering, these textbooks (such as Towey, 2012; Greenhalgh, 
2013; Kirkham, 2015; and Brook, 2017) draw on the Chartered Institute of Building’s 
Code of Estimating Practice (CIOB, 2009). The conventions set out in estimating 
codes for contractors take the form of Work Breakdown Structures (WBS): a 
breakdown of the project into processes such as bricklaying, plastering and roofing 
with their associated temporary work (Winch, 2010). Winch (2010) notes that WBSs 
are process orientated and based on the contractor’s Organisational Breakdown 
Structure (OBS), which breaks work down between different trades. Winch (2010) 
notes that the difference between object orientated PBSs codified in standard 
methods of measurement, and process orientated WBSs used by contractors for 
estimating costs, can cause problems of integration. 
 
 18 
Winch (2010) describes how contractors create WBSs for both work planning and 
cost estimating purposes and approach the task of building up a cost estimate from 
the bottom up. Texts on estimating and tendering (Towey, 2012; Greenhalgh, 2013; 
Kirkham, 2015; and Brook, 2017) identify the same three categories of sources of 
information for estimating and tendering. These three categories are described as: 
estimates of the use of a contractor’s own resources, quotations for work from 
subcontractors and overarching strategic tendering decisions. Kirkham (2015) 
contends that regardless of the project delivery method, the approach to construction 
procurement on a project, main contractors and subcontractors have the same task 
of building up a tender price from these three distinct categories of cost information.  
 
Greenhalgh (2013) analyses the three categories of cost that build up to the costs 
presented in the formal cost model. Firstly in terms of a firm’s estimates of the use of 
their own resources: Greenhalagh (2013) explains that cost estimates for work 
directly carried out by a contractor can be built up from first principles: the activities 
that consume a firm’s own internal resources of labour, materials and plant. These 
internal resource costs can be allocated to either preliminaries (site overheads) or 
measured items. He explains that a measured item, such as a square metre of a 
brick wall, is a component of the finished building with a measured quantity and a 
specification that influence the resources required. The materials required are 
calculated by a simple mathematical relationship that includes allowances for 
material waste. The labour and plant required are based on standardised rates for 
labour productivity and plant utilisation come from either a standard rates within a 
firm or industry standard price books. The estimator then uses their expert judgement 
to adjust these rates for project factors. Greenhalagh (2013) argues that how a 
contractor makes best use of their internal resources is the main competitive 
differential between competing contractors.  
 
The second type of cost information that builds up to the costs presented in the 
formal cost model described by Greenhalgh (2013) is comparative prices for 
packages of work provided by competing subcontractors in each trade. Here, 
Greenhalgh (2013) asserts that the calculations and judgements made about the use 
of labour, material and plant (as covered in the paragraph above) and the size and 
apportionment of risk contingencies, overheads and profit (to be covered in the next 
paragraph) are usually hidden from the receiving buyer. He says that the buyer can 
therefore only compare subcontractor quotations, negotiate and include the most 
favourable quotation on the basis of either lowest price or best value. He reports that 
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before negotiation, subcontractors are required to have included any recognised, 
standard trading discount for their trade. 
 
Greenhalgh (2013) describes the third type of cost information that builds up to the 
costs presented in a formal cost model: the overarching strategic tendering decisions 
that convert an estimate into a tender. He describes how contractors and 
subcontractors must make expert judgments and best guesses about allowances for 
design and other risk contingencies and about the required margin or mark-up to 
recover a contribution to indirect, a firm’s overheads and earn a profit. He says that 
the allocation of the indirect overheads of a firm is based on the use of internal 
resources and allocated to a project using a calculation based on a prediction of the 
firm’s annual turnover across all of a firm’s projects. He says that the allowance for 
design and other risk contingencies is based on thinking about the degree of project 
uncertainty and the allowance for profit is based on thinking about competition within 
the construction market.  
 
2.2.2 Commercial pricing decisions: their influence on standard project cost 
models  
 
Researchers who have documented contractors’ commercial cost management 
practices recognise a wider range of forces acting on cost information. Firstly, 
information about the use of resources may not be created in the first place. Brook 
(2017) documents his experience of how contractors’ standard estimating 
conventions are used in practice and argues, “sometimes contractors have difficulty 
finding time to apply first principle costing to tenders”. Ntuen and Mallick (1987) 
noted that there is a branch of alternative, informal, less detailed methods of building 
up costs of a project that rely on an estimator’s experience and judgement. He calls 
these experience-based estimating. Law (1994) found that in practice contractors 
use their own informal methods of estimating that are specific to their firm. Skitmore 
and Wilcock (1994) found that small contractors presented with formal, detailed cost 
models to price for tendering, estimate the costs of around half the measured items 
using formal, detailed methods of estimating and estimated the costs of other 
measured items using informal, experience-based estimating.  
 
Secondly, information about the use of resources may be obscured in a model by 
commercial behaviour. Ross and Williams (2013) draw on their experience and past 
research on commercial accounting in construction firms to look at the flow of cost 
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information through the supply chain from the firm that will do the physical work to 
costs to the client. They identify that it is unlikely that first principle cost information 
that shows how a subcontractor plans to use their internal resources will pass up the 
supply chain. So a contractor may not have a detailed understanding of their 
subcontractors’ costing basis. They also point out that as cost information flows up 
the supply chain many contractors are guarded when it comes to conversations 
about risk and margins. Laryea and Hughes (2010) in research into the actual 
process of how contractors price risk show that even within one organisation 
assumptions about contingencies for risk, overheads and profit may be obscured in 
the allocation of costs across a cost model, as different individuals and teams 
influence pricing levels at different stages of a bid.  
 
Others have shown that as information flows up the supply chain from the 
subcontractor who will do the physical work to the client, information about use of 
resources may also be obscured when the allocation of costs across a formal cost 
model is treated as an opportunity to maximise income or cash flow. Kenley (2003) 
and Cattell (2012) in empirical studies found that many contractors implement tactical 
pricing by using weighting strategies across a cost model to manipulate cashflow in 
their favour. Harris and McCaffer (2013) explore contractors’ pricing strategies and 
identify frontloading as another distortion applied to cost models to maximise positive 
cashflow: moving contingencies, overheads and profit and sometimes labour, 
material and plant costs from later to earlier items in the cost model, for example 
from painting to excavation items or preliminaries. They also identify loading of 
specific rates: moving costs to items where increased quantities are expected in 
variations or claims. Rooke et al. (2004), in an ethnographic study of contractors, 
similarly found a culture of loading specific items that were known to be under-
measured at contract stage in order to claim later when the quantities were re-
measured. In extreme instances illegal practices may be used to distort cost models; 
such as bid shopping, in which the lowest price is disclosed to competitors who are 
invited to beat it (Vee and Skitmore, 2003) or overpricing, also known as cover 
pricing, an extreme instance of which is the illegal practice of collusion (Lowe and 
Skitmore, 2006). These examples show how cost information that is reliably tied to 
resources may be either not created in the first place by the contractor who will 
directly provide the resources, or be lost in the cost model when it is obscured before 
it is passed between one firm and the next. 
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The increase in the extent of subcontracting increases information loss across the 
boundaries between organisations. In a review of subcontracting Hughes et al. 
(1997) explain that main contractors’ general reduction in directly employed 
workforce and general increase in the level of subcontracting has been driven by 
technological, political, social and economic change since the 1970s. In a review of 
the construction industry structure from government statistics, Abdel-Razek and 
McCaffer (1987) suggest that success in obtaining tighter and tighter quotations from 
subcontractors during the recession of the early 1980s is amongst these factors 
contributing to the increase in the extent of subcontracting. Fryer et al. (2004) found 
that subcontractor quotes made up the majority of a main contractor’s costs with 
main contractors typically subcontracting over 80% of their work. Ross and Williams 
(2013) argue that this fundamental change in the industry’s structure means that 
contractors’ skill in negotiating quotations with subcontractors is “a significant 
competitive differential between competing contractors”. However Hughes et al. 
(2006) suggest that the imperfect market, in which main contractors negotiate within 
a limited pool of subcontractors, acts as a limit to the competitive differential between 
main contractors. This, and the work of Ross and Williams (2013), contrasts with 
Greenhalgh’s (2013) assertion that “contractors main competitive advantage lies in 
how they make best use of their internal resources”. It is common for the price basis 
of subcontracts to differ from the price basis of the firm they are contracting with. 
Winch (2010) outlines the price basis of spot contracting, an agreement to carry a 
defined piece of work for a lump sum. Known as sequential spot contracting when 
rates of pay are agreed task by task. The most common form of payment agreement 
under this practice is project-by-project agreement of a lump sum for a specific task. 
The lump sum is paid on completion of the task, not on time spent. Winch (2010) 
points out that this practice is part of the industry’s standard business model. 
 
Ross and Williams (2013) describe how, once a contractor has won a project, the 
site team has the job of post-contract cost control: to build the project within the 
budget they have been given through the contract. They describe how the site team 
will often get new material and subcontractor quotations and compare these to the 
budget. They explain that this opportunistic, but standard, practice of undertaking a 
secondary competitive tendering process with subcontractors and suppliers nearer 
the start on for each trade, often requires subcontractors to give an additional trading 
discount on top of the standard trading discount offered by subcontractors in the first 
competitive process. As new prices are obtained, the site team carries out regular 
reconciliation of costs to completion against the budget allowance in cost value 
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reconciliation. Ross and Hughill (2006), in an empirical study that involved a detailed 
examination of contractors’ post-contract cost reporting processes in practice, found 
that the effectiveness of modelling actual or outturn costs during the post-contract 
stage is reduced due to “entanglement of cost and price data”. They further argue 
that few organisations have formalised systems for collecting and analysing data 
from site to refresh the databases they use in estimating. Al-Hasan et al. (2006), in a 
survey of subcontractors, found that around half of the subcontractors involved did 
not have any historical data collected in their firm about labour and plant productivity 
from observations on site because there was a lack of confidence in structured 
feedback from site, relying instead on judgement and experience. 
 
2.2.3 Alternative price basis in procurement: moves towards financial 
incentives for improvements  
 
Hughes and Kabiri (2013) note that approaches to construction procurement are 
complex and often described in an incomplete way. They developed a procurement 
framework that comprehensively defines the range of procurement options available 
to clients for project delivery. The framework has six dimensions: source of funding, 
selection method, price basis, responsibility for design, responsibility for 
management and responsibility for supply chain integration. They give examples of 
different price bases such as cost-based labour and materials, single price for a 
whole building, lease of a managed facility, or competitive dialogue. Winch (2003) 
notes that despite options in procurement, pricing documents in the form of detailed 
bills of quantities still play a crucial role as a model for presenting a contract price, 
setting the contract budget and establishing stage payments. He notes that projects 
in which a contractor has responsibility for design the contractor presents the 
contract price in a model that is a summary contract sum analysis: a series of lump 
sums of money against defined elements, trades or stages of a project. 
 
In a significant move away from the requirement for project cost models to provide 
only for establishing a price, budgeting and payment, the debate on construction 
improvement has moved to building financial incentives for improvements into the 
price basis of projects. The ability of cost information to account for improvements 
becomes critical under these methods. Target Costing (TC) (Ansari et al., 1997) 
became widespread as a strategic management tool in manufacturing as a method 
for controlling costs to a target. A target cost is set by the client as an alternative to 
controlling costs to a fixed budget in a contract sum. TC has been adapted to 
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construction through Target Value Design (TVD) (Zimina et al., 2012). Zimina et al. 
(2012) explain that TVD requires early contractor involvement in design, and looks 
for efficiency savings by rewarding contractors and key subcontractors with a 
financial gain share. It achieves this by using a cost plus incentive fee method. It 
establishes actual costs through open book accounting (as described in Section 1.2) 
and shares the difference between target cost and actual cost. Amongst the body of 
research into TVD in construction (Ansari et al., 1997; Ballard, 2011) there is a strand 
of empirical research that takes the contractors’ perspective. These empirical studies 
report significant limitations. Nicolini et al. (2000), in a study of two demonstration 
projects that used TVD, conclude that “UK commercial cost management practices 
are a major barrier to rewarding efficiencies through a pain/gain sharing payment 
process as contractors were not able to cost alternative design proposals due to a 
lack of basic knowledge of costs on the construction supply side”. Pennanen et al. 
(2011) looked at TVD in theory and conclude that more transparency of cost 
information is needed to gain commitment, but do not address specifically the 
problem of the nature of the cost information available. Zimina et al., (2012) looked at 
TVD in practice and conclude its application is limited by factors including the cost 
information available for setting a target cost.  
 
A similar, but simpler way to set up financial incentives though a new construction 
delivery model, is the decoupling of profit margins from cost reductions in a lump 
sum contract through Supply Chain Cost Management (Holti et al., 2000). Used in 
conjunction with early contractor involvement in design this facilitates design savings 
by decoupling margin from each measured item in the cost model so that reductions 
costs can be made without eroding contractors margins. This means that contractors 
and key subcontractors are guaranteed a total margin upfront. Ross and Williams 
(2013) argue that this way to reduce costs directly addresses the disincentive in 
standard project delivery models, where cost savings lead to lower turnover hence 
lower margin. However they conclude that lack of transparency in UK costing 
practices is a major barrier to rewarding cost reduction through a payment process 
that protects contractors’ margins.  
 
Where incentive based contracting is used, Saad et al. (2002) note that cost 
reduction tends to come from product design decisions. Examples of savings that 
come from process improvement decisions about the way a project is constructed 
are rare. Authors have also found that change brought about by incentive-based 
contracting has been limited by the continued use of lowest price competitive 
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tendering. Nicolini et al. (2000) report that incentive-based contracting is based on 
lowest price competitive tendering with add-on incentives for collaboration. They 
contend that this means that there is no reallocation of risks and rewards to 
subcontractors in a way that may otherwise motivate them to identify improvements. 
Saad et al. (2002) similarly report the continued use of traditional arms length buyer-
supplier relationships. They contend that this means that there is no change in 
demand-side behaviours that may otherwise motivate change in supply-side 
behaviours towards greater collaboration and mutual benefit.  
 
2.3   Perspectives on construction improvement 
 
2.3.1 The broad debate 
 
This Section takes a broad overview of the sources and definitions of construction 
improvement in literature and its context in the macro-economic environment. The 
literature establishes that construction improvement is geared more towards pull from 
the demand side, the client, than push from the supply side, the contractor and their 
supply chain. From this overview Supply Chain Management (SCM) and lean 
approaches are established as the main focus in literature for improvements by the 
main contractor and their supply chain. Section 2.4 explores these two improvement 
concepts in more detail, their origins and uptake in manufacturing and application 
and uptake in construction. This sets the scene for an exploration of alternative cost 
methods, from management accounting that relates to SCM and lean approaches in 
the following section 2.5. 
 
As set out in the Introduction (Section 1.1) in the UK the construction industry is 
under continuous pressure from government and best practice groups to reduce 
costs as a measure of improvement. Farmer (2016) is the latest in a series of 
reports. Farmer (2016) sees the industry at a “critical juncture” at which deep-seated 
structural problems and poor outcomes on productivity and predictability need to be 
addressed together. Alongside this push from best practice bodies, academics 
Lansley (1987) and Hillebrandt et al. (1995) found that contractors and 
subcontractors themselves are constantly seeking cost reduction strategies in order 
to be more competitive and profitable. Cost reduction is a frequently cited aim for 
improvement through BIM. Both the Cabinet Office (2011) and Business Innovation 
and Skills (BIS) (2014) promote BIM to enable change to meet cost reduction aims. 
Dissatisfaction with the status quo has motivated a broad and long debate on 
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construction improvement.  
The macro-economic environment provides the backdrop to the construction 
improvement debate. Green (2011) critiques a century of political change and 
attempts by successive governments to shape the performance of commerce in 
general through the macro-economic environment. He reports that the big shift in the 
economy was one from a more stable, state-controlled economy post WWII to a 
more cyclical, neo-liberal, free-market economy since the late 1970s. As set out in 
the Introduction (Section 1.1) Hillebrandt (2000) extensively charts the resulting 
market structure in the construction industry. She describes the industry’s boom-and-
bust macro-economic cycles and the resulting fragmented market (many small local 
firms including a separation of design and construction expertise in different firms) 
working in short term project-based relationships, mediated by market-based 
transactions with an overriding adversarial culture. Love et al. (2004) concur that the 
resulting industry structure is fragmented with many small companies responding to 
discrete projects in a cyclical market. 
 
2.3.2 Improvement concerns and their focus on pull from demand-side action 
 
As set out in the Introduction (Section 1.1) in recent decades successive 
government-backed reports have sought to motivate improvement in the construction 
industry. Latham (1994) in ‘Constructing the Team’ advises the construction industry 
to adopt a less adversarial culture by embracing more cooperative and trusting 
relationships, with “partnering” as a solution. Egan (1998) in his report ‘Rethinking 
Construction’ goes further than partnering and advises the construction industry to 
adopt supply chain management and lean construction and sets goals for 
improvement through benchmarking: a set of standard goals across construction 
projects. He also advises the industry to adopt a less short-term focus by forming 
long-term alliances instead of one-off project partnering. Egan’s (2002) report 
‘Accelerating Change’ builds on the preceding reports, specifically suggesting that it 
is possible to achieve better value by integrating clients and suppliers.  
 
Turner (2004) noted that these successive reports advocate mainly client-led action 
to motivate improvement through their expertise in project procurement, also known 
as project delivery, in other words from pull from the demand side of the industry. 
Langford and Murray (2006) argue that contractors take new procurement led 
initiatives on board. But in practice, the macro-economic environment that the 
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construction improvement debate operates in presents barriers to be surmounted in 
fully realising the intended benefits of new procurement led initiatives. Section 2.4 will 
therefore turn to procurement led initiatives in construction improvement and the 
barriers to be surmounted by contractors and subcontractors in implementing these. 
 
BIS (2013) shows that, measured by investment in research and development, the 
evidence of improvement from action by contactors, their subcontractors and 
suppliers, in other words push from the supply-side of the industry, is relatively low 
compared to other industries. BIS (2013) and Pries and Doree (2005) found that the 
main source of research and development funded improvement and innovation in the 
industry from the supply side arises from product innovation driven by the expertise 
of suppliers. They explain that by suppliers they encompass suppliers of materials, 
components, modular units, tools and machinery. They attribute this firstly to the fact 
that suppliers are driven to innovate by the market as these firms are compelled to 
be price-makers in their market. Secondly, to the fact that suppliers have a 
manufacturing-based business model that allows for relatively high upfront 
investment in research and technology and thirdly, to the fact that suppliers are 
heavily influenced by innovations from other industries. Sergeeva and Radosavljevic, 
(2010) found improvement from the expertise of contractors and subcontractors to be 
rising but limited and restricted mainly to incremental process improvement and 
some new technologies. They attribute this to the fact that contractors are not 
compelled to be price-makers in the market as there is little differentiation between 
contractors. In the Introduction (Section 1.1) the credit-based business model of 
contractors was outlined (Boukendour and Hughes, 2014). Boukendour and Hughes, 
(2014) argue that the credit-based business model adopted by contractors does not 
allow for high upfront investment in research and development.  
 
BIS (2013) also identifies that research and development in the sector arises outside 
of formal research and development budgets through investment in more intangible 
activities, such as design and construction expertise and new technologies. Design 
expertise and hence design-led improvement, traditionally sits on the demand side of 
the industry, with the client employing the designers. The industry is criticised for a 
lack of integration between design and construction expertise (Latham, 1994; Egan, 
1998 and Farmer, 2016). In response design expertise can be integrated with 
construction when design expertise moves to the supply side through procurement 
models, such as design and build, that hand over decisions on design to the 
contractors. Alternatively Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) (Mosey, 2009) allows 
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contractors to influence design decisions using their construction expertise. Some 
authors have articulated potential advantages of ECI. Grey (1983) points out that 
design details can be difficult to construct unless the expertise of the contractor is 
taken on board. Langford and Murray (2006) noted that the management expertise of 
contractors and subcontractors is key to decisions about construction method. 
‘Designing for Buildability’ (CIRIA, 1983; Adams, 1989) encompasses design and 
construction, but is led by changes to design. ‘Constructability’ (Griffith and Sidwell, 
1995) also straddles design and construction, going further than Buildability in scope 
by being led by changes to both design and construction methods. 
 
The next section shows that literature suggests that the concepts of supply chain 
management and lean are the two main remedies for improvement in construction. 
The potential of the adoption of these new approaches in BIM to support 
improvements is later discussed in section 2.6 
 
2.4 Perspectives on supply chain improvements 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
From the array of improvement efforts Supply Chain Management (SCM) and lean 
approaches potentially draw directly on the expertise of contractors and 
subcontractors in mobilising resources in site operations to deliver construction 
projects. This section charts the emergence of SCM and lean approaches in 
business and then their adoption in construction.  
 
This Section firstly explores responses to SCM in commerce through a review of 
definitions of SCM and then its uptake in practice. The literature finds that even in the 
manufacturing industry, where uptake is driven to a large extent by the existence of 
long-term relationships, the uptake in practice is reported to be limited in the extent to 
which it is used within firms, and the extent to which it involves the lower tiers of the 
supply chain. Given that promoters of SCM advocate large advantages to be gained, 
the relative scarcity of moves to SCM in manufacturing suggest that there are major 
hurdles to overcome. The shift from traditional buyer / seller relationships through 
competitive tendering is seen as a major hurdle. 
 
The Section then looks at efforts to import ideas of SCM into construction. Use of the 
same term SCM in construction suggests that it is possible to adopt SCM into 
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construction from other sectors without significant adaptations. Hence this Section 
contextualises SCM in construction industry with its short-term, one-off, project–
based relationships, fragmented supply chains, adversarial relationships and lack of 
integration between design and construction expertise. The additional hurdles that 
this context presents to the uptake of SCM in construction are discussed. It is shown 
that the contractors’ business model may reduce the degree of cooperation in 
relationships between companies. The challenge of estimating costs that evidence 
savings is also seen as a potential additional hurdle.  
 
2.4.2 Supply chain management in commerce 
 
The supply chain has been a concern in the commerce, mostly in manufacturing and 
its associated retail sector, for decades. Many authors trace the origins of SCM to the 
textile and grocery industries in the mid 1980s (Lummus and Vokurka, 1999) in 
response to increasing competition and complexity from globalisation. Harland et al. 
(1999) describe the emergence of interest in SCM by commerce. Harland et al. 
(1999) note that interest in SCM originated in logistics, the flow of goods in and out of 
firms, in manufacturing industries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Porter (1985) 
states the key concerns for SCM as integration and competitive advantage. He 
argues that previous cost cutting drives had taken out available cost savings from 
within firms, so further savings must lie in aligning or integrating the boundaries 
between firms. Harland et al. (1999) identify that the field of SCM broadened out from 
the field of logistics into a set of beliefs in which “each firm in the supply chain can 
directly and indirectly affect the performance of all other supply chain members, as 
well as overall supply chain performance”.  
 
Like many popular concepts in commerce, SCM has been defined in numerous 
ways, from a number of perspectives (Lambert et al., 1998). Mentzer et al. (2001) 
conducted a review of SCM literature. They identified more than 100 definitions of 
SCM and conclude that this diversity of definitions creates a difficulty for firms trying 
to make sense of SCM. They found that the supply chain itself is defined in different 
ways. Viewed from the perspective of an end-product, the supply chain is defined as 
encompassing the network of companies who carry out activities associated with the 
complete processing of a product: from raw materials to purchase of the end-product 
(Lambert et al., 1998). Viewed from the perspective of an individual firm an 
organisational supply chain encompasses the network of firms around a focal firm. 
The depth of the supply chain taken in any definition also varies to incorporate one or 
 29 
more of the lower tiers of the supply chain. Based on their overall review, Mentzer et 
al. (2001) give a broad definition of the supply chain as ‘”a set of three or more 
entities (organisations or individuals) directly involved in the upstream or downstream 
flows of products, services, finances and / or information from a source to a 
customer”. Mentzer et al. (2001) also observe that in all definitions of a supply chain 
there is an inherent, but not explicit, assumption that there is one focal firm.  
 
Mentzer et al. (2001) illustrate that the diversity of definitions of what a supply chain 
is, is followed by a greater diversity of definitions of what SCM is. This led Mentzer et 
al. (2001) to view SCM in its broadest sense as “a systems approach to viewing the 
supply chain as a single entity, rather than a set of fragmented parts each performing 
its own function”. From their review of hundreds of definitions of SCM Mentzer et al. 
(2001) identify several types of activities that help to define the scope of SCM. The 
first is integrated behaviour (Bowersox et al., 1996) in which partners flexibly respond 
to the needs of end customers. The second is mutual sharing of information (Cooper 
et al., 1997; Ellram and Copper, 1990) in which firms share tactical information, 
primarily on marketing strategy and sales forecasts, to reduce uncertainty between 
firms. The third is mutual sharing of risks and rewards (Cooper and Ellram, 1993) to 
achieve competitive advantage over the long term. The fourth is cooperation through 
joint product development, planning, control and evaluation. The fifth is sharing the 
same goal and the same focus on serving the end customer (LaLonde and James, 
1994) in a form of policy intervention. The sixth is integration of processes (Stevens, 
1989), which covers sourcing, manufacturing and distribution. The seventh is forming 
partnerships and alliances (Cooper et al., 1997) in which firms build and maintain 
long-term relationships. 
 
Many practices have sprung up to address one or more of these activities. The three 
main areas are agile practices in distribution (Christopher, 2000), lean practices in 
production (Womack et al., 1991; Ohno, 1998) and Strategic Procurement in 
sourcing and managing subcontractors and suppliers (Porter, 1985). There is also a 
philosophical branch of SCM thinking that looks at the prerequisites for better 
relationships between firms, such as trust, good communications, cooperation and 
collaboration. Mentzer et al. (2001) point out that implicit in all definitions of SCM is 
the fact that supply chains exist, whether or not they are managed. Most often the 
term SCM is used in commerce to promote change and concerns what should 
happen to result in improvement. However, sometimes the term SCM is used as 
purely descriptive term. Mentzer et al. (2001) contend that this confusion, on top of 
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the plethora of definitions, adds to the difficulty for firms seeking to make sense of 
SCM. 
Of the main practices under the banner of SCM in commerce, lean (Womack et al., 
1991) emphases the elimination of waste across the value stream: from design 
through manufacturing to sale. Like SCM, the theoretical scope of lean production 
(Womack et al., 1991) ranges from a single firm (across functional departments, such 
as sales and marketing, design, operations, logistics and administration) to activities 
between firms (such as e-commerce and sharing of information on anticipated 
demand). Womack et al., (1991) explain that lean is synonymous with business 
process reengineering in its focus on eliminating waste and improving efficiency 
through continuous process improvement. Lean will be outlined from literature in 
more detail in relation to lean construction in Section 2.4.3 below. In commerce 
Green and May (2005) critique the diffusion of lean practices in UK car 
manufacturing as ranging from change through unique innovation, lean as a catalyst 
for change in current practices and lean as an add on to existing practices.  
 
Mentzer et al. (2001) contend that the difficulty in making sense of SCM may 
contribute to the limited uptake of SCM in commerce. Emberson and Storey (2006) 
carried out a three-year study of six international supply chains of blue-chip 
corporations across manufacturing and retail. They find that SCM is at best, still 
emerging in terms of both theory and practice. They find SCM was applied in pockets 
of practice with some direct suppliers, rather than across the whole firm and reaching 
into the lower tiers of the supply chain. They observe that this piecemeal adoption 
makes SCM practices vulnerable to being abandoned. They challenge the thinking 
about the maturity of SCM in manufacturing. Emberson and Storey (2006) found that 
maintaining the status quo in traditional buyer and supplier relationships was a 
significant limiting factor to SCM adoption. They found that “didactic buyer-supplier 
relationships remained the mainstay of supply interactions”. This contrasts with 
Christopher’s (2000) description of SCM in business as involving significant change 
from traditional, arms length, adversarial, buyer and supplier relationships. 
 
2.4.3 Importing supply chain management into construction 
 
As explored in Section 2.3.2, a key concern for construction improvement is 
integration between firms in a supply chain and as explored in section 2.4.1 a key 
barrier to this is the fragmented industry structure. One branch of SCM is concerned 
with a fundamental switch from distant, one-off relationships to closer, longer-term 
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relationships in order to initiate greater cooperation and bring mutual benefits for 
continuous improvement through organisational learning (Tennant and Fernie, 2013; 
Bresnen, 2009; Cox and Ireland, 2002). However literature finds that the formation of 
long-term relationships in construction is very limited in practice. Strategic, long-term 
partnerships and alliances are few. Some long-term alliances have been formed in 
small parts of the industry such are materials suppliers (Agapiou et al., 1998) but 
efforts towards long-term relationships through strategic partnering are limited. 
Eccles (1981) viewed SCM from the perspective of the long-term relationships that a 
main contractor has with its network of subcontractors. He called this the quasi-firm. 
He described the contractor as the integrator for SCM across the quasi firm. Fernie 
(2005) finds that some contractor-led efforts towards long-term relationships with 
their network of subcontractors through ‘organisational SCM’ have been made, such 
as information sharing on pipeline and e-tendering.  
 
Despite some small moves towards long-term relationships, overall, the construction 
industry remains fragmented. In this context the most common focus of SCM 
attention has been efforts towards integrated behaviour in discrete projects (Love et 
al., 2004). King and Pitt (2009) note that client-led efforts towards integrated 
behaviour in Project SCM are the most common form of SCM and driven by 
procurement. Hughes and Kabiri (2013) point out that construction procurement is 
complex and there is a wide range of options available to procurers. Amongst the 
options Love et al. (2004) advocate early contractor involvement in the design stage 
of a project through procurement options such as Design and Build, Management 
Contracting and Design, Build and Operate. Cox and Thompson (1997) pick a 
different procurement option and advocate procurement for collaborative buyer / 
supplier relationships. They describe this as a move from contractual to relational 
contracting, such as, partnering: which seeks to foster better relationships in projects. 
Nicolini et al. (2000) advocate collaborative supplier / buyer relationships as a 
motivating tool in Building Down Barriers, an example of efforts to extend better 
integration between firms throughout the design, build and operate stages of a 
project using single point of responsibly procurement. Hughes and Kabiri (2013) 
similarly advocate incentive procurement, mutual sharing of risks and rewards in 
which savings are shared between client and contractor which incentivises the 
contractor to seek cost reductions.  
 
Gosling and Naim (2009) and Gosling et al., (2015), looking at the application of 
supply chain thinking in construction, define construction as an Engineer-to-Order 
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(ETO) supply chain alongside other project based manufacturing sectors such as 
shipbuilding and aerospace. They describe ETO supply chains as supply chains that 
encompass a diverse range of companies who come together to deliver a one-off, 
complex product, or project. They contrast very customised ETO supply chains with 
very repetitive Make-to-Stock (MTS) supply chains. They emphasise the importance 
of the decoupling point (Hoekstra and Romme, 1992) in supply chains and describe 
how, in ETO supply chains, the decoupling point is located at the end of design 
stage. They argue that this separates the design and production activities and 
procurement options tend to be driven by this separation. Williamson (1985) taking 
an economic view of supply chains in general calls this point the fundamental 
transformation, the distinction between pre-contract and post-contract relations. 
Winch (2010) applying this economic view in construction concurs. He sees this as 
non-trivial, as capital sunk into a project by a client cannot be easily switched from 
this point. As do Flyvbjerg et al. (2002). 
 
Contractor-led efforts towards integrated behaviour in SCM in projects focus on 
greater involvement of subcontractors and suppliers in the construction stage of 
projects. In this respect, O’Brien et al. (1995) consider the logistics of materials 
management from the materials supplier off-site to where the materials are needed 
on site. Other authors have charted contractor-led efforts in SCM. Cox and 
Townsend (1998) advocated increased use of standardised materials and 
components. Vrijhoef and Koskela, (2000) advocate increased use of off-site 
manufacturing, the transferring of on-site activities off-site. Authors such as Koskela, 
(1992) and Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000) consider planning activities in the production 
stage of construction. This is a key aspect of lean construction. 
 
Lean construction (Koskela et al., 2002) emphasises better control of the site 
operation processes of a construction project through a focus on elimination of 
waste, efficiency and quality. Koskela et al. (2002) sees lean construction as inspired 
by lean practices in the production stage in manufacturing, but responsive to the 
specific context of construction. For example Koskela (2004) takes Toyota’s seven 
categories of waste in production and adds an eighth category of waste of making 
do, namely starting or continuing a task when not all inputs are present. This 
additional category recognises the greater uncertainties in a construction on site 
compared to a manufacturing. Ballard and Howell (1994) work on last planner as a 
collaborative planning practice that anticipates the challenge of making do and tries 
to eliminate it by ensuring that tasks only start when preceding tasks are fully 
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complete. However Winch (2006) points to the fact that work will come to a stop if full 
completion is not available. Green (2011) points out that last planner is further 
compromised by the fact that construction planning tends to be dictated by 
subcontract packaging rather than the immediate needs of the day-to-day activities of 
construction.  
 
Fellows (2009) questions the fit of construction industry culture to the diversity of 
improvement efforts that operate under name of SCM and lean construction. He 
notes that Latham (1994) identified a real concern in relation to advocating cultural 
change and Egan (1998) identified a real concern in advocating process change. 
Pryke (2009) notes that in practice, change in both directions has been limited to 
very large, high volume, more progressive clients. Bresnen (2009) and Saad et al. 
(2002) find that contractor-led supply SCM efforts do not extend beyond first tier 
subcontractors and suppliers. Dubois and Gadde (2002) and Hartmann and 
Caerteling (2010) perhaps get to the heart of the matter when they note that 
contactor led, competitive pricing remains the prevailing means of subcontractor 
selection. 
 
Winch (2003) comments on the differing contexts of manufacturing and construction 
and the effects this has on efforts of SCM and lean construction. He notes that SCM 
and lean theory and practice are advocated in construction, despite the fact that 
manufacturing and construction are quite different. Pryke (2009) argues that in 
manufacturing the existence of long term supply relationships and the relatively 
intense management of these relationships has been central to the emergence and 
practice of SCM. He observes that in contrast, in construction the fragmentation of 
the industry has been seen as a key driver for the growth of SCM as a form of 
practice. This is because increased fragmentation offers considerable scope for 
applying theories of SCM in construction. Green (2011) argues that SCM has grown 
in practice in construction because it legitimises the reliance on subcontractors and 
acts as a sense making mechanism. King and Pitt (2009) disagree. Pryke (2004) 
contends that there must be an implication that by using SCM you are doing 
something more complex than managing a group of subcontractors and suppliers 
and requires communication with organisations that are not directly joined by 
contractual conditions. 
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2.5   Theories and methods of costing in commerce 
 
2.5.1 Developments in management accounting  
 
Management accounting first emerged in commerce in the industrial revolution and 
its theories and methods remained much unchanged throughout the first seven 
decades of the 20th century (Van Der Merwe, 2007a). Van Der Merwe (2007a) 
describes commerce (whether for profit of not) as dealing with “the flow of goods and 
services, acquired for and consumed in a conversion process to produce outputs 
(goods and services) in the market place”. Van Der Merwe (2007b) describes the 
tradition of management accounting within commerce as centred on value (money) 
saying, “Money is the meta-language of quantitive economic activity and expresses 
the quantitive flow of goods and services”. Ahrens and Chapman (2007) identify the 
role of management accounting within commerce when they say that management 
accounting “can generally be considered as set of methods that link accounting and 
organisational objectives.” Van Der Merwe (2007b) similarly identifies this link, saying 
that in commerce, managers are asked to “influence the flow of goods and services 
to achieve organisational objectives in an optimal way”. He says that the primary 
principle of management accounting is therefore causality. Management accounting 
aims to provide a “definite relationship to the cost of production”, rather than an 
“arbitrary and artificial” relationship. 
 
Johnson and Kaplan (1987) in their seminal work in the field of management 
accounting drew attention to limitations of conventional management accounting in 
achieving this this aim of quantity-based causal relationship and the need for change. 
They argued that management accounting had become uninterested in direct 
measures of activities in the firm, relying instead on what they call surrogate financial 
numbers (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998), which distances a cost model from the thing 
being modelled, and reduces the value of a cost model as a tool to better manage a 
business. At this time increasing competitive pressures and complexity from 
globalisation triggered a period of rapid growth in theories and methods in 
management accounting. 
 
This Section firstly explores standard methods of costing and then explores the new 
methods of costing and cost management that have arise since the mid 1980s to 
provide new cost perspectives. Section 2.5.2 describes the conventional, cost 
estimating methods that are used in management accounting to model the 
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consumption of resources, establish estimated costs and a budget against which to 
control costs (Kaplan et al., 1989). This will be seen to be similar to the processes 
used in construction project costing set out in the earlier section 2.2.1. The next 
section, 2.5.3, explores new directions in cost management that have emerged since 
the mid 1980s, responding to concerns of motivating and evaluating improvements 
across both design and manufacturing processes in commerce. This includes 
perspectives on cost management between firms that inform cost management in 
supply chains. In each of these sections, the purposes of these cost perspectives, 
the sources of the cost information they draw on and their limitations on are set out 
through literature. Their adoption into construction is also set out through literature. 
 
2.5.2 Modelling consumption relationships and decision support 
 
Kaplan et al. (1989) explain that businesses predominantly use standard costing 
(also known as full-cost pricing, cost-plus pricing or absorption costing) to establish 
the costs of products and add a profit to establish a price in the market. They explain 
that a traditional, volume-based estimate is created to develop a full product cost by 
combining (a) costs that can be directly traced to the product such as labour and 
materials (allocated on volume-based resource cost allocation rates) (b) contributions 
to factory overheads (costs such as labour, materials and machine time that are 
indirectly allocated to a product based on volume of the product) (c) contributions to 
general overheads (also called company costs that are indirectly allocated to 
products based on volume). Added to this cost is a target profit percentage. They 
argue that by using standard costing, the pricing calculations become straightforward 
and senior manager input is only required to except to adjust the profit margin. They 
note that cost-plus pricing places a firm at a disadvantage when competitors with 
excess capacity try to win business by excluding overheads. They also note that 
conversely, if demand is unexpectedly high and a constant mark up rule is applied, a 
firm would not maximise profits. Kaplan et al. (1989) conclude that standard costing 
has remained common practice because it is simple and easy to use. Most firms face 
thousands of pricing decisions, so it is impractical to analyse changing demand and 
costs for all products. Standard costing simplifies the many pricing decisions that the 
firm would otherwise have to make. Standard costing also provides stability to pricing 
decisions. They conclude that standard costing establishes reference points, which 
are then adjusted to reflect market conditions. They point out the limitations of these 
reference points for measuring improvements, as the reference points provide data 
on estimates of standard productivity rates for labour and plant and standard 
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allowances for waste of materials. The fixed productivity rates and budgets do not 
incentivise improvement. Van Der Merwe (2007c) notes that standard costing is 
highly structured, depends on its underlying principles of historic causality and 
standard rates, and lacks the ability to help managers with decision-making about 
improvement opportunities. In construction there have been recent efforts to increase 
the accuracy of some elements of standard costing. Peleskei et al. (2015) pursue 
probabilistic work to more accurately cost risk contingencies. Smith et al. (2000) 
explore stochastic calculations for the performance of excavators in earthworks. 
 
Activity Based Costing (ABC) was developed by Kaplan and Cooper (1998), through 
a concern to more accurately allocate general overhead costs to individual products. 
They noted that the treatment of general overheads is limited in standard costing, 
where contribution to fixed costs (which could be factory overheads or company 
overheads) is calculated by annual total and allocated by volume to different 
products. IMA (2006) argue that this method of allocating overheads to products 
works well at an aggregate level of the firm, because an aggregate level is not 
sensitive to the different demands that different products make on the overheads. But 
they argue that this does not work well at a disaggregated level of individual 
products. Turney (1992) says that this became to be seen as a major disadvantage 
under the competitive pressures from globalisation in the 1980s. So to improve 
pricing decisions about the contribution that different products should make to the 
fixed costs of overheads, more detailed measures were developed to examine what 
causes overhead costs to arise. They identify the main cost drivers for a firm’s 
overheads as transactions not volume. Kaplan and Cooper (1998) argue that this led 
to the measurement of previously unmeasured activities within a firm, such as 
number of set ups, inspections, or payments. They describe how these transaction 
costs (see page 40) can be allocated to individual products. Thus, ABC describes a 
costing method that traces transaction processes to activities and then to products, in 
order to provide greater detail for costing of overheads. This top down disaggregation 
has rules to establish when to stop so further disaggregation only occurs if there is a 
significant difference in costs. Maskell and Kennedy (2007) argue that ABC provides 
information of value only in mass-production and is not useful in customised-
production. Van Der Merwe (2007c) notes that ABC is highly structured, depends on 
the underlying principles of historic causality and standard rates, and, like standard 
costing, lacks the ability to help managers with decision-making about improvement 
opportunities. 
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Tsai (1998) presents an exception to this, giving an example of using ABC to help 
managers decide about the overhead costs of a firm’s quality management process. 
He presents an example of using ABC to measure the costs of quality, in which the 
identification of current costs leads to the re-planning of activities and cost reduction. 
The problem that is addressed is the reduction of prevention, appraisal and failure 
activities: the activities associated with a firm’s quality management process. Tsai 
(1998) bases his model on historical costs and comments that the sources of cost 
information are various. He reports that “some quality costs are readily available 
from a cost accounting system (e.g. scrap and rework costs); some can be derived 
from the data of activity reports (e.g. repair and inspection costs). Nevertheless, a 
large portion of quality costs need to be estimated in some way.” He argues that for 
example, the opportunity costs of lost customer goodwill and lost sales, cannot be 
directly measured but proxies can be used. He argues that there are other examples 
of costs, such as the costs of producing excess inventories or double handling 
materials, which are indirect failure costs and can be estimated by expertise. He 
notes that calculation of costs needs to include estimates of apportionment of time of 
people who do not usually record how they spend their time between different 
activities. He asserts that once all the activity costs of quality have been identified, 
Total Quality Management (a management concern of continuous improvement) or 
Business Process Reengineering (a management concern with big one off changes) 
can be used to reduce these costs.  
 
In construction, O’Brien and Fischer (2000) carried out a practice-based case study 
research in a construction firm and applied ABC to calculate the overhead costs that 
they call the cost of capacity and which they define as the fixed overheads that a 
construction firm carries that have to be shared between projects. Staub-French et 
al. (2003) carried out a practice-based case study in a cost consultant firm. They 
used ABC to account more explicitly for the cost of design features in construction 
projects based on the preferences estimators had for when to adjust standard costs. 
They expanded the range of product features that were identified from the design 
model and traced costs to these new measured features. This aimed to help 
estimators customise early stage construction cost information based on design 
features. They developed a feature ontology based on estimator’s preference. 
Lawrence et al. (2014) subsequently developed this ontology in BIM as will be seen 
in Section 2.6.2.  
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Lean Accounting (LA) (Womack and Jones, 1996) is described by Maskell and 
Kennedy (2007). They note that whilst ABC focuses on more accurately forecasting 
overhead costs to individual products, LA has emerged to help managers to track 
decisions about continuous improvements that are identified through lean thinking. 
They note that LA emerged in the mid to late 1990s alongside lean manufacturing 
and lean thinking to provide a measure of the financial impact of improvements that 
are important in lean thinking, such as just-in-time deliveries. They argue that LA 
provides information that is useful for customised-production. Cunningham et al. 
(2003) explain that LA considers the activities of value stream, as defined in Section 
2.4.2 encompassing design, manufacturing and sales. The focus is on the cost of 
materials. Labour and machine costs are considered as fixed and unavoidable (on 
the basis that machines are fixed and labour can be deployed elsewhere). There is 
little or no allocation of overheads. Material costs therefore lead decision making. 
Costs are typically collected weekly. Materials costs are presented alongside other 
financial information on other variable costs, fixed costs, revenue, profit and return on 
sales, and alongside non-financial information such as just-in-time deliveries, days of 
inventory, process quality and productivity. Maskell and Baggaley (2006) contend 
that LA brings together a dashboard of real numbers and presents them in a 
simplified model. This information is used for decisions about (a) weekly performance 
(b) the impact of lean improvements through current state and future (after lean 
improvement) state and (c) the impact of capital make or buy decisions. LA thus 
tracks actual costs of materials, and sometimes a few variable overheads and 
compares these with actual revenues, providing managers with weekly financial 
information on the actual revenue, cost, profit and return on sales. Maskell and 
Baggaley (2006) argue that in contrast to standard accounting LA facilitates an 
analysis of capacity. They argue that as lean improvements eliminate waste they 
create available capacity in the form of machine time, people’s time and physical 
space. The financial impact on a firm’s bottom line comes from decisions about how 
to use this new capacity. However Maskell and Baggaley (2006) argue that lean’s 
preference for standardisation runs counter to customer demand for customisation. 
Van Der Merwe (2007c) notes that LA has a simpler structure than standard costing 
or ABC, but shifts the focus away from causality to flow, away from a labour, 
materials and machinery to materials, and a narrower focus on value stream 
activities as the cost consideration for management decisions.  
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Throughput Accounting (TA) and Constraints Accounting (CA) are described by IMA 
(1999) as the costing methods associated with the Theory of Constraints (TOC) 
(Goldratt, 1990). They describe the TOC as concerned with managing constraints 
that stop the flow of products through the supply chain in machine-paced 
environments, where the dominant costs in the system are fixed. They point out that 
reducing the full product costs that are produced by standard costing is not the goal 
of TOC, so new models of TA and CA are associated with TOC. They describe how 
each use real numbers on sales, material costs, subcontracting costs, direct labour 
and overheads to consider the role of constraints. TA provides an understanding of 
throughput, inventory and operating expenses for decision-making about alternatives 
at the level of the firm. They describe CA as a stage beyond TA, when there is a 
need to measure physical constraints to operations and whether operational 
decisions will result in better use of the worst constrained resources. IMA (1999) 
argue that, similarly to lean, TOC places short-term emphasis on eliminating waste in 
processes through a planning process, not on reducing costs through a costing 
method. They argue that as improvements result in better use of the worst 
constrained resources this will increase total sales and speed up delivery. The 
financial impact on the firm’s net profit, return on investment and cashflow comes 
from decisions about how to improve throughput. Van Der Merwe (2007a) notes that 
TOC is a further simplification on LA, relying more on observable information than 
historical standard performance, therefore having less structure. He argues that this 
reduces the focus of the range of decisions it is concerned with, as throughput is the 
only consideration for management decisions.  
 
Two new pricing bases for controlling costs to a target have emerged in management 
accounting. Value Engineering (VE) (Miles, 1961) and Target Costing (TC) (Ansari et 
al. 1997) are methods that seek to pinpoint cost reductions, largely from product 
design changes (Surowiec, 2103). VE (Miles, 1961) is a process of assigning 
predicted costs to functional properties of a product. It is thus a means of linking 
functional design to cost. Kaplan et al. (1989) note that in VE, value is largely 
associated with minimum acceptable function to the consumer and reduced cost. 
They note that VE is usually used on a completed design when cost reduction is 
needed, but comes into its own when it is used during design. VE underpins TC 
(Ansari et al. 1997). TC is a system of cost control, which uses information on 
functional properties of a design to force cost reductions. Evidencing potential costs 
savings in VE or TC centres on changes in design through using alternative materials 
and components or reducing volume. Kaizen Costing (KC) (Kato, 1993) follows on 
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from TC. TC is applied during the design stage and KC is a system of cost control to 
force cost reductions during the production phase. KC and lean thinking take “shop-
floor” modelling as their source of information for decision-making and focus on the 
seven lean wastes.  
 
2.5.3 Modelling inter-firm consumption relationships and decision support 
 
New methods of cost forecasting and control have been described in Section 2.5.2 
above. These methods can be applied both within a firm (intra-firm) and between 
firms (inter-firm). Surowiec (2013) describes the concept of Inter-Organisational Cost 
Management (IOCM) as an “extension of intra-organisational efforts to manage 
costs”. He notes that bargaining over price and quantity is the usual method of cost 
management between firms, but there are examples where new cost information is 
shared to enable different interactions in the supply chain beyond bargaining over 
price and quantity.  
 
Barney et al. (1996) report that neoclassical economics largely ignored inter-firm 
costs until Williamson (1975) produced a theoretical model of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). They explain how TCE views firms and markets as alternative 
governance structures that differ in their transaction costs. TCE seeks to compensate 
for flaws in the market-oriented view of perfect competition by focusing on how 
organisations can avoid dependence and deal with opportunism. Williamson (1989) 
explains that TCE is concerned with the economics of trust. He assumes that two 
parties in a transaction start from a position of low trust, assuming that the other 
party will gain something at their expense. Each party introduces controls using 
offensive and defensive strategies in self-interest and costs escalate as a result of 
this. Williamson (1989) therefore contends that major cost reduction opportunities 
exist in transactions. In this context transaction costs are the costs particular 
decisions about the governance arrangements of make or buy. Looking at the level 
of supply chain structures, Williamson’s (1989) theory suggests that transactions 
costs include both the direct costs of managing relationships and the possible 
opportunity costs of alternative decisions. Rindfleish and Heide (1997) show that 
TCE is based largely on qualitative assessment of the degree to which alternative 
governance arrangements meet a range of behavioural and market measures. TCE 
has also been criticised for focusing on the solutions of either make or buy, ignoring 
the possibility of intermediate solutions based on relational contracts (Ghoshul and 
Moran, 1996). However Surowiec (2013) and Mouritsen et al. (2001) conclude TCE 
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did throw a spotlight on the major objective of SCM, which is to increase efficiency 
across organisations in the supply chain. This Section next sets out the theories 
inter-firm cost management that grew up alongside operational efforts in SCM. 
 
Kajuter (2002) charts the development of concepts of inter-firm cost management 
starting with Porter (1980) who introduced the concept of Strategic Cost 
Management, the use of cost data to identify strategies that will provide competitive 
advantage, and its three strategic ideas of (a) the value chain in which cost 
management efforts should extend across organisational boundaries (b) strategic 
positioning in which cost management efforts should focus on competitive strategy, 
be that cost or quality leadership (c) cost drivers in which cost management efforts 
should focus on drivers that create cost advantage such as scale and links across 
organisations. Kajuter (2002) reports that Porter (1980) had identified some 
important aspects of managing costs in the supply chain, but argues that Porter’s 
(1980) key ideas remained separate. Kajuter (2002) identifies that Cooper and 
Yoshikawa’s (1994) work subsequently introduced a slightly more structured concept 
of managing costs in the supply of Inter-Organisation Cost Management (IOCM). 
Cooper and Yoshikawa (1994) say that opportunities for cost reduction lie firstly in 
the relationships between firms, secondly in collaborative product development and 
thirdly during manufacturing. Kajuter (2002) then identifies Seuring’s (2002) concept 
of Supply Chain Costing as work that built on the relationship and product 
development ideas of IOCM and introduced the idea of transaction costs. Seuring’s 
(2002) concept considers direct costs (labour and materials); activity based costs 
(overhead labour, materials and machine time) and adds transaction costs (overhead 
labour time that results from relationships with other firms) and the trade-offs 
between these three cost categories, i.e. transaction costs may increase to improve 
coordination but there may be a decrease in direct and activity costs. Kajuter (2002) 
notes that this framework is limited because the conceptual design of an accounting 
model for transaction costs is largely unsolved, as described in the earlier in this 
Section. Kajuter (2002) concludes that there is a considerable gap between the 
theoretical work to provide a comprehensive, multi-perspective concept of supply 
chain costing and the practical application of cost management in supply chains.  
 
Alongside the theories of TCE and SCM, the application of ABC, LA, VE and TC 
(covered in this Section above) have all been expanded to encompass inter-firm 
costs, costs that arise from transactions between firms.  
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Kajuter (2002) reports that TC is suitable for inter-firm cost management because it 
passes cost reduction pressures throughout the supply chain by linking the target 
cost systems of firms. Seal et al. (2004) note that target costing is portrayed as 
enabling firms to maintain control over subcontracted activities. Lamming (1993) 
notes that even a forced TC regime may offer mutually beneficial collaboration 
between firms that forced cost reductions outside of TC do not. Kajuter (2002) 
reports that, when TC involves more than one firm, it is often used with open book 
accounting (as described in Section 1.2). Some authors have identified shortcomings 
in the cost information available in open book accounting. Seal et al. (2004) says that 
commercial information may be used to squeeze subcontractors by threatening them 
with walking away and going to a competitor. Seal et al. (2004) argue that the 
temptation in supply chain relations is always to go elsewhere. Through a case study 
they found that whilst TC may be used to build collaboration across the supply chain, 
there is an inherent tension between sharing commercial information and competitive 
tendering. They therefore concluded that the impact of extra information is 
ambiguous as it can lead to more “shopping around” rather than closer relations. 
Kearney (1995) observed that open book accounting may be hampered by the 
internal cost information created. 
 
Dekker (2003) reports on the application of LA that has been applied to the supply 
chain in Value Chain Analysis. Here lean’s focus on the value stream is expanded to 
the value chain to consider the activities and costs between firms. 
 
LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) identify the application of other techniques, including 
ABC, to inter-firm cost management. They explain how Kurt Salmon Associates’ 
(1993) Direct Product Profitability (DPP) method, that considers the logistics of 
moving items between supply chain firms, contributes to inter-firm accounting. They 
describe how DPP responds to management interest in the profit implications of 
different handling and storage decisions for different products. To analyse this DPP 
identifies previously unmeasured activities within the firm that are influenced by other 
firms, such as handling, freight, discounts, allowances, storage and direct labour 
costs. LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) note that DPP does not consider the fixed costs 
of overheads. LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) therefore identify Kaplan and Cooper’s 
(1998) ABC method of assigning accurate costs to products, to pick up these fixed 
overhead costs. The application of ABC within firms was described in Section 2.5.2. 
LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) identify Carr and Christopher’s (1992) Total Cost of 
Ownership method that looks at the total costs between two linked firms in a supply 
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chain as a method that draws on how the performance of one firm affects costs in 
another firm in the supply chain. This draws on previously unmeasured activity costs 
such as number of product returns, under-shipments, non-conformance or late 
shipment, in other words tracking the hidden, indirect costs of transactions. Finally 
LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) identify Weeks and Crawford’s (1994) Efficient 
Customer Response (ECR) method that focuses on management concerns of 
reducing whole supply chain costs through a better transfer of information, 
automating administration processes and coordinating replenishment cycles. Here 
methods of communication are strengthened, but in terms of cost information, ECR is 
not a new costing model and the norm of competitive competition is maintained. Cost 
savings occur from reduced administration from automating ordering, labour saving 
from docking inventory, and more efficient use of space. LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) 
argue that firms may be unwilling to share their cost information or may not have the 
capability to trace resource costs to specific activities. 
 
The impact of these new methods of costing in commerce has been challenged. The 
application, both within firms and between firms, of standard costing, ABC, LA and 
TOC have been considered by Van Der Merwe (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), who 
questions the impact of these new theories and tools in management accounting 
since the mid 1980s. He reports that managers largely view management accounting 
information as important but distorted and that advocates of individual tools do not 
readily recognise the shortcomings of their particular approach. He identifies a 
disparity in the focus between the different tools of standard costing, ABC, LA and 
TOC and sets out an evaluation framework for describing current tools and providing 
fundamental principles to consider in the development of new approaches. 
 
Dean (1993), working in project cost estimation and control in the aerospace and 
space industry, takes a similar position concluding that project cost information has 
little relationship to the work carried out. Dean (1993), asked the question ‘why does 
it cost how much?’. He draws attention to problems in cost management when he 
describes the ‘accounting ‘noise’ (Dean, 1996) that is inherent in even the most 
detailed cost models. He identifies a number of variables that obscure estimated 
costs from a good model of work carried out, such as the cost basis of a firm’s 
resources, the buyer a firm will buy from, the existence of trading discounts, the 
personal skills of negotiation, inflation and market conditions and risk evaluation. 
Dean (1993) identifies that costs are estimated from a combination of calculation 
(which he calls “data”), standard historical rates (which he uses as a surrogate for 
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current rates and calls “analogy”) and judgement (which he calls “expert opinion”). 
This sets a budget and costs are managed against this budget. He advocates that 
management accounting needs a range of different perspectives on cost in order to 
analyse a number of previously unmeasured costs that address specific 
management concerns.  
 
2.6 Building Information Modelling (BIM) and cost modelling in BIM 
 
2.6.1 Developments in BIM 
 
This section moves on to the arrival of Building Information Modelling (BIM) in the 
construction industry. Amongst the digital disrupters outlined in the Introduction 
(Section 1.1), BIM is promoted as a set of technological and organisational solutions 
that will bring greater efficiencies and solve the collaboration problems inherent in the 
construction industry. This review focuses on literature that shows how BIM models 
construction projects and deals with approaches to construction improvement and 
costs. It focuses on the opportunity for BIM to handle a greater volume of information 
more meaningfully.  
 
Eastman et al. (2011) and Succar (2009) in describing the characteristics of BIM, 
outline that BIM technologies can handle information about the design of a final 
building and the process of its construction by providing a virtual prototype of a final 
building and its construction process. They describe how BIM is characterised as 
intelligent modelling that uses parametric components: components that know what 
they are and how they relate to other components. BIM is also characterised as 
integrated modelling: information from different firms in a central hub. Integration 
requires interoperability of information: the ability for the information produced by 
different firms to come together. 
 
BIS (2011) describe the ambitions of the UK government for a progressive adoption 
of BIM in the UK through four levels of maturity. The starting point, level 0, is taken to 
be two dimensional (2D) design modelling with no intelligent characteristics and no 
integration of information between firms. They describe level 1 BIM as 3D design 
modelling using intelligent modelling techniques, but with no requirement for 
integration of design information between different firms. Level 2 BIM is described as 
3D modelling using intelligent modelling techniques, with federated integration of 
information: different firms modelling their element of the design in their own models, 
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which are subsequently assembled into one federated model. Information in the 
federated model may include construction sequencing (4D) and cost (5D) 
information. The UK government requires all central government projects to be 
delivered to level 2. This requirement has been in place since 2016. BIS (2011) 
describe two further levels of maturity of BIM. They describe Level 3 BIM as a single, 
online, consolidated model that includes information on from different design (3D), 
construction sequencing (4D), cost (5D), and project lifecycle (6D) models. Finally 
they describe level 4 BIM as the addition of multiple decision support tools (nD), 
which introduces information about stakeholders’ preferences, such as 
environmental standards, to support decision analysis. 
 
BIM is advancing in terms of design visualisation and simulation. There is much 
promotional rhetoric from government and software vendors. However uptake of BIM 
to date is slow. Howell and Batcheler (2005) saw the effectiveness of BIM increasing 
as interoperability between the different elements increases. Four years later Succar 
(2009) note that the addition of 4D (construction scheduling) and 5D (costs) within 
level 2 was at an early stage of adoption by the industry. Four years after that Eadie 
et al. (2013) note that BIM is most often used in the early stages of projects. In 2014 
Azouz et al. (2014) challenged the continued promotional rhetoric of a BIM Utopia. 
Miettinen and Paavola (2014) argue that BIM is an emerging set of technologies and 
collaborative practices with a generalised promise of integration with no well-defined 
end. They argue that there is therefore a need for a realistic view of the complexity of 
the conditions that the new technologies are implemented in. They argue that to do 
this BIM development needs to be an expansive process with new solutions. 
 
In the contractors’ supply chain, Dossick and Neff (2009) studying mechanical and 
electrical services subcontractors found that the 3D geometry of BIM linked the 
subcontractors’ design to other project participants’ design more tightly 
technologically. But the mechanical and electrical services subcontractors remained 
organisationally divided from other project participants and crucial information and 
decisions were not shared in a timely way. Thus BIM delivered as a technology but 
not as a process. They argue that the introduction of BIM technologies alone is not 
sufficient for increased collaboration and whether a project uses BIM or not: 
organisational and cultural divisions between designers, contractors and 
subcontractors may stop collaborative working. Taylor (2009) argues that different 
and more universally agreed solutions to design problems are generated when BIM 
models enable conversations between designers and contractors. BIM is presented 
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as an opportunity to change work practices, but Hartmann et al. (2012) disagree and 
argue that BIM should be developed to fit existing work practices. An alternative 
approach to either is presented in information theory in which IT is used to informate 
(Zuboff, 1988) work practices, that is to acquire and create new knowledge in a 
process of continuous feedback from interaction between the technology and its 
users. 
 
In rhetoric better information on construction sequencing is promoted as an end point 
for developments in 4D BIM. Eastman et al. (2011) and Succar (2009) find that 
software that links construction scheduling to the design model, such as Primavera 
and Synchro, makes a significant step towards this by linking activities, time and 
space to show visualisations of the construction process. They describe how 
parametric objects of temporary works are added to the design model and the 
sequencing model to provide visualisation, or walk through, of the sequential stages 
of construction on site.  
 
2.6.2 Cost modelling in BIM 
 
Better information on costs is promoted in rhetoric as an end point for developments 
in 5D BIM. However Goucher and Thurairajah (2012) find that academic and industry 
research and software development in costing applications in BIM have to date 
focused predominantly on BIM’s ability to automate the current practices. This finding 
contrasts with the promises made of BIM to provide better information on costs. 
 
Fung et al. (2014) researching cost management in BIM in relation to estimating find 
that the uptake of 5D BIM is greatest by clients’ cost advisers who provide early 
stage estimates. Wu et al. (2014) summarise the current cost management 
capabilities in BIM (i) importing quantities from design models into cost models (ii) 
providing measurement tools for quantity take-off that sit on top of design models 
and (iii) linking historical cost estimating databases on unit costs to cost models. 
They report slow uptake of cost management in BIM in UK quantity surveying 
practices due to current limitations that include the quality of design models, data 
exchange issues and a lack of software that automatically supports UK measurement 
rules, such as the New Rules of Measurement. Outside of the UK Eastman et al. 
(2011) and Monteiro and Martins (2013) see the automation of cost estimating in BIM 
as problematic because estimating software cannot accommodate the level of 
explanation and interpretation required in creating cost estimates. Tiwari et al. (2009) 
 47 
recognise these limitations of cost management in BIM, but advocate 3D model 
based estimating for target costing in particular, as a significant advance on previous 
practice such as quantity take-off from a 2D design model by hand, digitiser or 
screen based design. They argue that the quantity take-off process from 3D design 
models is quicker and eliminates the scope for errors and omissions.  
 
Some authors see potential for BIM to handle new types of information for costing 
purposes. Foruges et al. (2012) see potential for BIM to handle information from 
contractors earlier in the design process. Sacks et al. (2010) and Sunil et al. (2015) 
are interested in the interaction between lean production and BIM and see 
opportunities for new information from site feedback to be used for costing purposes.  
Staub-French et al. (2003) identify new types of information on design features that 
expert estimators draw on and Lawrence et al. (2014) have mapped these onto 
design models linked to estimating software in BIM.  
 
2.7 Systems 
 
2.7.1 Systems modelling: hard and soft approaches and their implications for 
information requirements 
 
The systems movement was instigated in the middle of the 20th century as a general 
way to study systems across any discipline under systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, 
1950) and later systems thinking (Krammer and DeSmitt, 1977). Systems theory and 
systems thinking are based on the idea that different systems that at first sight 
appear to have little in common, such as biological systems or systems of human 
activity, actually have common patterns of things in them that can be described 
through principles. Beynon-Davies (2011) identifies three key principles that underlie 
a systemic approach: holism, emergence and purpose. 
 
The first systemic principle of holism is viewed by Beynon-Davies (2011) as the 
importance of conceiving of the totality, the whole of a situation. He describes this 
against its opposite, reductionism, the standard positivist scientific method that 
concerns itself with the parts of a system and assumes that the system is equal to 
the sum of its parts. He contends that the scientific approach, whilst extremely 
successful in understanding natural sciences, is often accused as “not being able to 
see the wood for the tress” particularly in understanding human systems of activity. 
Holism, in contrast, takes an understanding of the whole from the interaction of its 
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parts as its primary focus. It requires the ability to take a view of the whole, while 
keeping, not losing, sight of the parts. This requires information on the whole and the 
parts. He describes the second systemic principle of emergence as how the 
behaviour of a system emerges from interactions of the parts. He says that any 
system is dynamic in the sense that its parts potentially influence each other. From 
this viewpoint he argues that a system has properties that do not belong to any of its 
constituent parts. The systemic approach is often described by the maxim “the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts”. Finally Beynon Davies (2011) sees the third 
systemic principle as an entity that has a purpose, in that there is a defined goal to a 
system and the behaviour of the system is planned to fulfil the goal. The purpose 
often sets measures of performance that are part of the system and steer the system 
to its goals. He uses these concepts of holism, emergence and purpose not in a 
technical sense, but in a descriptive sense, as they are good for description of reality 
at every level. 
 
A general feature that is relevant to any system and central to the principle of 
emergence is the feedback loop. Rosenblueth et al. (1943) pointed out that all 
systems have a control process in a feedback loop that collects information about 
actual performance (outputs) and feeds this back to earlier stage inputs in order to 
modify operations. The feedback loop thus acts as the control message and is 
therefore central to communication within a system. Beynon-Davies (2011) describes 
the feedback loop as an input-process-output model in which the processes 
represent the dynamic elements of the system. He classifies two types of processes 
relevant to any system, operational processes to achieve the systems purpose, and 
control processes to “maintain behaviour of the operational processes in the desired 
directions, and hence maintain the overall identity of the system.” He says that the 
communication role of the feedback loop makes it central to systems modelling and 
learning. 
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) points out that these very general principles and features 
encompass a vast array of situations and a distinction has been made between two 
types of system: closed systems and open systems. He describes how closed 
systems sit in their environment but are seen as sealed from anything outside. In 
closed systems a decision is made about the objects of interest and their 
relationships, and all other factors are then excluded. On the other hand open 
systems must include a notion of the environment. Beynon-Davies (2011) points out 
that “defining a system means deciding what is to be included in the system and 
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what is to be included in its environment.” Once a system has been defined Ashby 
(1958) described variety as a measure of the complexity of a system. Beynon-Davies 
(2011) links this idea of variety to the idea of system states concluding that systems 
can be described by their entities and the connections between them, but for many 
systems, the variety of the system may be too vast to measure, because the number 
of possible states may be uncountable.  
 
Building on the distinction between closed and open systems, the concepts of hard 
and soft system thinking emerged. The two concepts take very different views of the 
world and the types of interventions that work in the world. Rosenhead (1989) 
describes a hard systems approach as one that starts by modelling the entities that 
are within its field of interest and the relationships between them, and assumes that 
this system is closed to its wider environment. A hard system approach then takes a 
defined problem and works on finding solutions based on efficiency and optimisation. 
In terms of the relationship that hard approaches have to information, hard, 
engineered systems are associated with the machine metaphor (Morgan, 1998) in 
which there is an assumption of a self-regulating feedback loop that is made up from 
and learns from hard, quantified data. Green (1999) argues that hard systems have a 
positivist relationship with information, which is specific and deterministic. Hard 
systems assume that everything relevant to the system under consideration can be 
measured and has a thirst for measurement. 
 
In project management, Greenberger et al. (1976) analysed the work of the RAND  
Corporation. They had applied hard systems thinking in different business sectors 
including aerospace and public heath. Greenberger et al. (1976) concluded that an 
approach of optimisation of parts had been successful in environments where there 
was agreement about a unitary purpose, a hierarchical structure and well-defined, 
repetitive tasks that provided certainty and feedback mechanisms that provided 
reliable data. They concluded that the work of RAND had not been successful in 
environments that did not meet these conditions.  
 
Rosenhead (1989) describes the emergence of soft systems thinking in comparison 
to hard systems thinking. He describes a soft systems approach as one that starts by 
modelling the entities that are within its field of interest and the relationships between 
them, and then assumes there is uncertainty within the system modelled. He also 
says that it is assumed that the system modelled is open to its wider environment 
and the wider environment contains uncertainties. In terms of the view of the world, 
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he argues that a soft approach takes the view that individuals will make sense of 
situations in the world in different ways. He describes how soft system theory starts 
from a position that the reality of the world cannot be reduced to well-defined 
problems because peoples’ perceptions of problems differ. This has implications for 
the nature of interventions. In soft system approaches there may occasionally be 
consensus about “change to bring about improvement” but the norm is “debate and 
accommodation of different people with different views”. Finding an optimal solution 
is not seen as important; problem structuring and negotiating cooperation in an 
uncertain environment is seen as important. He describes how, in soft systems 
thinking, model building concerns itself with problem structuring as a means to wider, 
social debate and negotiation, not model building as an end in itself. Three such soft 
systems modelling approaches emerged in the 1980s. Friend and Hickling (1987) 
introduced Strategic Choice Approach (SCA), which defines problems against 
uncertainties and possible solutions. Eden and Ackermann (1989) introduced 
Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) for problem structuring through 
cognitive mapping possible solutions. Checkland and Scholes (1990) introduced Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) for problem structuring through rich pictures and 
possible solutions. In soft system modelling the primary purpose is to gain an 
understanding of a problem situation, without imposing any particular structure. 
 
Rosenhead (1989) considers the relationship between soft approaches and 
information. He notes that systems that involve human activity are based on the 
assumption that they are open to their wider environment and embedded in the 
context of their environment, hence they are soft. He argues that soft approaches 
have a relationship with information that is underpinned by social constructivism, in 
that they take account of plural views and are non-deterministic. Soft approaches 
assume that not everything can be measured because people make sense of the 
world in different ways and not everything can be known and measured. 
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) is concerned with the category of soft systems that involve 
human activity. He links system approaches to information theory when he says “the 
decision about what to include as within a system, and what to exclude, is a decision 
for the system modeller”. He points out that system modelling is a process of 
abstraction, resolving what are the constituent parts of the environment, system, 
subsystem and so on. He also points out that system modelling is inherently 
hierarchical. Systems can be viewed “on various levels, each level of which can be 
can be conceptualised as a system. Hence, the environment of a system may be 
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viewed as a system in its own right and a process, which is part of one system, may 
be treated as a system in turn, and so on”. 
 
In the construction industry Winch’s (2010) specific theoretical framework, illustrated 
in Figure 1, is one way to describe the construction system as a whole and a 
hierarchy of systems within systems. Taking a systems thinking view, he sees the 
construction system as one that encompasses something both greater than its parts 
and constraining the performance of its parts. He develops what he calls a tectonic 
approach to illustrate the dynamic nature of the construction system he is describing. 
He illustrates the process level of a construction project as shaping and being 
shaped by a governance level, which in turn shapes and is shaped by an institutional 
level. 
 
Figure 1: The tectonic approach (source: Winch, 2010, figure 1) 
 
Winch (2010) illustrates the tectonic interactions within and between the different 
levels using the analogy of a river. He describes construction operations at the 
process level as a flow of information in a river, where the flow is shaped by and 
shapes the bedrock and banks of the river. The banks of the river are formed from 
issues of governance. The bedrock of the river is formed by institutional factors. He 
contends that the process of construction, the flow, can only be indirectly managed 
 52 
by managing the context in which it flows. Thus construction is conceived as a 
system that is interacting on many levels, from the site operative working with 
concrete, to the government policy maker working with ideas and the market 
responding to the wider environment. Winch (2010) also sees the project process as 
a reduction in uncertainty through time in which all information is eventually 
processed at completion. 
 
Winch’s (2010) framework of the contrition system characterises the overall system 
of the construction in a similar way to the seminal work by The Tavistock Institute 
(1966), who characterised the overall construction system as one of interdependence 
and uncertainty. They identified the importance of interdependence as a key 
characteristic because they saw that any decision taken sets in train a chain of 
consequences that could change the decision. Thus decision and actions depend on 
one another. They identified uncertainty as the second important characteristic 
because they saw uncertainties throughout the construction process; from doubts 
about information to faulty information and limited attempts to plan. Dubois and 
Gadde (2002) similarly observed the industry to be a loose-coupled system that 
operates through negotiation. These authors all identify the sociological aspects of 
the building process as of key importance. Fernandez-Solis (2009) seeks to 
understand the systemic nature of construction as an industry and argues that 
construction should not be viewed in the same light as manufacturing, through a 
machine metaphor of efficiency, control and optimisation. He draws on studies that 
have highlighted differences between construction and other industries already cited 
in this literature review: namely unique one-off projects delivered by project specific 
supply chains made up of multiple firms. He suggests that a biological metaphor is 
more relevant to understanding the construction system following Gunderson and 
Holling (2001) theory of adaptive change that explores how complex social systems 
transform. He sees a new understanding of the construction system as fundamental 
to developing complimentary interventions. 
  
 53 
2.8  Information theory 
 
2.8.1 Representation: signs as something of significance in the system they 
appear in 
 
This thesis focuses on contractor’s methods and systems of costing, within the wider 
construction system. It sees costing as open to its environment and it sees its 
environment as a series of interacting systems that are sociological as well as 
technical, as conceived by Winch (2010). This thesis therefore sees implications from 
soft systems thinking on the nature of problems and interventions as central to cost 
information requirements. This thesis draws on information theory to more explicitly 
discuss, and begin to open up, the private costing practices of contractors in a way 
that examines the social as well as the technical aspects of cost information. 
 
Information theory is a general way to study what information is, why it is important, 
and the value of information systems. Some authors who are working on trans-
disciplinary concepts of information are Brier (2008), Floridi (2011) and Beynon 
Davies (2011).  This thesis chooses Beynon-Davies’ (2011) ideas as a framework to 
analyse construction cost information because Beynon-Davies’ (2011) framework 
links soft system approaches to information theory, in that he works in information 
theory seeking to better understand problems in today’s world and the value of 
computer modelling in working on those problems. He says that information is 
commonly seen as a critical concept for 21st Century but it’s meaning is poorly 
defined and understood. He notes that the word information is generally treated 
either narrowly as the transmission of binary digits, or in a broad way that is taken for 
granted but vague and undefined way. His central concern with the meaning of 
information is in accordance with the views of soft systems methodologies, such as 
Checkland and Scholes (1990), who view information as data plus meaning. This 
concept acknowledges the soft system assumptions that situations involve multiple-
views and uncertainty. Mingers and Willcocks (2014) are similarly concerned with 
how meanings arise. They also draw a clear distinction between information and 
meaning saying that “information is objective, in the sense of being independent of 
the sender or receiver, and must be true to be information”. They say that meaning is 
“inter-subjective, in being at least partly dependent on human interpreters, and 
generated from information. Thus information systems, which store, process and 
transmit information, are only part of a wider system (or systems) of meaningful 
human communication.”  
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Taking a position of information as data plus meaning, Peirce (1978) argues that a 
sign brings with it two effects, the entity that it represents and the idea that it 
generates in an interpreter. He thus views a sign as a combination of meaning and 
representation. This has been developed by Falkenberg et al. (1998) and Hesse et 
al. (2008). They illustrate this by reference to the semiotic tetrahedron that shows the 
relationship between a thing, a meaning and its representation along three corners of 
a triangle (Figure 2). They show that the relationship from the representation to the 
thing is an indirect one, as it is dependent on the actor’s interpretation. Any symbol-
concept relationship is, in essence, the interpretation of an individual actor who sits 
on top of the triangle making a tetrahedron. 
 
Figure 2: Adapted from Pierce’s (1978) semiotic tetrahedron Falkenberg et al. (1998) 
and Hesse et al. (2008) as used by Rosenkrantz et al. (2013) 
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) holds a similar view in his conception of signs as 
representations of something of significance or meaningful to represent in the system 
it sits in. To illustrate the nature of information Beynon-Davies (2011) sees the 
physical form, or representation, of a sign as the top of the four rung semiotics ladder 
of Stamper (2001) between the social and physical worlds. The rungs of the ladder 
encompass meaning, structure and finally physical form of a sign. He uses an 
example of 13th to 16th Century Inca culture to illustrate the ladder.  In this example, 
the social realm provides the purpose for information, in this case to distribute labour 
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across the Inca Empire: pragmatics (the activity system that provides a purpose for 
signs) is the infrastructure of roads and trained runners that channels messages 
around the empire, semantics (the information system that provides meaning of 
signs) is provided by a system of cords and knots grouped in khipu in ways that 
represent numbers, syntactic (the information system that provides a structure or 
coding system of signs) is provided by the agreement on knot groups as symbols for 
numbers, and empirics (the data system that provides the form of signs) is the 
physical artefacts of cords, their placement in relation to each other, the construction 
and colour knots and their placement on the cords. The artefact of the khipu (an 
assemblage of coloured, knotted, cotton or wool cords) then exists in the physical 
realm. 
 
Mingers (2014) notes that there are multiple choices at each of the semiotic levels 
that can affect meaning. In other words communication is heavily dependent on its 
context. Any form of communication is therefore highly complex and open to different 
interpretations. This illustrates what Beynon-Davies (2011) calls the “enactment of 
significance” and supports the view of Mingers and Willcocks (2013) that it is 
necessary to distinguish between the system of symbols that allow messages to be 
sent and the meanings generated by the information and its representation. 
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) has built a concept of significance around the centrality of 
action; from the formative act of the decision of what is significant to represent; to 
how that significance is represented in a record, used through communication and 
acted on. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Beynon-Davies (2011) takes Dietz’s (2006) 
three perspectives on the sign: forma, informa and performa and views them as the 
glue on the semiotics ladder and the link to the systemic domain. Forma deals with 
the physical nature of signs and spans from the physical to the syntactic (coding 
system) levels on the ladder, informa deals with the meaning of signs and forms a 
bridge across the semantics rung of the ladder, and performa deals with the use of 
communication to make decisions, bridging the pragmatic and social level of the 
ladder.  
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Figure 3: Adapted from Beynon-Davies (2011) The semiotics ladder Figure 2.2 
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) considers action at a number of points, making the distinction 
between three forms of inter-related action: formative action, informative action and 
performative action. He argues that the “patterning of such action within data, 
information and activity systems is the essence of what we mean by organisation, 
particularly human organisation”.  
 
Beynon-Davies (2011) encompasses the encoding of data into artefacts, be that 
khipu of the 13th to 15th Centuries or digital computers of today, using a “mutually 
understood ontology: a shared set of representations of the world”.  He notes that 
different cultural groups choose different constituents of the world as significant to 
code with a set of symbols for communication. But whatever the choice of 
constituents, the collection of symbolic patterns is an ontology. He notes that the 
term ontology originated as a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature 
of reality and is today used in Computer Science and Cognitive Science. He says 
that the importance of ontologies arises from the fact that symbols as social 
constructs “rely on a shared ontology amongst a group: the context within which a 
group of signs is used in continuous communication by a social group or groups. 
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Hence a shared ontology is a necessary pre-condition for joint communication and 
effectively frames or controls such communication.” 
 
There is much more to Beynon-Davies (2011) work, and others working in 
information theory, than is presented here. The ideas presented have been chosen 
as a framework that links the real world in its entirety to the physical form of 
information, and is therefore chosen as a way to analyse cost as information in the 
world of construction projects. The ideas of forma, informa and performa will be used 
in Chapter 5, as the framework for discussion of the analysis of primary data and 
literature. 
 
2.9 Summary 
 
This review has shown that literature on contractors’ costing is presented largely 
uncritically in standard textbooks on contractors’ estimating, tendering and cost 
control routines. But the actual processes that contractors go through in their costing 
routines are not simple. There is a small amount of critical literature that seeks to 
better understand the effect of contractors’ commercial management on cost 
information (Brook, 2017; Ross and Williams, 2013; Laryea and Hughes, 2010). But 
the realities of contractor costing remain little understood in literature. 
 
Critical research on contractors’ perspectives on cost reductions in demonstration 
projects (Nicolini et al. 2000; Zimina et al., 2012) that seek to bring about change 
using target costing as an incentive for improvement, suggests that beyond price 
bargaining, costs cannot be readily attached to changes in a way that is agreed as 
improvement through the supply chain. The findings of this literature implies that if 
current models of costing are imported into BIM, BIM will not advance the problem of 
motivating and rewarding improvements through the supply chain. They also imply 
that the ability to estimate costs that evidence change that is agreed on as good 
through the supply chain, would better motivate improvements. The challenge of 
estimating costs of improvement through the supply chain is little addressed in 
construction literature. 
 
Before considering literature that has looked at where solutions to estimating costs of 
improvement though supply chains may lie, this Chapter set out the large topics of 
construction improvement and supply chain improvement. Construction improvement 
was shown to be a large and contentious subject in literature. The topic of supply 
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chain improvement was shown to be larger subject still. Supply chain management 
and lean thinking were found to be the two main improvement interventions 
advocated for the supply-side of industry in literature. However critical literature 
argues that the uptake of these two interventions is limited, even in the 
manufacturing industries that they arose in. Efforts to import ideas of supply chain 
management and lean thinking into construction were presented with additional 
contextual hurdles and literature was presented that found that the evidence of cost 
reductions is anecdotal.  
 
Literature was then presented that considers how management accounting has 
tackled the challenge of motivating improvement through costs in commerce 
generally. Even in manufacturing, critical literature finds a considerable gap between 
the theoretical foundations and practical relevance of cost management methods, 
both within firms and across supply chains. Across supply chains literature identifies 
the continued use of price bargaining between firms in all industries. 
 
Better information on both construction sequencing and costs are promoted as end 
points in the literature presented on the progressive adoption on BIM in UK 
construction. Literature that promotes the adoption of BIM as enabling significant 
change towards greater integration is tempered by literature that takes what it sees 
as a more realistic view and sees a more limited role for BIM. Dossick and Neff 
(2009) illuminated this stance, saying that whilst BIM can tightly integrate design 
technologically, firms in a construction project supply chain remain organisationally 
divided. Literature on construction sequencing shows a significant step change from 
project Gantt charts that show activities and time, to visualisations that show 
activities, time and space. Literature was presented on the adoption of costing in BIM 
that sees the aim of BIM as the automation of current practice, with a few exceptions, 
where authors see potential for BIM to handle new information to support costing. 
Literature was also presented on the adoption of construction scheduling in BIM. 
 
Since the industry’s focus is on BIM, the meaningfulness of cost information in BIM is 
crucial. This requires further thought on the nature of problems of costing in 
construction and the value of computer modelling in working on those problems. 
Literature by Rosenhead (1989) was therefore presented, theorising in soft systems 
thinking on the nature of problems in situation of human activity in a social world, in 
which people make sense of the world in different ways. Rosenhead (1989) argues 
that these situations require solutions that acknowledge uncertainties and incomplete 
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information and accommodate different interests. This theory runs counter to the 
assumptions presented in literature of hard, formal and complete information. 
Winch’s (2011) theoretic framework was presented as one way to describe the 
construction system along with the Tavistock Institute (1966) characterisation of the 
construction industry as a system of interdependencies and uncertainties and Dubois 
and Gadde’s (2002) definition of construction as loose-coupled system that operates 
through negotiation. 
 
Finally, consideration of the value of computer modelling in working on problems in 
construction costing prompted the presentation of Beynon-Davies (2011), working in 
information theory, who provides a concept of significance for examining the link 
between information and the organisations that information is used in. This literature 
was presented for later use in seeking to understand the meaningfulness of cost 
information against its uses, as the basis for deciding what information to include and 
what to exclude in computer models.   
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CHAPTER 3 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The primary research of this thesis was guided by a pragmatist philosophy. It 
investigated the costing processes of a main contractor and subcontractors to gain 
knowledge of how a construction supply chain approaches costing; how it creates 
and uses cost information. This chapter focuses on the methodology used to carry 
out the primary research. It begins by discussing the research philosophy and 
methodological problems. It then looks at the ethical issues surrounding the research 
topic. The chapter moves to the various methods used to carry out the primary 
research. It offers a critique of the methods, identifying their strengths and 
weaknesses. The chapter describes how the methods were applied in this research 
to minimise their weaknesses and finally summaries the researcher’s personal 
research journey. 
 
3.2 Philosophical perspective 
 
This research takes a critical realistic methodological stance (Bhaskar, 2008). This 
approach accepts the existence of an intransitive domain of objective knowledge but 
also accepts that access to this can never be purely unmediated since access to this 
domain is always through a transitive domain that is socially constructed and subject 
to change. This is appropriate for research into construction as it both establishes an 
acceptance of the hard reality of the physical world, of work done by contractors, of 
BIM and of costing, but also involves an acknowledgement of the considerable 
stakeholder negotiation in the means and ends of projects, in the ways in which 
construction costing practice is carried out and given meaning, Others have used this 
approach for research into costing work in the field of alternative management 
accounting research (Baxter and Chua, 2003).  Alternative management accounting 
research uses non-positive language, a broad set of alternative discourses, to 
understand accounting in the broader context of the social sciences.  
 
Grounded in practice, this research drew on a range of different ways of knowing as 
identified by Mingers (2008) from a critical realist perspective. Mingers (2008) 
presents four different forms of knowledge, each grounded in a different concept of 
truth. These are: propositional, (hard, reproducible and factual), experiential (based 
on previous experience), performative (associated with how things are done), and 
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epistemological (concerning deeper understandings and explanations of why things 
are as they are). The relation between accounting numbers and the concept of hard 
reproducible and factual forms of knowledge is viewed in accordance with non-
positive approaches to accounting research, which includes followers of Latour 
(1987, 1993, 1996) who are concerned with how accounting sits in the context of 
human and non-human actant and argue that numbers are fabrications (Preston et 
al., 1992) and built to take on the appearance of facts. 
 
Using this methodological viewpoint, costing practices are seen as fixed reference 
points in construction projects, which are given meaning by people to a significant 
extent. Improvement, as offered by BIM, sets new reference points but these are 
open to negotiation.  Thus, grounded in an interpretivist approach, the methods of 
this study seek to provide an understanding of the meanings that people place on 
their actions in order to know what organisations and individuals do and why they act 
as they do (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Thus, the exploration of documents and 
software applications draw on hard, propositional knowledge, whilst the exploration 
of how costing practices relate to their context, draw on experiential, performative 
and epistemological knowledge.  
 
The research uses the concept of “cost as information” to challenge the basis and 
practicalities of costing practices. Cost, then, is merely a representation of resources, 
purchasing possibilities and risk, but this is made problematic when costs are given 
meaning by people and become fixed reference points in construction projects. This 
research did not therefore start from propositional knowledge of current practices, but 
rather looked at the variables behind cost information, where that cost information is 
derived from and how it is used, seeking to better understand what cost information 
means to different people. The research did use propositional knowledge from 
costing documents and software applications but explored these from an experiential 
and performative perspective. This allowed the study to explore narratives from the 
calculative world of costing. Its objective was to explain current approaches to 
costing and explore potential directions for accounting for improvements.  
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3.3 Research tasks and their relationships 
 
The empirical research in this thesis addresses the first three objectives set out in 
Section 1.3, of firstly to determining how current approaches to supply chain costing 
affect supply chain operation and overall construction costs in a project, secondly to 
determine how different approaches to costing of supply chain operation can be used 
to deliver efficiency and cost savings in projects, and thirdly to examine how BIM can 
be used to produce different, more useful costs of the supply chain operation through 
projects. 
 
This research exists between the social realm of the construction project and the 
technical realm of information systems. It also exists between the realms of 
construction practice and the knowledge base from theory. The task of carrying out 
empirical research was therefore organised alongside the task of carrying out a 
literature review. The organisation of these two parallel research tasks was informed 
by Dubois and Gadde’s (2002 and 2014) systemic combining logic, in which new 
approaches evolve through confrontation throughout the research between case 
study analysis situated in its specific context and relevant literature. 
 
Figure 4 shows a schematic diagram of the research process. The collaboration 
agreement with the main contractor identified the initial problem. This informed the 
starting point for the problem analysis. The problem analysis was carried out in two 
parallel strands; from the primary data and from the literature review. In this way 
problem analysis arising from the empirical investigation came into continuous 
contact and interaction with problem analysis from theory. The analysis of the 
primary data (Chapter 4) came out of what people said when describing the real 
world problems though a case study. The parallel analysis of the knowledge base in 
literature came out of the literature review (Chapter 2). The literature review began 
by looking at current project cost models in construction and general supply chain 
management principles and their associated cost models in other industries. The 
literature review then looked upwards to the origin of supply chain management 
ideas in system approaches and forwards to realisation of ideas through information 
theory. In the discussion (Chapter 5) the problem will be redefined from a 
confrontation between primary data and theory, and a new approach to costing that 
is useful for improvement deep into the supply chain is proposed.  
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Figure 4: Methodological approach adopted 
 
3.4 Ethical issues 
 
This research was a collaborative project between the research institution and the 
Midlands division of a national main contractor in the UK construction industry. The 
collaboration involved the main contractor’s sponsorship of a three year PhD 
studentship which was formally established in February 2013. This collaboration 
provided a vehicle for accessing data and a drive to creating a practical outcome. 
 
How access to a particular organisation is gained affects the validity of the findings, 
and whilst collaboration provided access to people and documents, it also posed a 
potential problem of stakeholder influence on the research purpose. A common 
purpose between the research institution and the main contractor was found at the 
outset of the research. The academic and company goals to be achieved 
simultaneously were explored through discussions on the research proposal and set 
out in a Collaboration Agreement (Appendix A1.1). Separate company deliverables 
that involved participation in the company’s business were managed and achieved 
simultaneously, but separately, to the academic goals and are not presented in this 
thesis. 
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The collaboration between the research institution and the main contractor provided 
access to the main contractor and firms in their supply chain to do this through 
interrupted involvement (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008) in which the research involved 
intermittent periods of time with the main contractor and firms in their supply chain. 
Whilst the collaborative nature of this research facilitated access to relevant 
interviewees, practical issues of the researcher’s presence could potentially inhibit 
the interviewees’ openness. Practical measures were taken to encourage 
interviewees to share commercially sensitive information by ensuring relevant 
permissions were obtained. Practical measures were also taken to encourage 
interviewees to explain what they really think, by ensuring the nature, purposes and 
confidentiality of the research were made explicit to all participants.  
 
The research collected and used commercially sensitive data in relation to costing. 
The research also elicited data that is potentially damaging to the reputation of 
organisations and the personal privacy of individual research participants. The 
researcher exercised due ethical responsibility by holding all data securely, in line 
with best practice in data protection, and by not publicising or sharing any information 
that was likely to harm the interest of the organisations or individual research 
participants. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) note that organisations may provide access 
to confidential data provided that confidentially conditions are met. To this end the 
research institution and main contractor signed a Confidentiality Agreement setting 
out clear agreement around access, confidentiality, the researcher’s right to publish 
and the main contractor’s right to monitor and control certain types of content. 
 
Individual, all research participants were informed about the purpose of the research 
and the confidentiality agreement and were selected on the basis of the relevance of 
their job role and expertise. Any information given in confidence by one person 
during the research was not given to any other person. The research participants 
were identified only by their job role in the recording of the raw data and full results. 
Many of the research participants had a unique job role so the research did not set 
out to provide anonymity in the raw data or the full results. However, mindful of any 
personally sensitive data, individual research subjects have been anonymised in 
findings published both internally and externally.  
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3.5  Data collection 
 
3.5.1 Case study approach 
 
To address the research objectives set out in Section 1.3 this study used a case 
study of a supply chain involving a main contractor and firms in their supply chain.  
 
Case study research is not new in the field of costing. Baxter and Chua (2003) note 
that case studies in accounting topics from an alternative strand of research to 
mainstream quantitative research and can illustrate how numbers are constructed to 
“accommodate and persuade diverse and changing interests of different 
stakeholders”. Andon et al. (2015) similarly argue that it is the people who use 
management accounting information that make the information useful. This research 
seeks to study the praxis of costing by studying the creation and use of cost numbers 
within the UK construction industry, to understand the nature of the numbers that are 
built on the diverse and changing interests of different stakeholders. 
 
The case study as a research strategy (Hartley, 2004) is widely used in studies of 
organisations. The most frequently discussed disadvantage is the problem of 
generalisability but Hartley (2004) points to an increasing interest in context, making 
the lack of generalisability an advantage where the illumination of behaviour in its 
context is important. Lukka and Kasanen (1995) note the fact that firms copy best 
practice and are constrained by the same regulations results in regularities from the 
way firms and individuals are forced to act, increasing generalisability. Hartley (2004) 
notes the advantage of case studies in potentially revealing informal behaviour in 
processes as they occur. He points out that in case studies that involve multiple 
methods of data collection, comparison between methods can lead to improved data 
validity. The disadvantage is potentially having an overwhelming amount of data. 
This is discussed later, under each method of data collection. The high volume of 
data collected across a case study does pose challenges for analysis. Hartley (2004) 
points out that without a theoretical framework, case studies tend toward description 
and lack significance. He argues that to avoid leaping to premature conclusions, the 
development of categories needs to be carefully managed in case study research. 
The approach that this research took to data analysis is outlined in Section 3.5.8 
below. The theoretical framework of systemic combining logic (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002 and 2014) used in this case study deals with theory and findings concurrently 
and lead to emergent theory rather than examined propositions. 
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In this research, access to people and documents in the main contractor and 
subcontracting firms allowed mixed research methods to be used to create a case 
study of a supply chain combining semi-structured interviews, in-depth reviews of 
documents, non-participant observation of projects and events and workshops. This 
mixed approach allowed the research to elicit Mingers’ (2008) four forms of 
knowledge that were used, between them, to uncover the rich and varied ways in 
which people may be said to know. 
 
Many of the practical issues with gaining access to meetings, individual interviewees 
and documents within the main contractor’s organisation were overcome by the 
collaborative nature of this research that provided board level permission from the 
main contractor to access relevant interviewees. To overcome the difficulties in 
gaining access to subcontractors in the supply chain the researcher and the main 
contractor selected key subcontractors from the main contractor’s network of 
subcontractors that they work with across projects. The subcontractors were chosen 
to represent different trades. After this the primary selection criterion was a 
willingness to be involved. The researcher negotiated participation in the research of 
the main contact from each subcontractor, usually a senior manger. Participation with 
subsequent supply chain tiers was negotiated in a chain reaction. In other words the 
researcher and the main contact from each subcontractor negotiated participation in 
the research of other interviewees in their firm and the main contact from a 
subcontractor in their network, and so on. In this way the longest chain, for the 
mechanical and electrical services subcontract, brought together the four tiers of that 
supply chain.  
 
3.5.2 A case study of a supply chain 
 
A construction project supply chain is a temporary organisational relationship and as 
such it is difficult to investigate the problems of construction supply chains. A 
construction project supply is linked to the more permanent supply chain network of 
each firm in a project supply chain. Thus a web of relationships exists within and 
around a project supply chain. Throughout the research the researcher was sensitive 
to the conflicts of interest and the ethics that the research of a supply chain involved. 
The conflicts of interest were carefully managed, as described in Section 3.4 above, 
to be sensitive to each contractor’s position, in order to gain full access to the reality 
of their situation.  
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The research did not attempt to encompass the perspectives of all stakeholders 
across the whole process of a construction project. The research concerns the 
involvement of the contractors’ supply chain so the research focused on the parts 
played by the main contractor and subcontractors. The research therefore covers the 
construction process from the point that the main contractor becomes involved in a 
construction project, on receiving an invitation to tender for a project, to the 
agreement of final costs of a project.  
 
The case study involves the sponsoring main contractor, the Midlands division of a 
UK national contractor, and seven subcontractors across three work package supply 
chains (supply chain for subcontract packages of work) in a notional project supply 
chain. The idea of a notional project supply chain came about near the start of the 
research. The research originally intended to encompass parts of the actual supply 
chains working on two of the main contractor’s projects. However, in practice, this 
approach was soon found to be a barrier to access to subcontractors due to the 
commercial confidentiality of the cost information that the research sought to elicit, 
and the potential for the research to collide with live unresolved issues. Practical 
measures were therefore taken to gain access to confidential information and 
encourage participants to explain what they really think. This was achieved firstly by 
taking a different project for each subcontractor as the subject of the in-depth review 
of documents and associated semi-structured interviews. This was achieved 
secondly by assembling a notional supply chain in a workshop, in which participants 
were brought together who had worked with one or more of the other participants 
across projects, but the workshop was not focused on assembling part of the actual 
supply chain for a particular project. However, across all the research methods used 
to form the case study of a notional project supply chain, the main contractor and 
subcontractors referred to similarly large, complex, one-off construction projects for 
education sector clients in the Midlands, in which the client controlled the design 
phase of the project. Participants established that they used the same project costing 
practices and written reports across all their similar projects and what they did was 
similar across all projects. 
 
The case study of a notional supply chain thus encompasses firms from three work 
package supply chains within a notional project supply chain (Table 1). The three 
work package supply chains cover the trades of mechanical and electrical services, 
suspended ceilings and partitions, and movable partitions. The main contractor (tier 
1) is a large, national organisation with an annual turnover of over £1bn of which 
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around 70% is spent in a supply chain of around 3,000 firms. The subcontractor (tier 
2) in link A is a large, national mechanical and electrical services contractor with and 
an annual turnover of over £350m of which 60 to 70% is spent in their supply chain. 
This subcontractor facilitated access to one of their subcontractors (tier 3), who in 
turn facilitated access to one of their subcontractors (tier 4). The subcontractor (tier 
2) in link B is a small, regional suspended ceilings and partitions subcontractor with 
an annual turnover of under £10m. This subcontractor facilitated access to one of 
their subcontractors (tier 3). 
 
Tier Organisation Size Trade Ref Annual 
turnover 
Spend in 
the 
supply 
chain 
1 Main contractor Midlands 
division  
General  MC Over 
£1bn 
70% 
2 Specialist 
Subcontractor 
Midlands 
division  
Mechanical and 
electrical 
services 
SCA1 Over 
£350m 
60 to 70% 
2 Specialist 
subcontractor 
Midlands 
company 
Suspended 
ceilings and 
partitions  
SCB1 Under 
£10m. 
60% 
2 Specialist 
subcontractor 
Midlands 
division  
Movable 
partitions 
SCC1 
Data not collected 
3 Specialist 
subcontractor 
Midlands 
company 
Electrical 
services 
SCA2 
3 Labour only 
subcontractor 
Sole 
trader 
Suspended 
ceilings and 
partitions fixer 
SCB2 
3 Labour only 
subcontractor 
Sole 
trader 
Movable 
partitions fixer 
SCC2 
4 Specialist 
subcontractor 
Midlands 
company 
Electrical 
services 
SCA3 
 
Table 1: Turnover and spend in the supply chain of organisations in the case study 
 
The relationships between the organisations is shown in Figure 5 below, where the 
main contractor is notated as MC and the subcontractors are notated as SCA1, 
SCA2, SCA3, SCB1, SCB2, SCC1 and SCC2, to reflect links A, B and C and the 
tiers in the supply chain. 
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Figure 5: The relationship between organisations in the case study 
 
Thomas’s (2011) typology of a case study offers a way to describe the subject and 
object, purpose, approach and process of a case study. Using Thomas’s typology 
this research uses a case study approach to explain contractor costing (the subject) 
using the concept of cost as information (the object). The case study subject, 
contractor costing, was selected because cost is fundamental to motivating 
improvement in construction projects. The case study object, cost as information, 
emerged during the research as information technology, with its potential to 
manipulate more information faster, makes an exploration of costing through the lens 
of information theory (what this thesis calls cost as information) an appropriate lens 
through which to interpret the subject, contractor costing. The case study draws on 
the local knowledge of participants selected for their key roles in contractor costing. It 
then views the realities of contractor costing described by participants through the 
analytical frame of cost as information by drawing in ideas from information theory. 
 
The case study thus takes the approach of illustrating contractor costing to provide a 
rich description of contractor costing, rather a theoretical study of contractor costing. 
The case study design adopted is a single case study with embedded multiple units 
of analysis in accordance with the typology of Yin (2014). The single case study is of 
a main contractor's supply chain. This provides the opportunity to examine how a 
main contractor's supply chain relates to the context of the construction industry as a 
whole. Embedded within the single case study of a main contractor's supply chain 
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are three embedded units of analysis, one for each of three work package supply 
chains A, B, and C as illustrated in figure 5 above. This methodology was chosen in 
order to view the embedded units, the work package supply chains, both individually 
and collectively within the unit of interest, a main contractor's supply chain. This 
approach allowed the practices of costing that exist both within and between 
organisations to be studied, as individual practices and the inter-relationships are 
both essential aspects of a supply chain. The approach also used different data 
collection methods to enrich the case study. 
 
The notional supply chain represents three typical links of a main contractor’s supply 
chain in the UK. The three trades studied are similarly subservient to the same 
financial, contractual and procedural control of the main contractor. The first major 
difference between the trades is that the mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractor has significant design contribution, which adds vulnerability to the main 
contractors design programme. The second major difference between the trades is 
that the mechanical and electrical services subcontractor and the movable partitions 
subcontractor both provide some custom items that are on a long lead in delivery 
time; whereas the suspended ceilings and partitions subcontractor provides mainly 
commodity items that are on a short lead in time. These differences have been taken 
into account in the analysis of the findings.  
 
The case study encompassed 15 semi-structured interviews; 3 workshops, two with 
participants from the main contractor and one with participants from organisations 
across four tiers of the mechanical and electrical services work package supply 
chain; 9 observations as a non-participant observer, observing, listening and 
following decisions through the site meetings of two projects as part of the main 
contractor’s organisation; 6 in-depth document reviews and 9 observations of events. 
The majority of the research was carried out between January 2013 and July 2015. A 
final workshop was held in July 2016. The detail of each activity will be described in 
Sections 3.5.2 to 3.5.7 below and summarised in Section 3.5.8 below. 
In summary, the research focuses on the parts played the main contactor and 
subcontractors in a supply chain during tendering and site operations. The 
investigation is Midlands based. It covers projects procured by education sector 
clients through competitive tendering with negotiation. The investigation is thus 
positioned in the middle ground of construction projects by geography, client 
expertise and cost basis. This provided a case study across projects and 
organisations that were neither likely to fail badly nor perform significantly better than 
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the norm. The research was not exploring demonstration projects that were seeking 
to improve through the introduction of a specific change. The projects were one-off 
complex buildings, the most common type of project in the industry, and based on 
competitive tendering, the most common form of contractor selection in the industry. 
Throughout participants said that what was observed was normal business.  
 
3.5.3 Main contractor’s projects 
 
Part of the access to the main contractor (MC) involved the study of two specific 
projects in detail. These two projects were used for all the interviews, in-depth review 
of documents and observation of the main contractor site meetings with participants 
from the MC. As described in Section 3.5.2 above, these two projects formed only 
part of the overall case study of a notional supply chain, as separate interviews, in-
depth review of documents and workshops with subcontractors add to the case 
study, but do not specifically refer to the two projects studied in detail with the MC. 
The research with the MC was limited to two projects to focus on the in-depth 
insights from a number of interviewees for each project.  
 
Project A was a £30m medical school building for a university in the Midlands in 
which MC did not control the design stage. It was procured by the client through 
selective competition with negotiation of a main contractor on a traditional cost-plus 
price basis. The price basis was a fixed price, lump sum presented in a bill of 
quantities with provision for client variations and liquidated damages. Responsibility 
for design transferred to them as main contractor at contract stage through a novated 
architect. Responsibility for management lay with them as main contractor. 
Responsibility for supply chain integration also lay with them, as main contractor. 
They approached supply chain procurement through competitive tender of 
subcontractors. The selection of subcontractors through competitive tendering was 
carried within their supply chain policy. This project provided a challenge to supply 
chain operation and costing as the relationships were short-term and set the limit to 
the use of BIM for supply chain improvement. Project A was carried out under the 
JCT Design and Build Contract 2011 (including client amendments) where the 
liability of quantity errors falls on the main contractor. 
 
Project B was a standard, repeatable, design for a £2.2m primary school building in 
the Midlands. The school project was a standardised school design from a product 
range of standard school designs developed by the main contractor and a publicly 
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owned framework procurer. The school project was procured through a framework 
agreement. Each product could be built to different sizes depending on the size of a 
school’s intake of pupils. The pre-construction estimator explained as main 
contractor they offered three options for the price basis to schools through the 
framework (a) a fixed price, closed book, lump sum (b) a cost-based labour and 
materials open book re-measure (c) a cost-based labour and materials open book to 
contract stage. Only option A had been chosen by clients to date. In Project B the 
price basis under option A was, similarly to Project A, a fixed price, lump sum 
presented in a bill of quantities with provision for client variations and penalties 
through liquidated damages. The long-term relationships involved in this project 
provided an ideal opportunity to establish the benefits of new approaches, which can 
be reproducible in future work. Project B was carried out under the JCT Design and 
Build Contract 2011 (including client amendments) where the liability of quantity 
errors falls on the main contractor. 
 
As outlined previously in Section 3.5.2 the subcontractors each chose a different 
project in the education sector as the subject of their interviews and document 
reviews. The mechanical and electrical services subcontractor (SCA1) explained 
their process for compiling a tender using the example of an education sector project 
using client design. The suspended ceilings and partitions subcontractor (SCB1) 
explained their process for compiling a tender using an example of an education 
sector project with contractor design. The movable partitions subcontractor (SCC1) 
explained their standard practice in compiling tenders across projects. 
 
3.5.4 Interviews 
 
Data collection with the main contractor and three tier 2 subcontractors (Table 2) 
involved semi-structured interviews to evidence what people do when sourcing and 
using cost information in different firms. Because the interviewees were chosen on 
the basis of their job role the interviews were non-directive in order to respond to the 
participant’s position, whilst still remaining relevant to the research objectives. 
 
Interviews offer advantages (King, 2004) to the critical realist approach in that they 
allow information seeking questions that can be followed up with probing questions 
that allow different levels of meaning to be uncovered. This is important to this 
research, which seeks to elicit organisational and personal ties within complex multi-
organisational supply chains. He points out that research participants readily accept 
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interviews as a research method and this is driven by the fact that people like talking 
about their jobs however of interviews are time consuming. This proved a 
disadvantage in getting people involved, but once involved participants were willing 
and interested in further participation. The main disadvantage falls on the researcher 
in managing the high volume of information generated. This was managed by 
focusing the interview questions on the research objectives through the structured 
framework for data analysis, which is described later in Section 3.6. 
 
The selection process for interviewees was based on the relevance of their job role 
and expertise. Within MC this was be made up of nine interviews as Table 2 below. 
The researcher first asked questions about how each organisation goes about 
putting a price together for a project and then, once a project has been won, how 
each organisation controls costs. This aimed to find out what cost information is 
created and how methods of costing reach through the supply chain. The researcher 
then asked questions about how key relationships work to find out about 
organisational behaviour and decision-making in relation to the supply chain. The 
interviews gave the researcher the opportunity to get participants’ ideas, thoughts 
and intentions on current practice and on changes to current practice. The interview 
guide is included in Appendix A2.1, the interviews were audio recorded and an 
example of a transcribed interview is included in the Appendix A2.2. 
 
Reference Interviewee Title Nature of organisation 
1 MC1 BIM Manager Main contractor 
2 MC2 Commercial Manager Main contractor 
3 MC1 BIM Manager Main contractor 
4 MC3 Quantity Surveyor site 1 Main contractor 
5 MC3 Quantity Surveyor site 1 Main contractor 
6 MC2 Commercial Manager Main contractor 
7 MC4 Quantity Surveyor site 2 Main contractor 
8 MC5 Project Manager site 1 Main contractor 
9 SCA1 Project Manager Mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractor 
10 SCB1 Manager Suspending ceilings and partitions 
subcontractor 
11 SCC1 Manager Movable partitions subcontractor 
12 MC6  BIM Manager Main contractor 
13 SCA1 Project Manager Mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractor 
14 SCB1 Manager Suspending ceilings and partitions 
subcontractor 
15 SCB2 Cost Manager Mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractor 
 
Table 2: Summary of interviews 
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3.5.5 Document reviews 
 
The documents collected (Table 3) consisted of the full estimating build-ups, priced 
tender documents and post-contract cost control documents for a completed project 
from the main contractor and the two tier 2 subcontractors. Access to this confidential 
data was provided on the basis of confidentiality conditions being met. The 
documents were used to gather background information, to determine if the 
documents reflect practice, to help formulate questions for interviews and workshops 
and to see how firms create information on costs. The documents were reviewed 
with the interviewee who provided the document to understand the context and 
content of the documents.  
 
Reference Documents Title Nature of organisation 
16 MC3 Quantity Surveyor site 1 Main contractor 
17 MC4 Quantity Surveyor site 2 Main contractor 
18 SCA3 diary 
from site 
Electrician Tier 3 Electrician 
19 SCB2 Cost Manager Mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractor 
20 SCA3 diary 
from site 
Electrician Tier 3 Electrician 
21 SCB1 Manager Moveable partitions subcontractor 
 
Table 3: Summary of document reviews 
 
The documentation of information from site in the form of a qualitative free text, 
research dairy was used to suit the preferences of the Electrician who participated in 
the research (Table 3: References 18 and 20). The use of a diary was used for the 
Electrician to recall the events of a day. It drew on the Electrician’s interest in writing 
and offered advantages in recording the immediacy of everyday events (Symon, 
2004). The use of a dairy accepts the relevance of individual accounts and thus fits 
with the critical realist approach of this research.  
 
3.5.6 Observations 
 
The natural context (Steyaert and Bouwen, 2004) of the main contractor’s site 
meetings provided opportunity to observe groups where the participants were 
already at work. Steyaert and Bouwen (2004) see an advantage in the natural group 
in its usual setting, because all participants give their view on the subject of the 
meeting and a natural mix of views can be observed. The interaction observed is 
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between participants, not between the researcher and the participants. Steyaert and 
Bouwen (2004) see a disadvantage in that the information collected may be overly 
complex or disorganised. However, the use of observations in a natural context fits 
the critical realist approach of this research.  
 
The researcher observed nine of the main contractor’s site meetings over two 
projects in order to follow decisions over Projects A and B (Table 4). The 
observations aimed to find out the inherent behaviour of the firm by observing their 
concerns and conduct in order to understand what was taking place and was used to 
understand the links between costing practices and site operations.  
 
Ref Project Meeting Nature of 
organisation(s) 
22 Medical school building  CRM Main contractor’s 
site progress 
meeting 
23 Medical school building  
24 Primary school building  
25 Medical school building  
26 Medical school building 
27 Primary school building  
28 Medical school building 
29 Medical school building 
30 Primary school building 
 
Table 4: Summary of observation of projects 
 
An example of the field notes recorded during non-participant observation is included 
in Appendix A2.3. The field notes were supplemented by document collection. The 
data from the document collection and field notes encompasses data from the 
documents used at the site meetings that identify data MC’s project control activities 
observed in the research. It also encompasses data from the field notes taken during 
site meetings that looks at construction and costing problems associated with the two 
projects and the responses of the research participants to those problems. The site 
meetings on both projects are called Contract Review Meetings, The meetings are 
MC’s primary means of communicating programme and financial information from 
the site to head office, linking the company level accounting cost control policies to 
project cost control through monthly meetings held on site. The purpose of the 
meetings is to report a project’s progress against programme and financial position at 
the end of a month. The meetings are a key part of MC’s organisational governance. 
Two senior managers from head office attend the meetings, the Operations Director 
and the Commercial Manager. The rest of the participants are members of the site 
team, the Site Manager, the Site Quantity Surveyor, the Design Coordination 
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Manager (where applicable) and their assistants. The agenda for the meetings is 
common across the all MC’s projects. The meetings do not include the process of 
reconciliation (the comparison of cost and net realisable value required for the 
company’s management accounts, called a cost value reconciliation). However the 
meeting does inform the CVC that is subsequently produced by the Commercial 
Manager, but was not observed. 
 
Data collection with the main contractor also involved observation events (Table 5). 
This encompassed three supply chain network events, a BIM implementation event 
and the commercial testing of three alternative costing software packages. These 
activities involved related deliverables to the main contractor for their internal use (as 
described in Section 1.3), namely a survey of their supply chain’s attitudes to BIM 
and collation and reporting of feedback from participants from the software testing. 
The researcher, whilst participating in these events for the company deliverables, 
also observed the event to find out the inherent behaviour of the firm by observing 
their concerns and conduct in order to understand what was taking place. 
 
Ref Event Title Nature of organisation(s) 
31 BIM model health check Main contractor and design software supplier 
32 Supply Chain Forum Main contractor and regional category A star 
subcontractors 
33 Supply Chain Forum Main contractor and regional category A star 
subcontractors 
34 Costing software testing Main contractor and software supplier 1 
35 Costing software testing Main contractor and software supplier 2 
36 Costing software testing Main contractor and software supplier 3 
37 Supply Chain Workshop Main contractor and project 2 supply chain 
38 Planning software 
testing 
Software supplier 4 
39 Payment software 
testing 
Software supplier 5 
 
Table 5: Summary of observation of events 
 
The observations of projects and events were recorded as field notes. 
 
3.5.7 Workshops 
 
Three workshops were held during the course of the project (Table 6). The created 
context of workshops (as described by Steyaert and Bouwen (2004), where the 
researcher brought participants together, provided a second opportunity to observe 
groups.  Steyaert and Bouwen (2004) note the advantage of created group contexts, 
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which can provide rich information that is exploratory and generates ideas. But they 
note that the role of the researcher needs careful consideration. The workshops 
involved in this research involved the researcher and the research supervisors. 
Steyaert and Bouwen (2004) note that group processes should steer the progress of 
created workshops. The researcher therefore facilitated the process, rather than the 
content, of the workshops. 
 
The first workshop brought together senior managers from the pre-construction and 
site operation teams of the main contractor. The purpose of the workshop was to test 
whether the preliminary results from interviews, document reviews and observations 
chimed with reality, and where true opportunities for improvement could lie, which 
could have a demonstrable affect on the organisation’s costs. The workshop first 
presented preliminary results from interviews and observations that explored current 
costing practises. The workshop then aimed to discuss different ways of working that 
MC may have in the medium-term future. The workshop presented possible causes 
and effects of inefficiency in site operations that were influenced by lean construction 
to start debate on possible opportunities to improve site operations in the supply 
chain and discuss what the order of the cost saving in these opportunities might be in 
a project.  
 
The second workshop brought together four tiers of the mechanical and electrical 
services work package supply chain, SCA. This encompassed a Project Site 
Manager from MC (in tier 1 of the supply chain), an Operations Manager from SCA1 
(the mechanical and electrical services subcontractor in tier 2 of the supply chain), an 
Operations Manager from SCA2 (the electrical services subcontractor at tier 3), and 
an Electrician from SCA3 (the tier 4 electrical subcontractor). The aim of the 
workshop was to jointly explore opportunities for improvement in site operations, to 
help the overall research aim, which was to attach costs to how to do a better job on 
site.  
 
The third workshop reassembled senior managers from the pre-construction and site 
operation teams of the main contractor. The workshop first presented final results 
from interviews and observations that explored current costing practises and 
potential improvement interventions. The workshop then aimed to discuss and better 
understand the links between real world problems of contractors’ costs and 
contractors’ work plans.  
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Ref Workshop Participants Nature of organisation(s) 
40 1 As above Main contractor 
41 2 As above Supply Chain 
42 3 As above Main contractor 
 
Table 6: Summary of workshops 
 
The workshops were audio recorded and transcribed. An example of an extract from 
a transcription of a workshop is included in the Appendix A2.4. 
 
3.5.8 Summary of research activity 
 
The relationship between organisations in the case study was presented earlier in 
Figure 5 in Section 3.5.2.  The eight organisations are represented here in Table 7 
below to show the breadth and depth of the case study of a supply chain across 
organisations and across data collection methods. 
 
Supply chain 
 
Tier 4 Tier 3 Tier 2 Tier 1 
SCA 
 
Mechanical 
and electrical 
services 
SCA3 
 
Documents 
Workshop 
3 
SCA2 
 
Workshop 3 
SCA1 
 
Interviews 
Documents  
Workshop 3 
 
 
 
MC 
 
Interviews 
Documents  
(Projects A and B) 
Observations 
(Projects A and B) 
Workshops 
 (1, 2 and 3) 
SCB 
Suspended 
ceilings and 
partitions 
 SCB2 
 
Information 
provided by SCB1 
SCB1 
 
Interviews 
Documents  
 
SCC 
 
Moveable 
partitions 
 
 SCC2 
 
Information 
provided by SCC1 
 
SCC1 
 
Interviews 
 
 
Table 7: The breadth and depth of case study material 
 
The main contractor and the five subcontractors in the un-shaded boxes directly 
participated in the research. The two subcontractors at the bottom of supply chains B 
and C in the shaded boxes did not participate in the research. They are included in 
the diagram to show the depth of each supply chain and because the T2 
subcontractors in supply chains B and C gave views on this tier of their supply chain 
below them.  
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3.6  Research framework for data analysis 
 
This section describes how the data was summarised and analysed to present and 
explain the problems found.  
 
As summarised in the previous Section 3.5.8, five methods of data were used to 
collect data in the primary research. This resulted in a large volume of audio 
recordings, transcriptions, summaries of documents and field notes. As described 
previously in Section 1.4 and 3.3, a research approach of systemic combining logic 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002 and 2014) was used as the main approach to keeping 
track of the volume of data collected. Systemic combining logic follows a procedure 
of matching: going back and forth between theory and data gathered. This abductive 
approach generates a “tight and emerging” research framework. 
 
The researcher built an initial, rather sketchy and general research framework that 
emerged from theory on the sequential nature of standard contractor estimating and 
cost control processes. The chronological sequence of the costing system served as 
this initial framework in order to describe, understand and explain contractors’ current 
approaches to supply chain costing and compare these to concepts in literature.  
• Cost handling during tendering 
• Costs at contract 
• Cost handling during site operations 
• Cost handing at final account 
 
The researcher then developed the framework using concepts from estimating and 
tendering practice (Towey, 2012; Greenhalgh, 2013; Kirkham, 2015; and Brook, 
2017) (i) estimates of the use of resources and its further division into labour, 
material plant, contingencies, overheads and profit (ii) quotations received and (iii) 
strategic tendering decisions. This expansion of the research framework by the 
researcher explained some of the methods of costing, organisational behaviour and 
decision-making that had been found. As the empirical data collection continued to 
find out about current approaches to controlling expenditure during site operations, 
the researcher further developed the framework from emerging observations that 
identified examples of methods of cost control. From observations, the researcher 
further divided cost handling during site operations into the concepts of keeping to 
budget, keeping to time and cashflow. The researcher further drew of concepts from 
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theory in construction improvement and supply chain management (Mosey, 2009; 
Koskela et al., 2002; BIS (2013) and Pries and Doree, 2005), and participants’ 
experience and views on the link between costing and improvement. The concepts 
from theory that participants had experience of and views on in practice were early 
contractor involvement, collaborative planning and innovations in materials, plant and 
equipment. The researcher therefore encompassed these in to the research 
framework. These efforts to match theory and reality created two higher-level 
concepts that were recurring in theory and in observations: money and work done. 
These were added to the framework. The final framework that arose from concepts in 
literature and from what people said is set out in Table 8 below. 
 
Initial framework 
 
Expanded framework from abductive matching 
Cost handling during tendering Use of resources 
Quotations received 
Strategic tendering decisions 
Costs at contract 
Value engineering 
Cost handling during site operations Keeping to budget  
Keeping to plan 
Cashflow 
Cost handing at final account 
Improvement interventions Early contractor involvement 
Collaborative planning 
Innovation in materials plant and equipment 
Money 
Work done 
 
Table 8: The research framework for data analysis 
 
The framework was used to built up a multi-tiered picture of cost handling in 
construction projects that will be used in Chapter 4 to show how forecasts of costs 
are created and how actual cost are incurred and flow between organisations in the 
supply chain. 
 
3.7  Research journey 
 
This research, as described in Section 3.5 above, originated in an agreement forged 
by the research supervisor, between the research institution the main contractor for 
the contractor’s sponsorship of a research student for a period of three years, to 
undertake work of mutual interest in “contractor costing in BIM”. The main contractor 
and the research institution jointly chose the researcher. The researcher is a 
chartered quantity surveyor with 24 years’ experience in practice in Local 
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Government. The researcher took voluntary redundancy to pursue this research due 
to her interest in what academic research has to offer in this practical study with an 
industry partner. The researcher was familiar with the process and practice of 
costing, with 12 years experience acting in the roles of quantity surveyor, employer’s 
agent and design team manager. In embarking on the research project she was 
returning to the field of quantity surveying, having spent her latter 12 years’ as a 
senior manager in social housing policy and practice in Local Government, and a 
non-executive director in Housing Associations. Thus the researcher had a full 
grounding in the practices and jargon of construction costing, experience of working 
in organisations (and thus managing the research partnership), and a fresh outlook 
on the research subject, with no professional bias, having moved away from quantity 
surveying practice in the latter 12 years of her career. 
 
The first task for the researcher was to shape the research proposal by setting out 
the objectives of the partnership. The researcher, research institution and main 
contractor were all interested in studying contractors’ costing practices in light of the 
change to digitisation of information that was on-going in the industry. The original, 
outline research proposal was to gain an understanding of how real supply chain 
costs are built up through a project; how supply chain knowledge can be used to 
deliver better projects; costing methods in BIM, particularly comparing object costs 
with production activity costs, with an intention of creating theory on supply chain 
integration for construction using BIM. The main contractor’s intention was to take 
account of the research as they started to use BIM technologies for cost 
management of projects across their business.  
 
Discussions based on the research proposal fed into a Collaboration Agreement 
(Appendix A1.1) and a timetable of company and academic deliverables. The 
studentship was formally established in in February 2013. The researcher carried out 
tasks specifically requested by the main contractor, parallel to, but separately from, 
the academic tasks. Between April and July 2013, as a task for the main contractor, 
the researcher carried out a survey of the subcontracting companies in the main 
contractor’s supply chain network. The survey aimed to uncover subcontractors’ 
attitudes to BIM. In July 2013 the researcher delivered a survey report to the main 
contractor. During August and September 2013 the researcher carried out 
commercial tests of proprietary software for cost estimating for the main contractor. 
The researcher carried this out with members the main contractors’ pre-construction 
estimating and site quantity surveying teams. In October 2013 the researcher 
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delivered a report on the comparative functionality of five different software 
applications tested. This thesis does not report on these two company deliverables. 
However, the activities contributed to data collection for the academic deliverables. 
 
In March 2014 the research team published an academic paper based on the survey 
of the main contractors’ supply chain members and concepts of construction 
improvement and supply chain management in literature. This conference paper “UK 
supply chain attitudes to BIM” (Appendix A3.1) concluded that the subcontractors 
saw successful BIM implementation as conditional on strategic changes from short-
term project-based relationships to more long-term relationships with main 
contractors. However literature showed that in practice new ways of working in 
construction supply chains have taken an operational approach. Subcontractor’s 
desire for strategic change was also contradictory to the advantages of the dynamic 
capabilities (Green et al., 2008) that subcontractors gain from short-term project-
based relationships. These early findings started to reveal that the research problem 
of finding a new model of costs to account for supply chain improvement could not be 
isolated from wider systemic issues in the industry. 
 
The researcher undertook interviews with participants across the main contractor’s 
organisation. Access to the subcontractors who became involved in interviews for the 
study came from different routes. The researcher recruited one subcontractor 
through networking at the main contractor’s supply chain forums. A Director in the 
main contractor facilitated introductions to two of the subcontractors and the research 
supervisor facilitated introduction to the fourth subcontractor. A Director in the main 
contractor identified the two projects and facilitated introductions to the site teams. 
The researcher then carried out interviews and observations. In this phase of the 
research, the costing routines in different firms were analysed in detail and compared 
between firms. The results were presented to the main contractor in the first 
workshop and discussed in relation to improvements in site operation. 
 
In September 2015 the research team published a second academic paper “Are 
contractors’ cost accounting practices up to the job of establishing improvements in 
site operations?” (Appendix A3.2). This conference paper marked a redirection of the 
research. The paper reported that literature showed that Activity Based Costing was 
the main source of new information on costs associated with methods of work in 
commerce. This brought construction activities in to the picture. But the research 
showed that in construction supply chains, cost information on construction methods 
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that would be useful in rewarding improvement was either not created, or lost as cost 
information passed between firms. This led the research in a new direction, from 
pursuing more detail in current costing practices, to a consideration of the connection 
between the context of construction and its operations, as the fundamental direction 
for a solution. 
 
This change in direction of the research required new theory from literature and new 
research into the realities in site operations as experienced through the supply chain. 
New literature by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) showed that a loose relationship 
between work done and surrogate costs had been seen as a problem in commerce 
since the 1980s. Dean(1993) showed that accounting for improvements persisted as 
a problem in the space and aerospace industry, not just construction. Data collection 
continued with a new focus and the researcher put together a second workshop that 
brought four tiers of a supply chain together to talk about their every-day experiences 
on site and where they thought opportunities for improvement might lie. In June 2016 
the research was published in a journal paper “Studying cost as information to 
account for construction improvement” (Appendix A3.3). The paper concluded that 
“The problems with costing and the actual management practices in the industry 
require a systemic change to effect improvement involving not just new templates, 
but new cost information and changed supply chain relationships.” This required new 
research into “cost as information” given the move into the information world of BIM. 
 
The search for complimentary theory continued after the final phase of data 
collection, guided by the empirical findings. Particularly useful theory would 
emphasise the systemic nature of supply chain operations and explore the nature of 
information in order to link IT to the organisations it is used in. The research from this 
point drew on the Tavistock Institute’s (1966) work on the characteristics of the 
construction industry that need to be taken into account in any model of the 
construction process: interdependence and uncertainty. It also enrolled Winch’s 
(2010) tectonic model of the construction system. It drew on Rosenhead’s (1989) soft 
systems theory as a general framework for analysing social organisations.  It then 
drew heavily on Beynon-Davies’ (2011) framework of forma, informa and performa 
as a general theoretical foundation in order to illuminate the link in construction 
between costing systems, projects, organisations and IT, that were not yet fully 
realised at this point. These concepts were used to redefine the research problem 
from the single pursuit of greater detail in costing to simpler cost models that are 
more useful for improvement deep into the supply chain. This has brought the impact 
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of construction planning into focus and the insights from theory put future research 
into construction planning in construction supply chains as a starting point for further 
research, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the conclusion to this thesis. 
This research journey illustrates how the focus of this research changed as findings 
from the data collection came into confrontation with theory. This is the essence of 
Dubois and Gadde’s  (2002 and 2014) abductive research approach that was taken 
of systemic combining logic.  
Through the research, the researcher set out to learn about both the research 
process and the research subject. During the process the researcher learnt from both 
the theoretical frameworks enrolled in the research and from the empirical findings. 
This researcher found a great value in this interplay between findings and theory. 
From a background in practice, where policy is established and then not 
reconsidered as it is carried out, the researcher learned the value of openness to 
dialogue inherent in the research approach taken. The research process as carried 
out supported the researcher’s intellectual development and understanding of what 
academic research is and what it has to offer. The research process supported the 
researcher’s realisation that it is possible, and indeed common, to carry out a role in 
practice, without really understanding what you are involved in. The researcher was 
privileged to work with some participants who had a rich understanding of what they 
were involved in and said “we are mad if we are still doing it this way in ten years 
time.” 
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS FROM A CASE STUDY OF A SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter reports at the findings obtained from the primary research that was 
undertaken as a case study of a supply chain, encompassing a main contractor and 
seven subcontractors across three work package supply chains (supply chains for 
subcontract packages of work) as described in Section 3.5. The data was collected 
though semi-structured interviews, in-depth reviews of documents, non-participant 
observations, and workshops as described in Section 3.5.  
 
The research framework is used in this Chapter to structure the presentation of the 
problem and its analysis in this Chapter. The evolution of the research framework 
from both theory and the empirical data collected was described in Section 3.6. The 
framework is part chronological and part thematic. The chronological element of the 
framework covers cost handling during tendering, at contract, during value 
engineering, during site operations and at final account, each with thematic 
subsections. The framework then covers improvement interventions, again with 
thematic subsections.  
 
The empirical data presented in this Chapter primarily reflects the first research 
objective: to determine how current approaches to supply chain costing affect supply 
chain operation and overall construction costs on a project. The empirical data 
touches on the second research objective, to determine how different approaches to 
costing of supply chain operation can be used to deliver efficiency and cost savings 
in projects, where that was within the personal experience of participants. 
 
The findings are presented in this Chapter against the research framework with 
supporting quotations selected to illustrate specific examples. The presentation of the 
findings that follows takes a view from the lower tiers of the supply chain upwards, in 
that it presents illustrative quotations from subcontractors (tiers 2, 3 and 4 of the 
supply chain) first, in the left hand column, and presents comparative illustrative 
quotations from the main contractor (tier 1 of the supply chain) afterwards, in the right 
hand column. All quotations are notated to identify the tier, the work package and the 
organisation that they come from. Figure 6 below is represented here from Section 
3.5.2 to show the notations used for each organisation and the relationship between 
organisations. 
 88 
 
 
Figure 6: The notations for organisations and relationship between organisations in 
the case study 
 
All the quotations presented in the Chapter are also cross referenced to the specific 
interview, workshop, site meeting or event that they come from, using by the 
reference numbers for each research event (1 to 42) that were established in Section 
3.5. This Chapter ends with a summary and analysis of the findings against two 
higher-level concepts, money and work done. 
 
4.2  Cost handling during tendering 
 
4.2.1 Competitive tendering 
 
This first Section considers how, in a tendering situation, contactors and 
subcontractors address the problem of estimating the costs of the resources a 
project is forecast to absorb. The client sets the timeframe for the tendering exercise. 
The client also chooses the format for the model that costs are to be presented in. 
The cost model is usually the industry standard bill of quantities in which, as set out 
in Literature Section 2.2.1, costs are presented against measured items of work or 
lump sums for preliminaries and contingencies. Contributions to a firm’s general 
overheads and an expected profit are spread across each of these. The estimating 
process starts when a main contractor receives an invitation to tender for a project 
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from a client. The main contractor splits a project up into work packages: subcontract 
packages of work. and invites subcontractors to tender for work packages. 
Subcontractors may split their work package into smaller parts and so on. This 
produces a supply chain of firms tendering for a project.  
 
This section explains how estimators across the supply chain go about forecasting 
the resources a project will absorb. There is an industry standard cost-plus project 
costing method, in which each firm in the supply chain estimates their input costs of 
labour, materials, plant, equipment and project overheads. They then add a 
proportion of their firm’s general overheads and allowances for risk contingencies 
and profit. Forecasts of costs are built up though the supply chain towards the full 
cost of the project in a main contractor’s bid. Across the supply chain most firms 
have the same three categories of cost: use of own resources, quotations received 
and strategic tendering decisions. These three categories are used to present the 
findings in this section that seeks to uncover covers cost handling practices during 
tendering. 
 
4.2.2  Use of own resources 
 
Estimators across the supply chain may create cost information using first principles: 
the activities that consume a firm’s own internal resources of labour, materials and 
plant as described in literature in Section 2.2.1. The findings show that contractors 
created cost forecasts of the use of the labour, materials, plant, equipment and 
project overheads for physical work they will do on site using their firm’s own 
resources  
 
Forecasting the amount of labour required for the tasks that are absorbed by 
measured items is less straightforward. Estimates of the amount of labour forecast 
are mostly historically-determined norms, with project specific adjustments. 
Participants explained that they forecast the amount of labour based on industry 
standard sources of historical rates of labour productivity for different tasks, or their 
firm’s own internal standard rates. Estimators then adjust rates of labour productivity 
for the particular project based on design features, such as working in open or 
restricted spaces. In SCB the full risk of exceeding or falling short of the expected 
labour productivity rate is passed on to the labour-only subcontractors at the bottom 
of their supply chain, SCB2. SCB1 engages SCB2 on an output related incentive 
scheme: a price basis in which a daily payment is set based on an expected output. 
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In this case the risk of delivering to the forecast is transferred to SCB2 in the lowest 
tier of the supply chain. 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained ”On our 
estimation software we have site factors, 
which is what we use against labour… it 
might be a big warehouse, and 
everything’s 10 metres in the air and we’re 
working off large towers, so we add ten or 
fifteen per cent onto our labour costs for 
that… If we’ve got conduit running right 
the way down long corridors, straight runs, 
that’s fantastic, we’ll have a rate for that. 
But then when we’re doing toilet blocks, 
where it’s all little fiddly bends and all 
sorts, we change the rate.” SCA1 (15)  
 
At T3 in SCB, SCB1 explained that they 
transfer the risk of labour productivity to 
their labour-only subcontractors in T3 by 
negotiating a lump sum for labour. “All the 
labour, instead of being paid on day rate 
is paid on price, so basically, the more 
they put up, the more they earn.” (10) 
SCB1 explained (14) that they negotiate 
with T3 to agree a lump sum for T3 to put 
up a set area of ceiling. They explained 
that the calculation starts with an 
assumption of what a good fixer can put 
up in a day. This varies between projects 
based on the size of the job. A fixer who 
puts up 40 square meters per day earns 
more in a day than a fixer who puts up 30 
square metres.” (14) 
 
At T1, MC explained that the number and 
time requirements of directly employed 
managers is decided and the total is 
allocated to an item for site management 
in the preliminaries. The quantity is thus 
time related to the contract period. 
 
Quotations 1: Forecasting quantities of direct labour 
 
Forecasting the cost for direct labour is a relatively straightforward, technical exercise 
based on agreed pay rates. Costs for directly employed labour are derived from 
annually updated schedules collated by the organisation of the salaries that they pay, 
usually based on national wage agreements and salary on-costs. The degree of 
exposure of rates of pay to the market differs between trades. Rates of pay in the 
main contractor’s site team are fairly stable but rates of pay for specialist 
tradespeople at the bottom of the supply chain vary, even project by project, in 
response to demand for their work in the market. Predicted rises in demand for a 
specific trade gives rise to specific increases in rates of pay. Firms at the bottom of 
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SCB and SCC, sole traders in temporary employment as either an individual or a 
gang, experience the most volatile rates of pay.  
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained that the 
costs of directly employed managers and 
operatives are based on ‘company costs’ 
(15) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that they 
do not directly employ any operatives 
and the costs of managers are based on 
salaries plus on costs (14) 
 
At T3 in SCB, SCB2, the practices of the 
labour-only subcontractors who directly 
employ operatives, were reported by 
SCB1 who said that they start with the 
industry standard skilled labour rate for 
the trade and negotiate with SCB2 on 
each project in accordance with the 
going market rate and loyalty in the 
relationship between the two firms. SCB1 
explained that last year they could say to 
SCB2 “this is what I managed to get out 
of the job”. Now they were asking their 
best labourers “what do you want?” (14) 
 
At T1, MC explained that the costs of 
directly employed managers are “salaries 
plus on costs and planned uplifts” (7) 
 
Quotations 2: Forecasting costs of direct labour 
 
Forecasting the quantity of materials that are absorbed by measured items is the 
most straightforward calculation made by estimators and is based the quantity of 
materials, plus their firm’s standard or an industry standard percentage for waste. 
Forecasting the amount of plant required for the tasks that are absorbed by 
measured items is based on plant utilisation rates that are derived from either a firm’s 
standard or industry standard rates based on previous project experience.  
 
Forecasting the cost of material and plant is similar across the project supply chain. 
Forecast costs of directly owned plant comes from a firm’s own schedules. Forecast 
costs of regularly used materials and hired plant are derived from a firm’s regularly 
updated schedules of negotiated prices from suppliers. The costs of materials and 
hired plant are relatively unstable in response to demand across the project supply 
chain. But the length of time that prices are fixed does vary between and within 
different trades. As projects across the industry compete for the same resources any 
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forecast rise in demand for specific materials or plant, such as tower cranes, gives 
rise to increased costs.  
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained that “We’d 
buy all the electrical materials ourselves. 
So lighting, power, containment, cables: 
we’ll buy all that through our own supply 
chain arrangements with lighting 
companies or wholesalers…when we’re 
tendering we would always be using the 
latest figures that we can buy that 
equipment for” (9) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that “we'll 
get a material list together, put it onto a 
spread sheet, we'll then send that material 
list over to the distributors, they'll then 
send prices back for the materials and 
we've got formulas set up in Excel for 
different systems and so we'd just price 
from there… ninety per cent of our 
business goes to one, we still go out to 
two or three, just to make sure their price 
is competitive.” (10).  
 
SCB1 explained that they consult the 
labour only subcontractor about material 
specification and quantities “in the office 
we may think something's going to be built 
one way, on site the fixers might think it's 
going to be built another way. At the end 
of the day, they do it day in, day out; 
they're going to be the best people to 
know what material to use to do the job. 
So there is always a conversation there, 
and we both agree on what's needed.” 
(10) 
 
At T2 in SCC, SCC1, the specialist 
component subcontractor, explained that 
they can fix prices for component parts a 
year in advance with their supplier “we 
have established exclusivity agreements 
with recognised and high quality 
manufacturing partners…we have …a 
software package which is synchronised 
with [component manufacturer], so it’s 
kept up to date, they don’t change the 
prices on a day to day basis, it’s sort of an 
annual thing with plenty of notice.”  (11) 
 
At T1, MC explained that the cost of 
plant is based on internal or external 
hire rates. 
Quotations 3: Forecasting quantities and costs of materials and plant 
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First principle costs are created in this way by the firms that will do the physical work. 
This is the textbook method. MC explained how a groundwork subcontractor told 
them that they do not use first principle estimating for pricing manholes: forecasting 
costs of labour, materials and plant based on detailed quantities of brickwork, 
pipework and the other parts of each manhole. Instead they rely upon ‘experience-
based models’: alternative, informal, less detailed methods of building up costs of a 
project that rely on an estimator’s experience and judgement. This was described in 
literature Section 2.2.2. Participants also called this “back of the envelope” 
estimating. 
 
At T2, MC were asked about their 
knowledge of the way their 
subcontractors price the bill of quantities. 
The main contractor’s quantity survey 
observed that not all subcontractors have 
the costing systems to allocate resource 
costs to activities. 
“[we asked a subcontractor] how do you 
price a manhole? Do you get the cost of 
the concrete, brickwork, pipes and 
manhole cover and work out how much? 
No. We put five hundred quid in for each 
one. So how do you know that works? 
Well, we know it works and when it starts 
not to work we put our price up” MC (5) 
 
 
Quotations 4: experience-based estimating 
 
4.2.3 Quotations received 
 
The costs of the physical work that firms will do on site are passed up the supply 
chain in quotations. The main contractor estimated that 70% of the cost information 
building up to their costs comes from quotations received from subcontractors. SCA1 
and SCB1 also subcontract as much as 60% to 70% of their work by turnover. Thus 
the extent and therefore importance of quotations is significant as a source of cost 
information. 
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Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2, SCA1 explained that the size of 
their direct labour force is not fixed and 
influenced by the market and regional 
practices. “direct labour force...how we’d 
prefer to deliver a project, because you’ve 
got much better control over the quality, 
and the people, and who’s doing what, 
etc. But you can appreciate that when it 
turned down, and suddenly you’ve go 200 
guys and you’ve only got work for 100, 
you just can’t carry them….the Northern 
region has mostly direct delivery with few 
subcontracts. Ductwork would always be 
subcontract, and the specialist security 
and fire systems, but the electrical 
lighting, the power, and the pipework are 
all direct delivery. That reduces a bit in the 
Midlands. In London it’s pretty much all 
subcontract, That’s just traditionally the 
market in London.” “on the mechanical 
side we would always subcontract 
ductwork: that’s a supply and install 
package. Pipework, that varies: we carry 
our own direct labour but we would also 
often subcontract pipework systems, and 
we might subcontract materials and labour 
because there’s an element of risk with 
delivery issues.” (SCA1 9)  
 
At T2 SCB1 explained that they do not 
directly employ any labour. “All of our 
labour is sub-contract… thirty, forty 
blokes, we've been using for at least five, 
ten years… they are all self-employed, or 
they have their own limited companies, or 
they're sole traders…A gang would 
be…anywhere between four to ten 
people…The majority of supervisors are 
also fitters, so they're normally working 
supervisors” (SCB1 10) 
 
At T2 in SCC, SCC1 explained “We do 
use quite a lot of subcontractors, the 
reason we do that is predominantly the 
best guys have set themselves up as sub 
contract companies in their own right…We 
have got current plans to actually take on 
our own fitting teams.  We have got our 
own Service Engineers.” (11) 
 
At T1, MC explained that they directly 
employ site managers but no operatives. 
They explained how the size of their 
management team on a project is not 
fixed, it is influenced by the market. They 
described how the recession had driven 
them to resource projects with “Five 
managers to about 400 operatives on 
site.” (41) 
 
 
Quotations 5: Extent of subcontracting through the supply chain 
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Across the supply chain estimators, sometimes called “buyers”, receive quotations. 
The estimators compare the quotations they receive from competing firms. To 
compare quotations estimators make technical comparisons between quotations. 
They also use “buying skills” such as judgements about the track records and loyalty 
of competing firms, knowledge of the levels of standard trading discounts (discounts 
they expect to get that recognise trade business), and knowledge of competition in 
the market for specific work packages. They used their negotiating skills depending 
on the level of completion in the market. For example competition in the market for 
mechanical and electrical services work package is limited as there are a limited 
number of firms available to compete for this subcontract package of work, so scope 
for negotiation is limited in these circumstances. 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 illustrated the lack of 
competition in the mechanical and 
electrical services work package. They 
described the tension between MC’s 
desire for an exclusive arrangement 
(described as a back-to-back agreement) 
at tender stage, and their own desire to 
be part of all the competing tenders for a 
project. 
 
“we might get asked by two builders or 
three builders to go back-to-back with 
them. Again, potentially because of our 
name and because of our reputation, we 
sometimes find ourselves in that 
situation. And then at other times we just 
end up saying we’re just going to bid 
everybody because we’d rather have a 
competitive bid in the market. If you will 
want to name us then that’s fine, but 
we’re not going to just go back-to-back 
with you, because we end up in a 
position there where if the main 
contractor loses the project because 
they’ve done a bad bid, we might have 
done the best M&E bid out of everybody, 
but the main contractor’s bid is two 
million over, and that’s it: we’ve lost the 
job because of it. So there’s this whole 
backing the wrong horse or backing the 
right horse, which is awkward, but a lot of 
large contracts require you to tender that 
way” (9) 
 
At T1, MC illustrated the lack of 
competition in mechanical and electrical 
services work package. They described 
how the limited size of market makes it 
hard to secure competition between 
mechanical and electrical services firms 
when demand rises.  
 
“So when I've got an order to let for a 
twelve million M&E package and I really 
want to go to three or four big players in 
the Midlands, they're all going to be 
busy.” MC (40) 
 
Quotations 6: Limited competition for mechanical and electrical services 
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Findings show that it is standard practice across all tiers of the supply chain for 
quotations to be selected for inclusion in a tender on the basis of lowest price 
through competitive bidding. This Chapter will return to the category of costs sourced 
from quotations in section 4.5.1, where further findings show that the subcontract 
work package quotations received in a competitive tendering situation at the client’s 
tender stage, are revisited through a secondary tendering process, by a main 
contractor, if and when a main contractor wins the tender. 
 
4.2.4 Strategic tendering decisions 
 
Once estimators and buyers have created forecasts of costs from estimated direct 
costs and subcontract prices they pass this on in their organisation for senior 
manager input. A commercial manager, or equivalent, reviews the information and 
establishes the project mark-up. The mark-up is created for their expert opinion on (i) 
anticipated costs for contingencies for the level of uncertainty and risk in the project 
(ii) a margin to recover a proportion of the firm’s general overheads and (iii) a level of 
profit expected to be earned from the project. MC explained how mark-up cost 
information relies heavily on risk analysis and market knowledge to inform a figure 
that best accounts for project uncertainties and what the market will bear.  
Participants explained the realities of their intense discussions about contingencies, 
overheads and profit. The “vigorous debates” by senior managers over strategic 
tendering decisions contrasts with the relatively straightforward decisions that are 
made by less senior people about use of resources and quotations.  Thus experience 
and judgement are the main ingredients of decisions about risk and margins. 
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
AT T2 in SCA, SCA1 “We apply risk 
costs, overheads and profit, as agreed 
in the settlement meeting with directors 
and this form [the tender settlement] 
becomes the financial record of our 
tender. If successful this passes to the 
project delivery team as a record of 
decisions made at tender stage to 
come to our offer.” SCA1 (15) 
 
At T1 MC “We've had some vigorous debates 
about what the correct level of risk 
contingency should be on those jobs. We’ve 
had similar debates on every single job and 
it's the most subjective point taken…MD 
adjudicates it and he sits there and says, well 
I tell you what. We really want this job” MC 
(40) 
 
“There are two layers. Some people might 
take a few bob off to win a job but the figure 
they take that from is a figure which people 
have already made assumptions on.” MC 
(40) 
 
Quotations 7: Estimating risk and profit 
 97 
Participants described the differing amounts of risk they were prepared to take in 
respect of the level of design detail reached at tender. The mechanical and electrical 
services subcontractor, who has significant responsibility for design, puts a protective 
barrier into their tender by requiring a high level of design detail for their tender 
estimation. On the other hand, when the main contractor has no control over design 
information and when trades that do not have any design responsibility they have to 
take decisions about costs and without interaction with the designers. 
 
At T2, MC explained the difference they 
saw between their approach to design 
risk and the mechanical and electrical 
services  subcontractor’s more cautious 
approach to design risk. 
“[M&E contractors] interestingly…don't 
start procurement until they've got ninety 
five per cent technical sign off on the job. 
Now in a way that's contrary to ours.. 
we’ll lock in some deals... theirs is, let's 
not lock in deals coz we need to know 
they're technically right so we don't get 
caught out by variations in sub-
contractors.” MC (40) 
 
 
Quotations 8: Reducing risk in mechanical and electrical services 
 
Sometimes, a contractor has particular knowledge of a specific technical problem or 
a specific site factor that is not stated in tender documents. They either choose not to 
share this information and hope that they are paid the extra costs when the problem 
comes to light. Or they choose to share this information by “qualifying” their tender by 
listing their assumptions. Where contractors chose to share this information through 
qualifications they reported that it is standard practice for this to be disregarded on 
the basis that competing firms have absorbed the risk, either knowingly in order to 
not lose the job, or unknowingly. Good information can be lost in this way. 
 
At T2, SCB1 felt they were asked to take 
design risks 
“We usually list our clarifications and 
assumptions. Most people ignore that.” 
SCA2 (15) 
 
At T1, MC They described how they cost 
reductions or risk can be forced on them  
“the ground has got asbestos. You have 
to put in the quarter of a million pound 
price in and you then qualify it…. so 
they've said…remove all your 
qualifications. Stand by your price…If 
you pass on that risk and they [the 
subcontractor] collapse, the risk comes 
back to you” MC (40) 
Quotations 9: Taking risk 
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Firms estimate the overall costs of their own work, including what they think will be 
needed, not just what is described in the tender documents. The estimator checks, 
and hence improves, information received on quantities and specifications for 
measured items of work and customises these for work that is under or over-
measured, and under or over-specified. The suspended ceilings and partitions 
subcontractor expressed distrust of the client’s quantity surveyor’s ability to measure 
the work in their subcontract package accurately. The moveable partitions 
subcontractor expressed distrust of architects’ ability to specify components 
satisfactorily in the design information and quantity surveyors’ ability to measure it 
accurately. The mechanical and electrical services subcontractor as described before 
has significant responsibility for design. They put a protective, arms-length distance 
between themselves and the bill of quantities. Their work is generally measured as a 
lump sum against a plan and specification with supporting rates, not as rates against 
measured items. The main contractor expressed pragmatic acceptance that rates 
against measured items cannot be considered as accurately representing work done. 
The bill of quantities carries information about cost between firms. Participants saw a 
weak relationship between the bill of quantities and the cost information created within 
firms. All tiers of the supply chain generally thought that the detailed cost model, the 
bill of quantities, can significantly misrepresent forecast cost against specific measured 
items as costs can be manipulated across cost items in the model.  
 
T2 in SCB, SCB1 They explained that 
whether or not the main contractor provides a 
bill of quantities or not, they measure their 
quantities from the drawings. “Nine times out 
of ten, it's been prepared by someone that 
doesn't know your specific trade, so it's very 
generic, lack of detail and half of the time it 
isn't worth the paper it's written on, unless it's 
something simple like measuring squares.  If 
there's a bit of detail in it it's written down in a 
format that you don't understand, it doesn't 
relate to any drawings and it's just confusing 
more than anything else…we've done the 
take off ourselves and then you know you've 
covered all your details.” (10) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that price the 
main contractors itemised bill of quantities 
when they get the job. We don’t trust the 
main contractor’s bill of quantities, we 
prepare our own” (14) 
 
 
At T1, MC “There is a lot of 
manipulation in bills and a lot of game 
playing. So to try and get the truth we'd 
love to see what the true net costs are. 
There are so many people playing 
different versions of the same game it's 
really difficult to strike a line through 
and say, that's reality. Because we 
know that it's the rough with the smooth 
you don't really entertain that because 
their opportunity is in the next job too. 
So that’s the drive for the game playing 
you get.” MC (40) 
 
“you make more money on being paid 
for what you don't do than what  you do 
do. So if you get paid to hang fifteen 
doors and there's actually only twelve in 
there you make a hundred per cent 
profit on the fitting of three doors” MC 
(40) 
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At T2 on SCC, SCC1 “We try and avoid filling 
in bills of quantities, the reason we try and 
avoid doing that is that if it is a bigger job with 
several walls on it, what is factored into all 
those prices is a degree of shared costs. So 
if they then delete one of those items, they 
don’t increase the price of the others that are 
left, they just take away the one, and that’s 
no good to us because like transport costs 
are shared.”  (11) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that they may 
not create fully detailed information due to 
lack of time. “we’d love to, but we don’t ever 
seem to be able to get to that prime cost at 
tender, because it’s done in four weeks 
sometimes.” SCA1 (20) 
 
Quotations 10: Disconnection between a client’s cost model and contractors’ private 
cost information 
 
4.3 Costs at contract 
 
Literature in Section 2.3.2 emphasised the importance of the cost model established 
at contract. Findings showed that the costs in the contract documents are based on 
many assumptions, as at this point in time. Contractors cannot accurately predict 
what the building process and its costs will be but costs are fixed in a contract 
against specific measured items. Participants saw their prices as what this thesis will 
call commercial rational decisions about cost commitments, in which all parties 
accept the uncertainty inherent in what will be required to fulfil their part of the 
bargain. 
 
4.4 Value engineering 
 
The commercial bargain made between a main contractor and a client is usually 
based on the client choosing the lowest tender. If a chosen tender is above a client’s 
budget, the client may ask for a value engineering exercise to be carried out to 
reduce costs as described in literature Section 5.2.2. MC explained that this process 
undermines the assumptions they have made at tender stage. MC explained the 
difficulty of accommodating changes to design within the commercial decisions they 
have taken about cost and time to come to their tender figure. MC explained how 
value engineering to achieve cost reductions is not easily costed because the 
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changes have a broad effect on how the project hangs together that is not reflected 
in costs for individual measured items.  
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
 At T1, MC “When you get involved in the 
value engineering process, you start off 
with the job that's been well considered, 
but then we embark upon this period 
when we undo all that work and we pick 
at all the edges of it. So that the 
coordinated piece of design now has got 
different assumptions.” MC (40) 
 
Quotations 11: Commercially rational decisions and value engineering 
 
4.5 Cost handling during site operations 
 
4.5.1 Keeping to budget  
 
This Section considers how the main contractor and subcontractors address the 
problem of building to the constraints of a budget, from a start on site to the 
agreement of a final account. By this stage the main contractor has already agreed 
costs with the client. The main contractor’s overall price is a commercial decision, 
based on many assumptions and an acceptance of the uncertainty inherent in what 
will be required to fulfil their part of the bargain made in the contract. The 
subcontractors have provided quotations for work packages, but have not yet been 
engaged through contracts. There is not yet agreement on work package costs. 
Once a budget has been agreed with a client in a contract the main contractor’s site 
team has the job of building to the budget. The focus moves from cost modelling to 
cost monitoring against the cost model. MC explained that when a contract is 
awarded the budget is fixed but there are many ways to spent it. 
 
“[the contract sum] determines our income. But there's many ways we can spend it to 
deliver it and our sub-contractors have exactly the same view.” MC (31) 
 
Participants described the standard practice of undertaking a secondary competitive 
process on all quotations received from subcontractors and suppliers nearer the 
commencement of each subcontract package. Requirements for the physical work to 
be done are unaltered, but contractors throughout the supply chain force cost 
reductions onto their subcontractors and suppliers by asking for a new quotation that 
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is lower then the quote received at tender. This practice works to subcontractors’ 
benefit in a rising market, but outside of a rising market the contractor has the ability 
to force a new quotation out of a subcontractor based on the threat of going 
elsewhere, to competing firms, if price reductions are not given. All participants 
reported that when they are in the strong position of having won work themselves, 
they also seek to get lower prices though their secondary competitive tendering using 
their buying power in the market. Trading discounts again come into play. On top of 
the standard trading discount obtained in the first competitive process for operating in 
construction trades (as referred to in literature Section 2.2.2 and findings Section 
4.2.3), contractors require a further level of additional trading discount (as literature 
Section 2.2.2) in the secondary competitive process. Participants explained how 
knowledge of additional trade discounts can be treated as a way to obtain 
competitive advantage in the first round of competitive tendering, before the discount 
is secured from a subcontractor through the secondary competitive process. Two 
contractors explained that they usually take the risk that an additional trading 
discount, or more, will be realised in further negotiations if and when they enter into a 
contract. Each firm had their own terminology for going back to the market in a 
secondary competitive tendering process to get a cheaper price from their 
subcontractors and suppliers, for example “buying gains”, “betterment” and “savings 
through buying”. 
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 described how MCs 
will nearly always ask them for a lower price 
when the MC gets a job. 
“We never get notified whether it's our price 
being used or whether it's someone 
else's….they will never go with prices 
submitted at tender.  Well, I say never, they 
might do sometimes but it's very rare. They 
always ink them out with the QSs and try 
and get lower prices.” (10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At T1, MC, from the observation of the 
main contractors site meetings, on both 
projects the quantity surveyor led 
discussions on price bargaining based on 
their negotiations with subcontractors.  
 
One work package that had not yet been 
let was the building management system 
(BMS). The budget included a quote from 
‘BMS company A’ and the quantity 
surveyor had obtained two alternative 
quotations 
 
The overall aim was to get new quotes 
lower than the original quotes at tender. 
 
“Carpentry, joinery and ironmongery all 
have opportunities for savings through 
buying” (22) (5 February 14) 
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At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained how, when 
they are asked to provide a better price, 
discussions are accompanied by the threat 
of going elsewhere. “what often happens is 
that we would put a bid in, say it was 
£10,000,000, and we’d say that’s our best 
offer. The main contractor would win the 
work but it wasn’t necessarily with a named 
M&E contractor, it was just that they’ve 
used our price. And then they might come 
back and say ‘Right guys we’ve got the job 
now, we had to knock £2,000,000 off this 
entire project to get this job: you need to 
come along with us, and you need to make 
some savings and knock some money off 
otherwise we’re going to go 
elsewhere…“it’s a buying gain. It might be 
badged up as something else but 
realistically that’s what it is. The question is 
then asked, did they or didn’t they really 
knock that £2,000,000 off? Or are they just 
trying to get some better margin on our 
package?” (9) 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained how, when 
they have won a job with a MC, they then 
go to their subcontractors to get a better 
price “what happens is, after the bids have 
gone in, they say, oh we’ve been told we’re 
not the cheapest can we do anything with 
our price?  There’s always post tender 
questions…you’ve excluded this, how much 
is it going to be to add it in, or, how much 
would it be to take that out? Then they’ll 
say, well look, we’ve had to make a 
commercial decision, we’ve had to knock 
five per cent off our price to win the job, so 
we want you to knock another five per cent 
off….we give a lump sum to the client but 
we reprocure every project…there is a 
commercial benefit for doing that because it 
might be that if you go out to five sub-
contractors, the chances are you are going 
to find one who needs the work a bit more 
than the others.” (15) 
 
AT T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that, having 
secured labour on a lump sum price their 
only avenue for forcing cost reductions 
further down the supply chain is with 
material suppliers “The only way we're ever 
going to get down on price is by going back 
to the distributors, getting better material 
rates.” (10) 
 
“We’ve got a complete breakdown…his 
[‘A Mast Climber subcontractor] surveyor 
is saying he’s committing commercial 
suicide...but we have found a better price 
for the mast climber and his margin is at 
risk if he doesn’t hit our budget” (23) 
 
“He wants 15% overheads and profit on 
£x. We need to agree a sensible figure” 
(23) 
 
“Talk to other subcontractors so he 
knows he may loose. On ‘A Another 
Project’ one day after knowing we were 
going back out to tender ‘A 
subcontractor’ dropped their price by £x” 
(23) 
 
There was consideration about 
relationships as well as cost “ ‘BMS 
Company B’ offers a saving… but M&E 
contractor A’ says they are difficult to 
work with on site and “commissioning 
company A” say they are difficult on site” 
(22) 
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At T2 in SCC, SCC1 a contractor for a 
specialist component said that when they 
are the only firm in the market because a 
client has specified their product by name, 
MC will create the impression that they can 
go elsewhere to competing firms. “we know 
we are specified, they will put together an 
enquiry, that doesn’t show our name 
anywhere or our product, it becomes 
generic, they don’t want us to think that we 
have got any sort of power or any sort of, 
you know what I mean, they do that, which 
is fair enough, because it’s all a game, isn’t 
it, it’s all a game.” (11) 
 
Participants described how trading 
discounts have a unique hold in the 
construction industry as part of price 
bargaining 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 “Subcontractors never 
give their best price first. We pre-discount 
our price when we put our price in. So we 
take a discount off their prices so you add 
all these subcontractor costs. We'll pre-
discount ours before we sell it.” SCA1 (15) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1, the estimator advised 
that they deduct a percentage of the 
resulting cost per square metre for a 
standard trading discount, and an additional 
percentage for an additional trading 
discount for particular main contractors. 
(14) 
 
Quotations 12: Competitive tendering bonus round - hard bargaining 
 
Until costs for all subcontractors and suppliers are fixed in contracts, economic 
uncertainties about changes in the price of labour, materials and plant continually 
upset cost monitoring. If a tender is won when demand in the market is low and the 
work is delivered on site when demand and prices are rising, price bargaining 
strength switches to subcontractors and suppliers. As labour, material and plant 
prices rise; contractors may end up paying higher rates, overtime rates or agreed 
rates for specific tasks in order to secure labour when they need it. Contractors may 
end up being unable to buy materials or hire plant for their forecast costs. 
Observations of MC’s site meetings showed that construction price rises started to 
materialise on projects during the period of this research. In this situation the focus 
was on fixing subcontract and supplier prices as early as possible to mitigate against 
 104 
further, later price increases. In these circumstances MC’s site staff worked to keep 
their project within budget, whilst the senior mangers took a pragmatic view of their 
firm’s bottom line across time and across projects.  
 
T2, in SCB, SCB1 “The only thing we've 
noticed the recession on is margins 
[profit for the year].  In the last four 
years we've grown forty per cent 
throughout the recession, so we've 
ridden it pretty well.” 
 
“[Architectural metal work package] 
Quotations are up 25% for the feature 
staircase…ask for help from pre-
construction to procure at this price” (25) 
(6 June 14) 
 
“ Cost inflation is working against us as a 
business...” (26) 3 July (14) 
 
“We need to push on with procurement. 
Its an ever rising market…to get certainty 
on cost” (28) (5 September 14) 
 
“The steelwork market rate has gone up” 
(29) (3 December 14) 
 
Quotations 13: Competitive tendering bonus round: managing price rises 
 
The case study provided data on the ways in which costs are sometimes handled 
more flexibly through informal practices that are not found in textbooks. As well as 
hard bargaining on price to reduce prices without reducing requirements, MC 
pursued cost reductions by relaxing warranty and insurance requirements placed on 
their subcontractors or releasing money earlier to subcontractors by reducing 
requirements for retention money (Section 1.1), the money held back as security for 
contract performance. 
 
 At T1, MC “We’ve offered relaxation on 
the retention amount” (23)“ ‘A damp 
proof membrane supplier’ 
guarantee…they said you need to be an 
approved installer…will not give us the 
full warranty…its an extra cost” (24)“We 
have loosened requirements on the 
levels of PI [professional indemnity 
insurance] against the original contracts” 
(25) “New recessed brick design…water 
will pool on the top of the brick…A brick 
supplier says it reduces the warranty 
from 60 to 9 years” “compromise is to 
take it off the back elevation but keep it 
where it is ok under the colonnade” (28) 
 
Quotations 14: Competitive tendering bonus round: soft bargaining I 
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In some instances cost reductions were also achieved by reviewing assumptions in 
the original tender and reducing material and component quantities or specifications 
within the constraints of the contract. 
 
At T2, in SCA, SCA1 “simple thing might 
be that the original ductwork drawings 
show the duct coming into this room and 
it came right to the middle of the room 
here, and was supplying air under the 
floor, when actually we only need to just 
poke it into the room. So we might save a 
metre of ductwork. If you do that on 100 
rooms then you’ve saved 100 metres and 
suddenly you see some savings come 
out the package.” (9) 
 
“We’re looking at how it’s sized originally 
from the consultant and we think we 
could let the velocities increase a little bit 
in the ductwork and actually reduce the 
size of the ductwork a little bit… if we’ve 
got the time we would look at that in that 
sort of detail” (9) 
 
 
At T1, MC in project A “reduced lighting 
specification” was on the table with the 
client on 5 February 14 and different 
design solutions and material choices 
were being considered in both projects. 
 
“The plasterboard perimeter…show the 
extra over cost to the client and offer a 
saving if we use metal planks in the 
corridor” (22)  
 
“”A piling subcontractor’ say there is 
scope to reduce the tonnage in pile 
caps…if its £x saving we owe them £x of 
that” (25) 
 
‘A screeding subcontractor” are going 
with what the manufacturers 
recommend” “get ‘A main contractor 
person’ to review their method statement’ 
(27)  
 
Quotations 15: Competitive tendering bonus round - reducing quantities or 
specifications 
 
Whilst price bargaining was the norm to achieve cost reductions, there were some 
circumstances in which MC viewed relationships as part of, or more important than, 
hard bargaining on price.  
 
 At T1, MC considered relationships as 
well as cost “If we don’t get the right guy 
from ‘A subcontractor’ its not worth 
paying the premium” (24) 
 
‘A person’ working for ‘A Subcontractor” 
is superb…worth asking if we can keep 
him on the contract” “We are particular 
about the scaffolding subcontractors we 
use” “’A partitions subcontractor’ did a 
great job on ‘A project’ around the roof 
lights…makes sense to leave the job with 
them” (25) 
 
Quotations 16: Competitive tendering bonus round: soft bargaining II 
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4.5.2 Keeping to plan 
 
The project start and finish dates are fixed in the contract and the main contractor’s 
site team has the job of building to the constraints of this timeframe. At tender stage 
MC’s pre-construction planners estimate a weekly programme for a project based on 
assumptions about subcontract packaging, work packaging, the timing of work 
packages and allowances for contingencies. The main contractor’s site team then 
has the job of building to the programme. On site the focus is on monitoring 
performance against the weekly programme. MC explained that the start and finish 
dates are fixed at contract award, but the sequencing of the weekly programme is not 
fixed. 
 
“We get paid to work to a timescale that is probably tighter than the ideal…so there’s 
a profit if you can manage it well” MC (43) 
 
Participants explained how a pre-construction programme becomes a target for the 
site team to plan and monitor activities against, providing time envelopes for 
subcontract packages on site. Participants explained that there are considerable 
changes to construction methods and plans during the course of construction. For 
example, MC demonstrated considerable flexibility in changing the way components 
are built, to do more work on or off site; changing work methods including a major 
decision about temporary works, and changing work packaging by combining or 
splitting subcontract packages. The main contractor explained how they take major 
decisions about the way they package work for competitive tendering to achieve cost 
reductions, either splitting down traditional work packages, such as mechanical and 
electrical services, in to its constituent packages, or removing an element such as 
materials from a work package. They call this “unbundling”. 
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Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2, MC explained how they appreciated 
how their decisions about how they 
package work can affect their 
subcontractors. There were two examples 
where MC knew that taking the materials 
out of work packages would make the work 
unviable for a subcontractor 
 
“[we have an] unbundling strategy…He 
[groundwork subcontractor] says, you're 
chasing the only bit I make money on. We 
make money on buying materials and 
having deals with people and also getting 
rid of spoil. He said you want to take off the 
buying and materials. So I end up with all 
risk and you end up with all the potential 
benefit.” MC (40) 
 
“he doesn't make any money on laying 
floor. He makes all his money on selling me 
a damp proof membrane” MC (40) 
 
At T1, MC explained on project B that 
at the outset of this project on site, the 
site team had ‘unbundled’ the 
mechanical and electrical services 
work package, splitting it up into its 
constituent smaller work packages 
and directly contracting with 
subcontractors for each smaller work 
package. This practice had removed 
the cost of a mechanical and electrical 
services contractor’s overheads and 
mark up. But produced additional 
procurement and coordination costs 
for MC’s site team. 
 
 
 
Quotations 17: Main contractor’s flexibility in construction methods and plans I 
 
All participants demonstrated that in discussions on delivering projects to time the 
most important factor for subcontractors is to have the site ready for them to start on 
time. SCA2 described the pressure to start on site when the programme states they 
should start to show they are trustworthy, whether or not the site is ready for them. 
They described how they are unproductive at the start and have to accelerate later. 
All subcontractors said that they put resources into communicating with the main 
contractor ahead of their work package start date, to try to ensure that the site is 
ready for them when the programme states they should start. Participants explained 
that materials or plant delivered too late or too early cause disruption. Interactions 
between trades cause disruption either from problems of timing, the quality of others’ 
work or damage of work by others. 
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At T2 in SCB, SCB1 stressed the 
importance of having a clear and clean 
workspace to work in.  “the builders will 
like to sign us up to a contract, where 
we’ve taken that betterment on the basis 
that we’re going to have nice clean areas 
to work, everywhere, but it doesn’t 
happen, and then we end up working the 
same way as we always work, and we’ve 
given betterment that we then can’t 
recover.” (15)  
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained how they 
put resources in to make sure that work 
areas are available to them as planned   
“Every big job has a logistics controller 
on the job.. because we appreciate how 
much time we lose by not having 
deliveries arranged well, not agreeing 
with the main contractor who’s unloading 
and distributing all the materials, where 
it’s going to be from and to, what the 
access route to the site are, and where 
our cabins are going to be located… 
what happens is, they end up getting all 
over the place, and we say, we’re 
supposed to be working in here, it’s not 
ready for us, so we do have to make do, 
and we go back three visits, to 
somewhere that we should have been 
able to do it one. The worst place that 
happens, and it happens on almost every 
job, is when we get to commissioning… 
to do that, we need finished spaces, we 
need no plastering, no decorating going 
on, the carpets have to be down, the 
ceiling tiles have got to be in, ‘cause 
we’ve got to test the environmental 
conditions, test the fire alarms, if there’s 
dust and smoke that upsets all that.” (15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At T1. MC explained  
 “What do we give the supply chain? We 
give them a site to work on and we pay 
them on time. That’s about all we do as a 
main contractor…if we can’t give them a 
site to work on that’s ready for them and 
we cant pay them on time…we accept 
lots of stuff, but we don’t actually manage 
the site for them to work on very 
well...that’s the bit we need to focus our 
attention on” (43) 
 
At T1 MC knew that subcontractors 
experience advantages from clear work 
areas 
“the results of having a misconnection 
are reduced because you can have the 
same resources doing the same task in a 
different location.. you are only incurring 
the reset up time…most supply chains 
will say give me half a floor and I’ll go for 
it..they want that flexibility…if its goes 
better than they expected they don’t want 
to slow their blokes down, so they’ve got 
space to spill in to.. Similarly they hit 
problems and fail they need another 
day...”(43) 
 
 109 
In T2 in SCC, SCC1 explained how they 
put resources in to make sure that work 
areas   are available to them as planned 
“we will send a site surveyor and 
sometimes we have to agree with the site 
personnel where the floor levels are 
going, or where that stud wall is going to 
finish up, because we have got to commit 
to manufacture before it’s actually 
installed. So there is a lot of toing and 
froing, structural support is important as 
well, it is not always there at the 
beginning because the designers haven’t 
allowed for it, so we spend quite a bit of 
time toing and froing with the site teams, 
whether it be the designers as well to 
make sure that when our lads get to site 
with the materials, they can fit it.” (11)   
 
T4 said that the ability to mobilise a 
labour force to do the work at the time 
they want it is a serious problem for 
them. At T4 in SCA “we have to find that 
extra labour at short notice, which means 
employing people we don't know, who 
don't have any affinity to the job or the 
company, and that conduits got problems 
in quality and cost.  So all these things 
do mount up.” (41) 
 
Quotations 18: Subcontractors’ desire for certainty in the long term plan I 
 
Subcontractors explained that the norm is for day-to-day tasks to be disrupted where 
there are interdependencies between trades. They explained that they absorb this 
normal amount of disruption within their costs. SCA1 said that they estimate costs 
assuming that the site will be ready for them. However their outturn costs generally 
absorb a normal level of disruption, so they do not know how much a project could 
cost them without any disruption. T4 explained that high churn of labour affects costs 
as new people can be slower or more disruptive. They explained that delay in the 
availability of materials or plant causes increased costs. 
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At T4 in SCA, SCA3 described their 
everyday experience “You would come in 
one day, and he would say to the guys, 
well, here's what we'll do today, look at 
the schedule, and you'd sit down for 9 
minutes and you'd write out a task brief, 
where are you going and what access 
equipment you need, and what hazards 
there are in the area, and then you get to 
the job and there's a load of plasterers 
coming down the corridor and you can't 
wire this section.  You've wasted, I don't 
know, half an hour or maybe an hour of 
the day already.  And then you say to two 
guys, well, actually, something needs 
finishing over there, you go and do that.  
You don't then go back to an office, sit 
down for that whole new task briefing 
sheet go over the new hazards, it's just 
totally impractical if you try to do that.” T4 
(41) 
At T2 in SCC, SCC1 said that informal 
relationships with other trades can 
improve their tasks 
“Familiarity with other trades on site is 
always a bonus.  If you know people, just 
supposing you wanted to use that scissor 
lift over there that, you know, if you know 
them you will ask and they will probably 
say yes.  If it is some crew that has never 
seen you before they will probably say 
no, get your own. ‘ (11) 
 
Subcontractors in mechanical and 
electrical services and internal partition 
supply chains described their 
interdependence. 
 
“M&E are always a pain because they 
work before us, getting all their first fix in 
and then they work after us and they 
always wreck what we've put up.  It's just 
the nature of the beast, they just do that, 
I don't know why” (10) 
 
At T1. MC recognised that the 
interdependence of mechanical and 
electrical services and internal trades 
“where we are under a bit of pressure on 
the envelope, but we start the M&E 
anyway, we’ve got the internals going 
anyway, and now the site team are 
distracted, they are a bit stretched, then 
the M&E starts to go off track, it is about 
a third of the value of the job” (43) 
 
At T1, MC saw advantages in providing 
connecting tasks with clear work areas 
but the disadvantages on the time 
overall. 
“If you batch work… you reduce the 
interfaces…have four rooms ready for 
the carpenters to get in to.. so if he 
comes across a problem he didn’t 
foresee he has somewhere-else  to go. 
The painter will have four rooms that the 
joiner has finished. So you create like a 
train. But that adds time to the 
programme” (43) 
 
Quotations 19: Subcontractors’ desire for certainty in the long-term plan II 
 
Different subcontractors had different interests at any one time. There was an impact 
from different pricing basis between trades. The electrician at T4 in SCA explained 
that they had no powers to intervene when their spaces to work in were not available 
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as planned, compared to other trades who were employed on a lump sum price basis 
under sequential spot contracting (as explained in literature Section 2.2.2). 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained how 
trades procured on the price basis of a 
lump sum for a whole piece of work, 
impact on connecting trades procured on 
the price basis of cost-based labour and 
materials 
“it is sometimes difficult working with 
other trades, depending on the basis that 
they’ve been employed… too many 
trades that are based on not just an 
hourly rate, but they’re based on a price, 
so we get plasterers, and we say, oh you 
need to leave that bit out, ‘cause we’ve 
got to get…and he’s like, sorry mate, I’m 
on a price to get all this done, so the 
quicker I get out of here the better.  And 
there isn’t consideration.  Our guys aren’t 
like that.”  (15) 
 
At T4 in SCA, SCA3 gave everyday 
examples of problems caused to them by 
connected trades that have been 
selected on lump sum price (18) (20) (41) 
 
 
Quotations 20: Subcontractors’ desire for certainty in the day-to-day plan 
 
Client variations, although allowed for in a contract, were viewed as unplanned work. 
On project A, the client asked for a number of variations during the course of the 
contract. MC explained that the consequences of managing variations in the 
changing conditions of the project were considerable. With bargaining strength on 
their side, MC used cost increases as a tactic to deter the client from going ahead 
with variations. 
 
 At T1, MC  
“Take the list of variations and split them 
into those that have no consequence and 
those that have significant consequences 
and are distraction. I’ll take that to the 
meeting with ‘A client’ this afternoon” 
“Will tell them we need to take on a 
additional design manager if we do that 
variation” “The money we would make is 
not worth the distraction” “We will scare 
them off with the budget” (26) (3 July 14) 
 
Quotations 21: Commercially rational decisions and variations 
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Once subcontractors’ contracts have been let and the negotiating power shifts from 
the buyer to the supplier. If things start to go wrong after this, MC will go to significant 
steps to help subcontractors who are struggling. As costs rise because things have 
started to go wrong contractors will negotiate significant deals on costs. The case 
study provided data on the ways in which costs are handled more flexibly, through 
informal practices that are not found in textbooks, when the possibility of delays 
emerge. The groundwork subcontractor on project A was delayed, seemingly 
struggling to cope with the work. MC went to significant lengths to help. 
 
 At T1, MC on Project A the groundwork 
subcontractor fell behind programme 
early on in the project. The site team 
spent time considering different ways 
they could help to stop the subcontractor 
falling further behind.  
 
MC saw gaps in the groundworker’s 
resources and asked to look at the 
subcontractor’s plans. “A Groundwork’s’ 
supervision on site is unacceptable. They 
need a non-working supervisor on a job 
this size” “I need a written action plan 
from them on how they will manage the 
job.” (22)  
 
When the groundworker failed to share 
their plans the MC decided to try to help 
by providing additional resources,  
“ I spoke to ‘A groundwork’ He said he’s 
bitten off more than he can chew. 
There’s x who used to work for x…we 
could employ him…another option is to 
ask ‘A concrete frame subcontractor’ to 
do the groundwork but they are 
stretched…I’d rather help’ (22) 
 
But alongside the offer of help MC gave 
the subcontractor and early warning that 
they would be prepared to take 
contractual action “get a letter of concern 
to ‘A groundworker’…what was the 
difference between him and the next 
quote” “ There as little in it… three close 
tenders.” “Two choices…coach him 
along or take a chunk of the work off 
him...he’s good on flat site jobs…this one 
is harder” (23)  
 
Quotations 22: Main contractors need for flexibility from subcontractors when 
progress veers from plan 
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The ground worker did not deliver to the plan and started to delay the work packages 
that followed on. Needing to minimise the knock-on effect of the ground worker’s 
delay on the rest of the plan, MC looked for significant changes elsewhere. They took 
decisions about their own temporary works, such as introducing shrink-wrapping of 
the building to make it watertight earlier. They also took decisions that changed 
subcontract packaging, such as increasing off-site manufacturing. 
 
 At T1, MC on Project A there was some 
consideration of moving some activities 
off site to pull back time. 
 
“ How much off site is ‘M&E Contractor A’ 
using? Explore the opportunity to use pre-
insulated ducting” (22) 
 
“Can they spray paint the MDF bulkheads 
off-site” (27) 
 
On Project A, different solutions for the 
brick panels was considered in detail 
including unbundling and off site 
manufacturing 
 
“Options for the brick slip panels. We buy 
the bricks and the insulation. Use ‘A 
Brickwork subcontractors’ factory to put 
the panel together…We need a design 
and a sample panel…It depends on ‘A 
Brickwork subcontractor’ having a 
bespoke rig. We could set up a yard near 
the site… do we know what ‘A Brickwork 
subcontractor’s’ expectation of a margin 
is?” “He wont say” “I’ll call him and ask I 
can ring-fence his profit?” (22) 
 
“The price for hiring factory down the road 
for manufacturing [the brick slip panels] 
and storing them is £x. By buying the 
materials, the brick slips, louvres and 
insulation ourselves, we’ve taken £x off 
his price.” (23) 
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The main contractor looked for ways to 
pull back time by planning temporary 
works differently 
 
“Wrapping the building in temporary 
shrink wrap.. £x…but we can install the 
windows in from the inside. ‘A M&E 
subcontractor’ will have a section of the 
building earlier. We will have higher 
demand to get materials in and out of the 
building…set up one way in one way 
out...not sure we had a really robust plan 
in the beginning…its become a really big 
issue now” “we are being clear with “A 
subcontractor’ there’s no pre-loading of 
materials” (26) 
 
Quotations 23: Main contractor’s need for flexibility on construction methods and 
plans II 
 
The case study provided a further example of non-textbook practices when delays 
were realised and caused financial impact. MC switched from hard bargaining on 
small items to more flexible negotiations on big items, aiming to do deals on big 
sums of money.  
 
 At T1, the groundworker failed to accept 
the help offered, caused significant 
delays and MC changed tactics, to do 
deals with the groundworker and the 
client. 
 
“We need to have conversation with “A 
groundwork subcontractor’ on the claim.. 
its probably £x…we’d settle for half that” 
(28) (5 September 14) 
 
“See if we can do a deal [with the client]. 
Absorb their variations free of charge if 
they give us an extension” “If we know 
that, we will then know how hard to go for 
the groundwork and the concrete frame 
subcontractors” (30) (3 December 14) 
 
Quotations 24: Deals on big sums of money 
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4.5.3 Cashflow 
 
Cashflow is important to all contractors. To advance their cashflow, MC overvalued 
claims for stage payments to the client and rigorously pursued the client for payment 
on time. They did not pass the benefit of overvalue to their subcontractors, but they 
were concerned to pay their subcontractors on time. Subcontractors felt that 
generally their work was undervalued in stage payments and received late. 
Subcontractors at tier 2 explained how they might overvalue claims for stage 
payment and pass the benefit on to their subcontractors. The subcontractor at tier 3 
of SCA emphasised the importance of cashflow to them, suggesting that paying 
money due earlier, by not deducting retentions, would help their business. 
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained how their 
cashflow suffered from undervalue or late 
payment by MC 
 
“…if we demonstrate that we’ve done an 
element of work, they still won’t value it 
properly, or they’ll pay us late.” (15) 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 explained they 
sometimes used overvalue to help their 
subcontractors in lower tiers 
“we have.. in the past, supported 
business during the contracts...where if 
you're providing materials… we'll pay 
them early”  (41) 
At T3 in SCA, SCA2 explained how 
cashflow could be helped by relaxing 
requirements for retentions. 
I was talking to a couple of main 
contractors; some of them now are 
considering not holding retentions on 
subcontractors.  Which could make an 
awful lot of difference. (41) 
 
 
 
 
At T1, MC explained they liked to 
advance their cashflow from the client by 
“overvalue” in stage payments 
 
“We like to have overvalue in our orders. 
So we get paid more than we pay out 
every month and that generates a 
surplus for our business.” MC (40) 
 
“We are behind on the year end 
cashflow. We will get the M&E kit into the 
basement so we can claim it” (28)  
 
“the client is being lenient with what he 
signs off” (30)  
 
MC also liked to keep their cashflow to 
plan by chasing the client to ensure the 
never received late payment  
 
“Chase the payment from the client. Find 
the cashiers name” (22) (5 February 14) 
 
“We are chasing payment from the 
client…the previous issue was an 
undervalue” (24) (4 June 14) 
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Although MC didn’t pass the benefit of 
overvalue on to their subcontractors, they 
were concerned that they didn’t make 
late payments to their subcontractors 
 
“[Our head office] has slipped 
performance on late payment of our 
subcontractors…all on different invoice 
terms. We have got a new system. Don’t 
post anything to me. Email it. ” (22)  
 
However when things started to go 
wrong, MC used the tactic of “setting off” 
future predicted costs that would fall due 
in claims against payment  
 
“We are not paying “A Ground worker’” 
(25) 
 
Where potential claim costs emerged, 
senior managers in MC took a pragmatic 
view across projects  
 
“I’ll balance what we give them on other 
jobs so we don’t break them” (22) 
 
“’A subcontractor’ owes us money [on 
another project]. Ask them if they can do 
work on x on this project” (23) 
 
Quotations 25: The significance of cashflow through the supply chain 
 
4.6 Cost handling at final account 
 
There are two sources of information about final costs: contractual payments and 
each firm’s internal accounting systems. Participants accepted final accounts as a 
calculation of payment due. Each firm knew their own outturn costs and profit 
margins on projects. But they did not claim to know the outturn costs of tasks to 
compare with their estimates. At the end of the project participants recognised that 
firms across the supply chain each hold their own version of outturn costs. 
Participants saw project costing as a process in which the relationship between cost 
information for component measured items and work carried is tenuous. They saw 
contracting a process in firms in the supply chain win or lose across projects at each 
other’s expense.  
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Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 explained that they 
were unwilling to share their cost 
information. They saw requests from a 
buyer for more cost information as a sign 
of low trust.  
“what does it matter to the main 
contractors what we make on a job, all 
that they need to know is that they're 
going to get the job done to the standard 
that we give, for the cost that we say.” 
(10) 
 
At T2, SCC, SCC1 “every month. the 
cost analysis on every project that’s 
finished…all the costs have come in and 
we compare that with the with what was 
the original and most of the time we 
actually make more margin at the end 
than what we anticipated ... if it’s 
ridiculously more than we thought we 
would make, we will bring the estimators 
into that loop and just say, look, yes 
great we have made extra money but on 
another job we could have lost the order.  
” (11) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 Everyone's always 
out for their own individual gain.” (10) 
 
At T1, MC explained that at the end of a 
project every firm has their own version 
of costs in their private cost model 
 
“You know when it's costs less but that 
doesn't signify improvement because you 
don't know whether everyone else in that 
supply chain made a loss on that job.” 
MC (40) 
 
“Some contractors will make double the 
margin they expected to make and other 
contractors, they'll make half the margin 
they expect to make. You can guarantee 
only one of them is going to bang your 
door.” MC (40) 
 
 
Quotations 26: The final account as commercial decision 
 
Data on resources consumed by activities on site was rarely collected. Participants 
knew that actual work done on site is largely unobservable. SCA1 explained that in 
one instance, work had been observed on site and compared to their firm’s standard 
productivity rates in their estimating database. The productivity observed on site was 
faster than the rate they were using as their firm’s standard rate for estimating costs 
in projects. But the information on this difference was treated as a way to build in 
contingencies on future projects. The relationship between productivity rates used in 
estimates and actual work done on site was obscured. In SCB, SCB1 said that they 
do not need to know an accurate output rate as they pass the risk on to SCB2. When 
the risk of poor productivity is passed on in this way the outturn productivity on site 
remains largely unknown.  
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“There are industry standard resource 
and productivity rates for activities but we 
create our own. We reviewed our labour 
productivity four years ago with our site 
operatives. We identified efficiencies, but 
then we didn’t change our productivity 
rates because we were in a rising market 
and all costs were going up.” SCA1 (15) 
 
 
Quotations 27: Feedback from site treated as commercial information 
 
4.7 Improvement interventions 
 
4.7.1 Opportunities 
 
This Section shows that contractors see improvement in site operations as desirable 
throughout the supply chain. It also explains where contractors think opportunities for 
improvement in site operations lie. Participants thought that contractors take their 
own accumulated experience between projects but saw little learning between 
contractors from project to project. Participants from MC in workshop 1 held a range 
of views on the magnitude of the potential savings that could be made if they could 
improve site operations and sustain that improvement across projects over time. 
Their estimate of the order of the opportunity for savings ranged from 5% to 0.5%. 
They reached a consensus of 2% to 3%. Participants viewed this percentage as 
significant.  Four categories that emerged from the data are used to present the 
findings in this section: early contractor involvement, earlier planning, innovation in 
materials, plant and equipment, and money. 
 
4.7.2 Early contractor involvement 
 
In workshop 2 MC explained that they saw the greatest scope for improving site 
operations in the client’s procurement choice on the selection method of main 
contractors. MC explained that as the market was currently picking up they were able 
to choose projects where the client procured the main contractor by negotiation 
rather than competition. MC explained that in a negotiated contract, during the 
negotiation they are also deciding how they will do the job. So the negotiation is 
about both the plan and the costs and allowed for greater integrity between the 
forecast of work to be done and the commercial offer. 
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Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 “if you truly engage 
with each other, then you're going to get 
efficiency in that process, because you're 
going to say, well, no, this is the best way 
that we think we can do it.”  T2 (41) 
 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 “you’d work through 
with the design team from stage D, E, in 
the old RIBA stages, up to F, developing 
the design and developing the costs 
alongside it. All declared all open with the 
clients. I say open: we’d have quotes to 
back it up and we’d have take-offs to 
back it up, and then we’d put our mark-
up on it. And the idea of that is that you 
build up a good, solid coordinated design 
together. And that works for us, we like 
those” (9) 
 
At T2 in SCC, SCC1 “All these specialist 
subcontractors they know their game 
better than the main contractor, but they 
don’t feed of that.” (11) 
 
AT T4 in SCA, SCA3 though they “have 
value to add in the design and planning 
stage but nobody is prepared to pay for 
it.” (41) 
 
At T1, MC “We can sit round the table 
and negotiate and bring our M&E partner 
into the mix of this, and we all truly 
negotiate that project, the right program, 
the right price.  We can bring in all of 
these good thinking ideas that we've 
been lacking over the last four or five 
years” T1 (41) 
 
Quotations 28: Earlier contractor involvement 
 
4.7.3 Collaborative planning 
 
All parties thought that earlier, collaborative planning could play a large part in 
reducing disruption of subcontractor’s work on site. They thought that joint planning 
at an earlier stage increased their level of communication with other firms and 
increased their control over their work. Once on site all subcontractors thought that 
their work could be simplified by isolating their tasks from other trades.  
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Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 had experience of 
working on projects where they were 
more involved than usual in sequencing  
“Getting round the table and really 
discussing sequencing with your key 
supply chain, really looking at the project, 
getting into the design. We built rooms in 
our mind, drew them and built the 
programme around that.  Then we built 
the bigger programme.”  “we suffered 
problems,… but those problems would 
have been horrific, and would have, you 
know, for everyone involved would have 
been a lot worse.” (41) 
In SCB, SCB1 had experience of working 
on shop fit out projects though very 
detailed day to day planning of tasks 
“we do x stores and they're all lean builds 
so, within six weeks, they're completely 
fitted out and, prior to going on site…, we 
go to about three or four design 
meetings…to sit down together and put 
down how long you're going to be 
working for in each area so…as soon as 
a wall's built and boarded on one side the 
M&E will then move in. As soon as the 
M&Es gone out, we'll board the second 
side. As soon as we've boarded the 
second side, they'll come and skim or 
tape it, as soon as they've skimmed and 
taped it, the painters will come in and 
then the joinery will go on.  So it's all, it's 
literally, everyone just follows each other 
round.”  
 
At T1, MC put resources into planning 
parts of the work in detail commissioning  
“On mechanical systems if we don’t 
explicitly tell them how we want to 
commission a building, as in that floor, 
that floor, they wont design for it to be 
commissioned that way. Commissioning 
set out to commission legs of pipework. 
So if you don’t design how you want to 
commission it, early days, you wont be 
able to commission it that way…. So I 
think commissioning process is probably 
more troublesome than the install in 
itself… I’m introducing a commissioning 
manager…” (43) 
 
At T1, on site MC used design reviews 
during the project to identify the tasks to 
be done and plan them in detail 
 
“we have the design review so we know 
explicitly what tasks we’ve got left…we 
put the focus on the management on 
those tasks so they don’t disrupt 
us…”(43) 
 
Quotations 29: Collaborative planning: meeting subcontractors’ desire for certainty in 
the day-to-day plan I 
 
In Workshop 2the main theme that came up in participants’ views of site 
improvement was planning. Developing a robust was seen to be a key to the main 
contractor. The subcontractor at tier 2 saw task level method statements as 
standardised safety statements. The electrician at tier 4 corroborated and said that 
they disregarded planning at a detailed task level that they received in method 
statements. They said that they did not value method statements because they are 
generic statements do not reflect either what they are faced with on site, or the 
flexibility they use to respond to a day-to-day conditions on site. Subcontractors’ own, 
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higher-level daily task briefings were thought to be more useful by the subcontractor 
at tier 2, but the electrician at tier 4 said their day always changes and they always 
do something different from the daily task briefing. 
 
At T4 in SCA “the method statement that 
I sign...well, they have barely any level of 
detail about the specific job.” T4 (41) 
 
At T1 MC recognised the limitations of 
task level but saw opportunity for 
improving them  “we tend to focus 
method statements on controlling health 
and safety risks. We talked about quality 
method statements to give our guys 
information on what to manage. This bit 
is tricky, check this bit” (42) 
 
Quotations 30: Collaborative planning: meeting subcontractors’ desire for certainty in 
the day-to-day plan II 
 
The participants identified that, in practice, repeat projects have provided their most 
successful examples of achieving improvements in site operations across projects. 
They put that down to the people, not the technology. They also though that repeat 
projects achieved of greater degree of commercial integrity than one off projects. 
 
Subcontractors had no experience of 
repeat projects. The move to repeat 
projects had not reached subcontractors, 
and secondary competitive tendering 
remained the norm on projects that were 
repeat contracts for MC. 
 
 
The main contractor explained that they 
had achieved significant cost savings on 
repeat school product they delivered in 
project B. 
 
At T1, MC “the first one took us eighty 
five weeks...and it cost eight million quid. 
But the last one took us fifty six weeks 
and it cost seven million quid and…but 
we did six in the meantime”  (40) 
 
At T1, MC “we had the supply chain 
constant at every job so they turned up 
knowing that the making do was very 
negligible and it wasn't technologically 
driven, it was people driven because we 
always used [company A] on partitions. 
There was always also that implicit threat 
because the damages were so hard. But 
there was peer pressure and we used to 
have workshops and it was all very 
people focussed” (40) 
 
Quotations 31: Keeping to plan: main contractor’s long road to certainty in the day-to-
day plan 
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4.7.4 Innovation in materials, plant and equipment 
 
Participants thought that the big improvements in productivity in site operations have 
come from technological improvements in small, hand held tools.  
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCA, SCA1 “because there’s 
been advances in technology and things 
now, you get a lot more stuff that’s easier 
to fit than it used to be, you get cartridge 
fixings, and you get snap joints, instead 
of having to put three screws together, 
some of our rates, we’ve proposed, 
should come down.” (15) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 “we can’t be more 
efficient if we can’t afford new tools and 
machinery such as a plaster spraying 
machine” (14) 
 
AT T2 in SCA, SCA1  “if things go wrong, 
it’s normally down to labour overspend, 
sometimes prelims but predominantly 
labour… we try and do as much offsite 
pre-fabrication as we can….  (15) 
 
 
Quotations 32: Innovation in materials, plant and equipment 
 
4.7.5 Money 
 
Participants knew what good site operations on a well-run site looks like when they 
see it and cited money as a driving factor in good or bad site operations. All 
participants linked better project delivery with making money. 
 
Lower Tiers of the Supply Chain Main Contractor 
At T2 in SCC, SCC1 “now the client is 
going to have to pay a little bit more 
going forward and hopefully we will all 
benefit from that, we will all be able to 
deliver a better job and make a little bit 
more money, well hopefully.” (11) 
 
At T2 in SCB, SCB1 “The perception of 
value for money will impact on 
relationships. Its human to want to make 
more money, lets earn enough and 
reduce the hassle” (14) 
 
At T1, MC saw money as the driver of 
site operations  “you can go on to a site 
and within twenty minutes of walking 
round you know whether that site is 
running as it should do…everyone is 
starting at the optimum time and the 
process is running correctly…everybody 
is making the margin they should be 
making” MC (40) 
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At T4 in SCA, SCA3 “we’re all going to 
be one big team, and that's what's going 
to make it most efficient, but when the 
market drops, it's competition. So this 
team that you've got together for one 
build, will be at each other's throats 
tendering for the next jobs. So you're not 
really a team.” W2 T4 (41) 
 
At T3 in SCA “because we get delays in 
the install and the delays in 
commissioning, you're fighting a losing 
battle by spending more money to try 
and keep up.” (41) 
“They want to turn a good product and 
they want to make a margin they 
expected… they can get very quickly 
discontented but what's the driver for 
that? He's probably already not making 
any money out of it” MC (40) 
 
“I think the supply chain do bring 
benefits. But I just think it's hidden by 
where the market's going at the 
moment.” MC (40) 
 
Quotations 33: The fundamental importance of money to good site operations 
 
4.8    Analysis and summary of findings 
 
4.8.1 Introduction 
 
This Section is divided into two subsections: costs and work done. The first 
Subsection summarises the case study material on costing practices. The findings 
show that, because subcontractors themselves subcontract work, there is little 
distinction between the costing practices of the main contractor and subcontractors. 
The findings illustrate the creation and loss of cost information across a project 
supply chain. This reveals a disconnection between cost information held in 
contractors’ private cost models and costs to the client. This is not a problem for 
delivery, as each firm has made commercially rational decision based in their 
appetite for risk. However it is a problem for the main contractor for costing 
improvements, because adjustments to costs do not accommodate changes in any 
real way after the main contractor has made a decision on their tender sum. 
Changes in any part of the project have a wider, knock-on effect that is difficult to 
identify and cost. 
 
The second Subsection summarises the case study findings on work done in the 
supply chain. Contractors across the supply chain saw a link between better 
programming and costs incurred. But the findings showed a distinction between the 
main contractor and subcontractors in the degree of flexibility they desired to achieve 
better programming. The main contractor, managing considerable uncertainty, 
desired and used significant flexibility in both work planning and work methods. In 
contrast subcontractors desired certainty in both work plans and work methods. 
 124 
 
4.8.2 Costs 
 
The findings concur with the formal methods for cost handling during estimating and 
tendering set out in literature Section 2.2.1. However the case study revealed the 
detailed components used in the build up of costs. There were found to be known by 
everyone involved and considered the norm, but little found in textbooks.  
In terms of the formal methods of costing, once a contractor has decided to submit a 
tender, their costing process has four parts as described in literature (Section 2.2.1) 
and expanded in the findings. Estimators build up costs on the use of internal 
resources (Section 4.2.2); estimators or buyers build up costs from quotations from 
subcontractors and suppliers (Section 4.2.3); commercial managers and directors 
make strategic tendering decisions (Section 4.2.4); then once a contractor has won 
the work, their site team has the job of building to the budget (Section 4.5.2). The 
methods of costing are generally replicated through the supply chain. There are 
exceptions when experience-based estimating only is used (Section 2.2.2 in 
literature and Section 4.2.2 in findings). 
When cost information is created about the estimated resources that will be 
consumed in a project there is considerable need for judgement. Forecasts of 
quantities of materials and plant are the most certain pieces of cost information 
created in an estimate, but the costs of materials and plant can be volatile and even 
subcontractors in the lowest tiers of the supply chain see materials and plant as an 
opportunity to make money through by buying more cheaply (Quotations 3). 
Forecasts of quantities of labour created are historically-determined norms. Project 
specific risks of achieving productivity rates on site are, in some trades, transferred 
down the supply chain (Quotations 2). The estimated rates of pay for labour created 
are exposed to changes from market forces, especially in the lower tiers of a supply 
chain (Quotations 1). At the bottom of the supply chain it is more likely that no 
information is created on the resources that will be used in a project (Quotations 4). 
Cost information that is created in quotations does not show the constituent 
resources and firms see quotations as an opportunity to make money through by 
buying more cheaply. The extent of subcontracting and hence the proportion of cost 
information based on quotations is highest in the top tiers of the supply chain 
(Quotations 5). In some specialist trades this exposes the limited nature of 
competition in construction (Quotations 6). Cost information created on estimated 
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contingencies for risk and allowances for profit are based on experience and 
judgement (Quotations 7) because even tenders based on detailed designs are 
based on incomplete information. 
 
The cost information created within firms is presented in the clients’ cost model, 
usually a bill of quantities. Subcontractors did not trust clients’ cost models as 
providing an accurate description of work. Subcontractors said they withhold specific 
information about omissions in a client’s cost model for fear of losing a job. This 
appears in textbooks on commercial practice as an occasional practice (Section 
2.2.2) but was found to be the norm (Quotations 9) and also known and accepted by 
clients. Likewise the practice of frontloading clients’ cost models appears in literature 
on commercial practice as an occasional practice (Section 2.2.2) but was also found 
to be the norm across the supply chain (Quotations 10).  
 
Contractors viewed their decision about costs at contract as commercially rational 
decisions at a project level, but inadequate for reflecting commercially rational 
decisions about the costs of subsequent client changes though either value 
engineering (Quotations 11) or variations (quotations 21). Participants described a 
dynamic world as a construction project unfolds on site. One in which formal contract 
provisions for adjustments to costs through value engineering and variations do not 
accommodate these changes in any real way. This is because changes in any part of 
the project have a wider, knock-on effect that is difficult to identify and therefore cost.  
Findings on cost handling during site operations revealed that although the practice 
of secondary competitive tendering appears in some textbooks on commercial 
construction practice (Section 2.2.2) this happens systematically in practice 
throughout the supply chain. Contractors at all levels of the supply chain force cost 
reductions onto lower tiers. The only exception is SCB2, the labour-only 
subcontractor at the end of supply chain B, who only has costing routines around the 
use of their own resources and their own strategic tendering decisions, and no 
suppliers to pass cost reductions or risk on to. Subcontractors at all tiers of the 
supply chain therefore knowingly “never give their best price first’ and everyone 
involved knows this (Quotations 12). This process can result in higher prices to the 
buyer when demand is rising (Quotations 13). But when prices are not rising due to 
demand in the market the purpose is usually cost reduction though either hard 
bargaining (Quotations 12), reducing quantities or specifications (Quotations 15), or 
sometimes soft bargaining when relationships need to be preserved (quotations 14 
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and 16). To avoid claims the main contractor negotiated on big sums of money 
(Quotations 24). 
 
Participants described a negotiable world in which bargaining on costs is part and 
parcel of projects. Participants repeatedly described project cost handling as “game 
playing”. Participants thought that the level of bargaining on costs was able to 
accommodate the normal level of disruption experienced in site operations within 
projects. Participants thought that over time the industry accommodates mistakes 
and the changes in the market across projects. But they saw that this contrasts with 
the formal, fixed, deterministic cost model of the bill of quantities. Participants 
willingly used the bill of quantities for payment and for agreeing a final account based 
on adjustments allowed for in the contract. But participants controlled their firm’s 
costs, not against the bill of quantities, but against the breakdown held within their 
firm on the use of their own resources, quotations negotiated and contingencies on 
the project. This leaves the balance to contribute to the firm’s general overheads and 
profit. 
Cashflow was naturally important to all contractors. All contractors were trying to 
make a living out of doing work, not out of manipulating cashflow, but all contractors 
made efforts to push cashflow in their favour within good practice, and recognised 
the use of cashflow as a soft negotiating tool (Quotations 25).  
 
Drawing on information from across the findings, the creation and flow of cost 
information within a project and across a subcontract supply chain is illustrated in 
Figure 7 below. The illustration uses the example of supply chain B (SCB) from the 
findings, the subcontract supply chain for the suspended ceilings package of work on 
a project. Costs a contract are built up through the creation of cost information 
through the supply chain in a competitive tendering process based on resources (R), 
quotations (Q) and mark-up (M) in each firm. The resulting costs at contract are 
expressed in a bill of quantities that establishes the fixed price to the client based on 
unit rates of measured items. When a main contractor is awarded a project, a phase 
of secondary tendering begins. The main contractor restarts the creation of cost 
information and each firm in turn carries out a secondary tendering process with their 
subcontractor and suppliers. As costs are re-negotiated through this process, a new 
set of resources (R), quotations (Q) and mark-up (M) are established in each firm, 
from the main contractor downwards. As actual costs are incurred, a third set of 
costs on resources (R), quotations (Q) and mark-up (M) are established in each 
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firm’s private cost model. Subcontractors evaluate their actual costs against the 
budgets set in the secondary tendering process, and the mark-up achieved is their 
balancing figure. The main contractor evaluates their actual costs in a cost value 
reconciliation (CVC) against the budget in the final account 
 
 
Figure 7: The creation of cost information on resources (R), quotations (Q) and 
mark-up (M), 
 
In this creation and flow of cost information and the practices that operate the 
creation and flow of cost information, what is striking is that the formal cost models 
between the client (tier 0) and the main contractor (tier 1), costs at contract and final 
account, are disconnected from the rest of the cost information in the supply chain. 
The greatest disconnection is illustrated by the shading in the Figure 8 below. The 
actual costs incurred by tier 3, shaded resources (R), quotations (Q) and mark-up 
(M) have three levels of separation from the actual cost to the client, the shade costs 
in the final account. 
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Figure 8: The disconnection of costs across a construction subcontract supply chain 
 
The practice of making commercially rational decisions about costs at contract and 
committing to these as situations change is not unique to the construction industry. 
But the extent of change across a construction project supply chain between the 
costs at contract and costs at final account is unique. Change from the extent of the 
uncertainties from design risk, construction risk, market fluctuations and client 
variations are recognised in literature (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). But the extent of 
change from renegotiation across the supply chain illustrated above is 
unacknowledged. 
 
Participants said that these costing practices work for pricing and payment because 
each firm makes what they view as a commercially rational decision for them and 
then controls their costs against the budget in their private cost models. Budgets are 
able to accommodate a normal level of uncertainty as projects unfold. But controlling 
costs depends on the ability to renegotiate deals to a significant extent. Any 
improvements on a project are taken as increased profit for the individual firm and 
the lowest tier in each subcontract supply chain bears most of the risk and most of 
the impact. 
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Different attitudes to risk are part of the commercially rational decisions made in the 
costing practices described above. Different tiers of the supply chain and different 
trades showed different attitudes towards risk when they were coming to their 
decision about what is commercially rational for them. The main contractor showed 
the strongest appetite for risk in relation to design completeness and cost certainty. 
They viewed incomplete design as the norm and, in a low demand market, waited to 
“lock in deals on cost” as close as possible to the start of each work package. The 
mechanical and electrical services subcontractor took a much more cautious 
approach to design risk. They were not prepared to provide a cost until a set level of 
detail of design was available (and they had control of the design of their work 
package). The internal wall and ceiling subcontractor also took a cautious approach 
to construction risk, passing the risk of realising assumptions on labour productivity 
to their subcontractors through lump sum pricing.  
 
4.8.3 Work done 
 
This thesis did not set out to explore construction planning. But the importance of the 
link between construction planning and costs was emphasised by participants across 
the case study (Quotations 33) and data on construction planning and work methods 
was collected from observation of site meetings. As the link between construction 
planning and costs emerged as an issue, workshops 2 and 3 were set up to explore 
what improvement in supply chain operation deep into the supply chain would like. 
 
The formal agreement between the client and main contractor in relation to 
construction programme at contract is limited to project start and completion dates. 
The contract does not assume that a disaggregated project programme can be fixed 
at tender stage. During the course of the construction period the main contractor 
maintained flexibility in their decisions about work packaging and construction 
methods (Quotations 17). This contrasted with subcontractors’ desire to have 
certainty in both long-term and short-term plans (Quotations 18 and 19). 
Subcontractors explained how they start on site on their planned start dates to show 
they are trustworthy, but often find the physical conditions on site are not as 
expected (Quotations 18). Subcontractors said changes to daily plans were part and 
parcel of all projects. They thought weekly or daily plans were inaccurate and desired 
much more certainty (Quotations 20). When project A was delayed early on in the 
groundwork package the main contractor made significant efforts to manage the 
situation using soft bargaining to try to preserve their relationship with the 
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groundwork subcontractor (Quotations 20). As delays materialised the main 
contractor made significant changes to work packaging and work methods, for 
example a decision to make the building watertight by temporarily shrink-wrapping of 
the façade (Quotations 23). 
 
Subcontractors expressed a desire for more collaborative planning; illustrating the 
stress those subcontractors experienced and wanted to change. The main contractor 
wanted to maintain flexibility in planning. However they were in the process of 
reducing their planning timescale to daily planning of work during the mechanical and 
electrical services commissioning period. They saw commissioning a key area for 
daily planning because it has a high degree of uncertainty arising from 
interdependence between trades, is on critical path, and is at the end of a project 
when the main contractors’ programme contingences have been used up.  
 
All contractors expressed a desire to work on jobs in which their firm makes, not 
loses money. This was thought to be the biggest source of stress that all contractors 
experienced and wanted to change (Quotations 33). 
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CHAPTER 5 
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DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis set out to investigate the main contractor and their supply chain in order 
to find out how their cost information links to and motivates improvement efforts in 
the supply chain. The empirical research found problems in the type of cost 
information created and indeed its distortion away from a close link to work done. 
Part 1 of the Discussion theorises these problems to explore the reasons why 
importing current cost information into BIM will not provide information that supports 
and motivates improvement. Part 2 of the Discussion develops a new systems 
ontology of costing for development in BIM. 
 
Part 1 of the Discussion draws on Beynon-Davies (2011) concepts of signs from 
information theory in order to understand how, in information terms, current costing 
methods link to the organisation(s) and project(s) they are used in. The findings from 
Chapter 4 are confronted with Beynon-Davies (2011) ideas of forma, informa and 
performa to explain the nature of the current representations of cost that are created 
and used by contractors in projects. The analysis categorises contractors’ current 
cost information as a mixture of direct measures, standard rates, judgement, 
bargaining and intentional errors and enrols the word distortion to describe how 
current cost information in blurred from being a good representation of work done. 
The discussion introduces Kaplan and Cooper’s (1988) term surrogate numbers from 
management accounting to acknowledge the limitations in representations of costs. 
 
The discussion then links the findings on costing methods from Chapter 4 to the 
organisation(s) and project(s) they appear in using Winch’s (2010) tectonic approach 
as one way to describe the construction system. It is argued that the feedback loops, 
thus learning, in the current costing practices contains acknowledged practices, and 
that this perpetuates the status quo. This section calls estimating methods and 
processes and their feedback loop of acknowledged practices the system of costing 
and concludes that, in the current system of costing, parties share an agreed 
meaning for the cost information created: a meaning of establishing a price, making 
payments and controlling costs. But it is argued from the Findings in Chapter 4, that 
efforts to push the purpose of cost information to rewarding improvements throws the 
problem of the surrogate nature of cost information into relief. The system of costing 
breaks down because not all cost information is trusted and agreed as good 
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information with meaning for improvement. The section thus establishes that 
surrogates may be good for one purpose but poor for other purposes. This means 
that a costing solution to motivate improvement will not be found through working on 
the detail of the parts.  
 
Part 2 of the discussion takes up the exploration of what a good cost surrogate may 
look like in information terms for the different purpose of rewarding improvement in 
the supply chain. The discussion considers how others have used the terms hard 
and soft in theory as a way to explore how different representations handle the 
systems they appear in. The discussion draws on literature by Rosenhead (1989), 
who critiques the problem of a hard systems approach; its thirst for data to work on 
positivist problems of optimisation. The discussion argues that efforts towards 
addressing improvement aims through measuring greater detail are limited by the 
level of detail that can be known and handled. The section then draws on literature 
by Rosenhead (1989), who proposes a soft systems approach; its search for data to 
work on social constructivist problems of collaboratively discussing problems and 
solutions. The discussion argues that efforts towards addressing improvement aims 
through problem structuring may use less detail, but data that better reflects what is 
happening in the world.  
 
Participants said that it is difficult to identify and cost changes in any part of a project 
once they have made their commercially rational decision about the work they will do 
as a whole. So it is argued that the search for new surrogates and their associated 
methods of costing that could incentivise improvement throughout the supply chain 
needs to represent the system. Criteria for a good surrogate are proposed of 
measurable surrogates that can lead to management action, and are meaningful for 
improvements deep into the supply chain because they represent the system. 
Dependencies are identified as a good surrogate to show how the supply chain 
works together. The discussion explores where BIM technology can potentially help 
to model different dependencies for the challenging task of costing improvements 
deep into the supply chain, using a systems ontology of costing. Improvement 
requires as change to the norm. The discussion considers how the norm might be 
changed and that changed rewarded through money, thus in the long term changing 
the system of costing itself from the current acknowledged practices that perpetuate 
the practice of buying more cheaply.  
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Part 1 
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5.2. Problems in the representation of costs 
 
5.2.1 Cost information as surrogate numbers  
 
This Section uses the work of Beynon-Davies’ (2011) (set out in Section 2.8.1) who 
takes a information-theoretic approach to better understand problems in today’s 
world and the value of computer modelling in tackling those problems. His approach 
reflects the concern of this thesis to understand the link between contractors’ cost 
information and contractors’ problems in organisations and projects.  
 
This section uses Beynon-Davies’ (2011) concept of signs to examine how cost 
information is created and used in organisations and projects. Beynon-Davies (2011) 
conceives a sign as something of significance or meaningful in the system it sits in. 
He sees the fixed physical form, or representation, of a sign as the top of a four-rung 
semiotics ladder between the social and physical worlds. The rungs of the ladder 
encompass the purpose, meaning, structure and finally physical form of a sign 
(Section 2.8.1 Figure 3). He makes a distinction between three forms of inter-related 
action: formative action, informative action and performative action through which 
signs are created and used. Pierce’s semiotic tetrahedron was also illustrated in 
literature (Section 2.8.1, Figure 2) as a device to understand signs through the 
entities represented and the idea that they generate in an interpreter. In both these 
conceptions the unifying idea is the conception of information (signs) as data plus 
meaning. In this discussion the terms information and signs are used 
interchangeably to express the idea that data harvested from the world has to be 
interpreted and this interpretation is socially constructed.  
 
This Section uses the example of subcontract supply chain B (SCB) in a bidding 
situation for a work package for suspended ceilings. The intention across SCB is to 
carry out work and make payments for work done at agreed prices. The signs to be 
used for the purpose of payment are created in the fixed cost commitments that 
contractors enter into at different stages of a construction project. The cost 
commitments through a project are illustrated in Figure 9 below. Costs at tender are 
created first. Then, when a main contractor’s tender is successful, and any 
adjustments have been negotiated, costs at contract are established as the basis for 
future payments. As the construction progresses on site costs at stage payments are 
created, usually monthly. When work is complete and adjustments have been 
negotiated that are allowed for in the contract, costs at final account are established.  
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Figure 9: Cost commitments represented through the supply chain  
 
The costs at contract are particularly significant signs in a construction project. As 
outlined in Section 2.4.3, Gosling et al. (2015) stress the importance of the contract 
point in supply chain terminology as the decoupling point (Hoekestra and Romme, 
1992), the point at which a client’s order is set in a unique design and cost before 
construction begins, decoupling design and cost from the construction process on 
site. Winch (2010) also stresses the importance of the contract point but using 
terminology from transaction cost economics, the fundamental transformation point 
(Williamson, 1985). This is the stage at which there is a reversal in bargaining power 
from the client to the contractor. The findings in Section 4.8.2 similarly recognise that 
at this point contractors commit to project costs that contain forecasts and, apart from 
adjustments to costs allowed for in a contract, the contract point is significant 
because of the fact that the budget does not alter from this point, despite the fact that 
new decisions are taken and uncertainty continues to decreases as the building is 
progressively realised.  
 
The creation and flow of cost information through SCB in a tendering situation is 
illustrated in Figure 10. The labour-only firm of suspended ceiling fixers (SCB2) in the 
lowest tier of the subcontract supply chain (tier 3) creates estimates of the use of 
their own resources (E) and makes strategic tendering decisions (S). They pass cost 
information up the supply chain in a quotation (Q) for their work. A suspended 
ceilings subcontractor (SCB1) in next tier of the chain (tier 2) receives the quotation 
from SCB2.  The quotation becomes part of SCB1’s cost information. SCB1 in turn 
creates estimates of the use of their own resources (E) and take strategic tendering 
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decisions (S). This repeats up the supply chain to a main contractor (MC) in the next 
tier (tier 1). A client is at the top of the chain (tier 0).  
 
Figure 10: The creation and flow of cost information through the supply chain for a 
subcontract work package 
 
SCB2 (the labour-only suspended ceilings fixer at tier 3) is asked by SCB1 to bid for 
the labour involved in putting up ceilings in defined rooms for fixed price lump sum(s) 
under a sequential spot contracting arrangement (Section 2.2.2). In order to provide 
a quotation to SCB1 under this price basis SBC2 goes through cycles of forma, 
informa and performa in creating and using cost information in their firm. They create 
forma in their ideas about the area of ceiling they can put up in a day based on 
historical information, the particular design features of the ceilings in a particular 
project that will affect their productivity, the rate of pay for skilled ceiling fixers that 
the market is currently paying, and the loyalty that they give to and receive from 
SCB1 in terms of a long term relationship and prompt payment. This forma becomes 
informa when they discuss it within their firm. This informa becomes performa when 
they decide on their negotiating position for the project. SCB1 also goes though 
multiple loops of forma, informa and performa as they come to their negotiating 
position on a fixed price lump sum. SCB1 explained that, depending on the market, 
their negotiating position with SCB2 ranges from a fixed amount that the market will 
bear when demand is low, to an open question about what SCB2 will do the job for 
when demand is high. In the negotiations both parties know (informa) that SCB2 will 
take all the risk of delivery under the lump sum pricing arrangement. SCB2 will 
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realise a higher hourly rate of pay if they work more quickly than the rate of 
productivity they assume in their bid. On the other hand if they work more slowly, 
they will come out with a lower hourly rate of pay. The lump sum price for labour 
agreed with SCB2 is expressed in a quotation and the quotation becomes an 
element of forma for SCB1 in their bid. 
 
SCB1 prepares a bid for putting up ceilings for a fixed price represented as unit rates 
for measured work items (such as a cost per square metre of a specific quantity and 
type of suspended ceiling). The measured work items are set out in a bill of 
quantities in accordance with the detailed conventions for measuring work. Section 
2.2.1 described the bill of quantities as taking the form of a Product Breakdown 
Structure (PBS): measured items of work that are attached to finished products (or 
objects) in a design model. Literature presented in Section 2.2.1 also established that 
there are detailed conventions for estimating costs. Figure 11 illustrates the cost 
information created by SCB1 in this process.  SCB1 disassembles measured items 
of work into activities and the resources the activities will consume (labour, material, 
plant, overhead, contingencies and profit) calculating quantities of resources using 
labour productivity, material waste, and plant utilisation rates. This includes 
distributing the lump sum for labour negotiated with SCB2 across measured items of 
work using the hourly pay and productivity rates negotiated. Thus the activity based 
cost information in the lump sum quotation received from SCB2 is abstracted away 
from its origin, the lump sum, by SCB1 as they create their product-based cost 
information. SCB1 then reassembles all the activity costs into the composite costs for 
products (measured work items) listed in the cost model. As set out in Section 2.2.1, 
Winch (2010) notes that estimators come up against problems of integrating their 
activity based cost information with measured items of products in cost models. He 
notes that contractors create activity-orientated Work Breakdown Structures (WBSs) 
and trade-orientated Organisational Breakdown Structures (OBS) to help with 
estimating, and then funnel this information into the object-orientated PBS of the cost 
model. This view is supported by the findings in Section 4.2.4.   
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Figure 11: Records of cost created within organisations and passed on as composite 
costs 
 
Findings in Section 4.5 also show that a bottom-up approach, building up costs from 
the lowest tier of a supply chain to the client’s cost model, is followed sequentially in 
the initial round of competitive tendering. However commonly, once a main 
contractor is awarded a project at an agreed price with the client based on initial 
quotations, the main contractor discards the initial quotations and carries out a 
secondary tendering process nearer the start of each work package on site. All 
subcontractors commonly do likewise with their own subcontractors and suppliers. 
Thus further cycles of forma, informa and performa occur in methods of costing 
within and between firms.  
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The signs that represent cost commitments across the supply chain are created 
through the methods of costing described above and all involve cycles of formative, 
informative and performative action. The different types of information used within 
the methods of costing are categorised in Figure 12. Figure 12 uses the term "signs" 
to mean data plus meaning in accordance with Beynon-Davies’ (2011) theoretical 
use of the term. The first category is Dean’s (1993) term direct measures of “the cost 
basis of the firm's resources” (Section 2.5.3). Dean’s (1993) term “analogies” is 
adapted into the term standard measures to express the historically determined 
norms for consumption of resources. The traditional category of quotations (Section 
2.2.1) is adapted into the term bargaining to more specifically reflect the treatment of 
quotations as one of commercial buying behaviour rather than straightforward 
comparative prices. Dean’s (1993) terms expert opinion and best guesses are 
adapted into the term judgements to reflect cost records that are correlated to the 
market or other parts of the construction system. Lastly a category of intentional 
errors reflects practices that knowingly corrupt a cost model from a good 
representation of work the cost of work to be done in any specific item of measured 
work. Figure 12 uses the term distortion to describe the degree of distance between 
forecasts of physical work required, and the signs created. The level of distortion is 
shown to rise progressively, from its lowest level in firm at the bottom of a supply 
chain to its highest level in the clients’ cost model.  
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Types of information created across a 
subcontract supply chain 
 (From primary data) 
 
 
Type of signs  
 
 
 
Distortion within 
signs  
 
Labour-only 
sub 
contractor’s 
private cost 
model 
 
Tier 3 
 
 
Subcontractor’s 
private cost 
model 
 
 
 
Tier 2 
 
 
Main 
contractor’s 
private cost 
model 
 
 
Tier 1 
 
Across the supply chain 
 
 
• Labour 
cost 
 
 
• Material cost 
• Plant cost 
• Direct project 
overhead cost 
• Trade 
discounts 
 
• Direct project 
overhead 
costs 
Direct 
measures of 
cost of internal 
resources 
correlated to the 
market 
 
Low: an 
environment of 
sureness created 
by direct measures 
of cost 
• Labour 
productivity  
 
• Back of the 
envelope 
estimating 
 
• Material waste  
• Plant utility  
• Cost allocation 
for project 
overheads. 
• Cost allocation 
for the indirect 
overheads of a 
firm 
• Back of the 
envelope 
estimating 
 
• Cost allocation 
for project 
overheads 
• Cost allocation 
for the indirect 
overheads of a 
firm 
 
Standard 
measures 
From industry-
wide or 
organisation 
specific 
estimating 
databases of 
historical use of 
internal 
resources 
 
Low to medium: 
an environment of 
uniformity created 
by comparisons to -
determined norms 
and allowances for 
context 
 • Driving cost reductions on 
Quotations received  
• Secondary discounts 
• Going back to market to negotiate 
 
Bargaining 
correlated to the 
market or other 
parts of the 
construction 
system 
 
Medium to high: an 
environment of non-
cooperation 
created by lowest 
price commercial 
buying behaviour  
 • Cost inflation  
• Qualifications 
• Planning for variations  
• Contingencies  
• Profit 
 
Judgements 
correlated to the 
market or other 
parts of the 
construction 
system 
 
Medium: an 
environment of 
chance created 
‘best guess’ 
 
 • Frontloading 
• Late payments 
• Underbidding 
• Planning for claims 
• Cover pricing 
• Dutch auctions 
 
Intentional 
errors 
correlated to 
parts of the 
construction 
system 
 
High: 
An environment of 
distrust created by 
acknowledged non-
collaborative 
practices 
 
Figure 12: Signs created and their classification by type and level of distortion 
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Figure 12 shows that some of the signs that represent cost commitments are 
relatively faithful to forecasts of work that will be done. For example the specifications 
of products, their quantities and the geometry of their design are the simplest 
representations to make and provide direct measures of the materials required. But 
even where bills of quantities provide a large amount of information there are gaps in 
design information. The activities that contractors will go through (such as 
sequencing tasks, allocating resources, putting up ceiling grids and laying ceiling 
tiles) in changing conditions on site are much more uncertain and harder to 
represent. So there are bigger gaps in technical information at this stage about work 
programming and work methods. As well as gaps in technical information the signs in 
the cost model are removed from a good representation of the physical work done by 
the commercial decisions that contractors make. The influence of commercial 
decisions on the signs will also change after the contract point, when contactors 
engage in a second round of competitive tendering in changing markets that create 
shifting power between buyers and suppliers. 
 
Taking each type of sign in Figure 12 in turn, costs of a firm’s own resources are 
perhaps the closest representations of cost made to work that will be done, but are 
highly market dependent. The cost of labour for example depends on the availability 
of skilled labour. The costs created by lowest tier subcontractors are potentially 
closest to true input costs because the greatest proportion of their costs falls in this 
category. Material quantities are good representations but material costs are 
negotiable throughout the supply chain. They are based on the list prices from 
suppliers, and contractors across the supply chain hope to negotiate better prices 
and credit terms for repeat business. Plant input costs are either direct measures of 
cost where a contractor owns the plant or forecasts of cost for hired plant based on 
list prices. Like materials, costs of plant vary in the market. Project overheads, such 
as the labour costs of a site supervisor and plant costs for site cabins are also 
examples of direct measures of forecast costs of a firm’s own internal resources. 
Direct measures comprise the surest information on which to forecast costs, thus 
introduce an atmosphere that this Section calls sureness.  
 
The use of a firm’s own resources are highly project dependent. The productivity and 
skill of labour for example are assumed to be fixed, but in practice will vary between 
projects. The utilisation and performance of plant and equipment are assumed fixed. 
But in practice innovations in materials, components, plant and equipment can differ 
between projects and may be slow to be costed. Section 4.2.2 found that the 
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industry-wide or an organisation’s own standard rates for labour productivity, material 
waste and plant utilisation are based on historically-determined norms from site, but 
the context of any particular project lowers the relationship of this type of cost 
information created to the actual work done. The standard rates, amended by best 
guesses for project-specific factors and uncertainties, introduce an atmosphere that 
this Section calls uniformity.  
 
Quotations received are influenced by bargaining, negotiating lowest costs deep into 
the supply chain. Examples from literature section 2.2.2 and the findings from 
primary data section 4.5.1 showed that negotiations include bargaining for discounts 
on prices and better credit terms, driving cost reductions on quotations received with 
the threat of going to competitors, and actually going to competitors for new 
quotations. Section 4.2.3 shows that over 80% of the main contractor’s costs falls 
into this category, as well as around 70% of SCA1’s cost, and 60 % of SCB1’s cost. 
The bargaining across the supply chain is therefore significant because of its extent 
and introduces an atmosphere that this Section calls non-cooperation. 
 
Strategic tendering decisions examples (Section 4.2.4) are readily acknowledged as 
commercial decisions and create an atmosphere of chance. Other practices also 
create an atmosphere of chance. Experience-based estimating (Section 2.2.2) 
bypasses the creation of information about the use of resources and introduces 
acknowledged guesswork. Judgements on cost inflation, planning for variations, and 
qualifications introduce further degrees of acknowledged guesswork and increase 
the atmosphere of chance. 
 
Acknowledged practices of intentional errors across a cost model (from findings in 
Section 4.2.3) include frontloading. Other categories of commercial practice come 
from literature (Section 2.2.2). These systematic practices create an atmosphere of 
non-cooperation so sub-contractors price for acknowledged non-collaborative 
practices such as disruption and late payment, by adding contingencies for poor 
coordination due to the atmosphere of distrust. 
 
This analysis reveals that apart from direct measurement of quantities, contractor 
costing sits in the social world of standard rates, bargaining, judgements and 
intentional errors. Contractors put uncertainty costs in to their cost models to handle 
this. In Beynon-Davies’ (2011) terms the signs represented in the resulting cost 
model point in two directions through their interaction with forma, informa and 
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performa in the methods of costing. One direction is to the physical world of work to 
be done linked to technical design and construction information, and another 
direction is to the social world of negotiation of design, work programming, work 
methods and commercial exchange in construction projects. The signs in the cost 
model are thus distorted from a good representation of work to be done. The bill of 
quantities thus becomes a list of assertions about work to be done and payments 
due.  
 
Representation of cost is not just a problem in construction. Across commerce in 
general how the information world of costing handles this social world of 
uncertainties and commercial practices is also not transparent. In management 
accounting literature Van Der Merwe (2007a) notes that management accounting 
has for many years sought new cost perspectives that better link costs with causes. 
He argues that causality should be the overriding modelling principle in cost 
modelling. But agrees with Johnson and Kaplan (1987) who had earlier observed 
that management accounting had become uninterested in direct measures of 
activities in the firm, relying instead on what they call surrogate financial numbers, 
that reduce the instrumental value of cost information in providing management with 
a tool to better manage a business (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987) also used the term surrogate to draw attention to the disconnection 
between the representation of cost and physical work. They said that cost 
information had become “uninterested in representing actual work done.” This was 
also recognised by Dean (1995) working on costing in the space industry who also 
used the term surrogates in a wider sense to establish a wider conversation about 
the broader range of alternative surrogates available.  
 
Surrogate numbers in cost information are the norm, even in manufacturing, as 
uncertainties and errors are inherent in even the most detailed estimating methods 
and commercial pricing strategies influence product cost models away from a good 
representation of work done. In construction, where uncertainties are greater, even 
the detailed and specialised formal project cost models adopted in the UK do not 
represent actual work done well. The term surrogate is therefore important as it 
acknowledges that the representations of costs created cannot be complete, ideal 
representations of physical work done to create a finished object. The output, the 
contract sum, is made up of surrogates. The surrogates are established and 
connected to the task of payments by their meaning of establishing a price. The 
construction industry has worked with the surrogates described over a sustained 
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period of time, despite the atmosphere of uniformity, non-cooperation, chance and 
distrust within the signs that are used in project costing.  
 
5.2.2 The system of costing in construction  
 
The system of costing that handles the surrogate nature of cost information in 
construction can be described using the concept of the feedback loop from systems 
thinking as one way of conceiving how methods and processes carry the significance 
of the system they sit in. Ackoff (1979) sees the feedback loop as an adaptive control 
system, a system that compares outturn with prediction and proposes corrective 
action. The feedback loop is therefore central to learning and hence improvement. 
Figure 13 illustrates a feedback loop for a generic costing routine. 
 
 
Figure 13: The feedback loop in a system of costing 
 
Multiple feedback loops occur in all systems. In the system of costing in construction 
multiple feedback loops exist throughout a construction project and deep into the 
supply chain. Using the concept of distortion (see Figure 12 and the discussion in 
5.2.1) the feedback loops in the system of costing are described as loops of 
acknowledged practices. Figure 14 illustrates how the acknowledged practices form 
the feedback to costing methods and processes to the next project, and become 
constant from project to project, thus form the system of costing, 
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Figure 14: The feedback loop in the current system of costing in construction 
 
Estimating databases and methods are part of the system of costing, which itself is 
part of the system of construction. The estimating methods and databases are based 
on signs that contain a mixture of sureness, uniformity, chance, non-cooperation and 
distrust. The final account is only one version of outturn costs within the system of 
costing as illustrated in figure 14. The acknowledged practices include aspects of 
practice identified from the primary data (section 4.7) such as non-cooperation 
experienced on site, differences between trades identified from the primary data 
(Section 4.2) such as lump sum sequential spot contracting or attitudes to risk and 
such as lowest price competitive tendering across the supply chain and secondary 
competitive tendering for subcontractors (Section 4.5). The acknowledged practices 
in the feedback loop arise from practices across all three levels of the system of 
construction as conceived by Winch’s (2010) (as described in Section 2.7.1): a 
system of ever changing conditions at the three levels of processes, governance and 
institutional. From the site operative working with concrete in the process level, to the 
government policy officer working with procurement ideas at the governance level 
and the market responding to the wider environment at the institutional level. 
 
The feedback loop of acknowledged practices in the current system of costing 
creates stability, which maintains the status quo. The people who establish prices, 
make payments and control costs respond to the current signs in the cost model by 
operating on the basis that the cost model contains agreed data. In this way they 
make the cost model appear as if it works as a deterministic, mechanically simple 
system in which there is one unified purpose between parties and known, quantified 
feedback. There are advantages to everyone for this to be so. It allows routine 
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costing activities that are quite concrete and closed to continue, and money to flow 
through projects.  
 
But what really happens is that the methods and processes of costing adapt in order 
to accommodate the uncertainty in the system. At a project level, adaptations are 
made that cannot be accommodated by the formal costing routines, so they are dealt 
with through informal practices. The primary data shows that people working on the 
costing routines know that sometimes people drive a hard line on costs, usually from 
a top down approach, in which cost commitments are non-negotiable in hard 
bargaining (Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). At other times people make deals on costs to 
preserve relationships and factors that affect costs such as credit, warranties, 
insurances or quality of work are used as reasons to adjust prices in soft bargaining 
(Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). But neither of these commercial practices is seeking to 
discover information that may result in improvement. 
 
Detailed bills of quantities that are calculated to two decimal points seemingly take a 
reductionist view that the detail is correct and add ups to a larger model of the 
system because “the parts make the whole”. But part of the acknowledged practices 
in the feedback loop is that everyone knows that the detail is not correct. At an 
industry level adaptations are made between projects that cannot be accommodated 
within projects, but are dealt with in the informal system (Section 4.5.1). The findings 
(Section 4.8.2) show that everyone knows that firms win and lose on different 
projects and any improvements are hidden in the system, taken as profit within firms. 
Knowledge of what the current system of costing means is part and parcel of the 
skills of the people who are running the system. The system may be used at times 
for practices like hard bargaining and this forms a significant part of the stress for 
people in construction (Section 4.8.3). But most of the time costs are used to ensure 
money flows through projects in a way that that keeps companies liquid, in a 
collectively acknowledged way in which people understand the problem of money 
flow. However it is difficult to operate this system to everyone’s benefit. People 
higher up the supply chain may want to know that fair costs are being paid, but they 
pursue subcontractors for increasing cost reductions because that is part of the 
system. 
 
This presents a problem in using the current cost surrogates for the purpose of 
improvement. The primary data (Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) shows that current cost 
information is not generally agreed on for the more uncertain and open activities of 
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negotiating deep in to the supply chain on changes that result in improvements. Like 
Nicolini et al. (2000) (Section 2.2.3) this Section argues that when the industry moves 
away from short-term market-based exchanges to more relational exchanges, it 
takes the same problem of the surrogate nature of cost information with it. Pushing 
the purpose of cost information to establishing improvements in more relational 
exchanges is problematic. There is a lack of agreed data for costing improvements in 
the supply chain operations. The agreements on cost break down, for not all cost 
data is trusted and agreed as good information for improvement purposes. The next 
Section will go on to consider current views on tackling improvement in the supply 
chain and their associated surrogates for cost information.  
 
5.2.3 Current improvement interventions and their associated methods of 
costing in construction 
 
In order to understand how new and different cost surrogates can better motivate 
improvement, this thesis enrols the concepts of hard and soft to describe 
improvement interventions in organisations and projects, and their relationship to 
information.  
 
The field of Operations Research (OR) (Section 2.7.1) has taken both hard and soft 
approaches to interventions that seek to bring about improvements. A hard OR 
approach is one of improvement through setting unitary goals and optimising 
processes. This approach is underpinned by an epistemology of positivism. It 
attempts to engineer a situation to take the uncertainty out of the system. This 
approach requires hard, measurable information, which is specific and deterministic. 
It aims to get full data about the system. However there may be a limit to the 
availability of data and / or the ability to interpret more and more data. Hard 
measurements are important because they deliver trust. However trust is 
compromised if there are problems of data availability or analysis. A soft OR 
(Rosenhead, 1989) approach contrasts with a hard approach. It starts from a 
situation that some people regard as problematical and worthy of serious attention 
aimed at improvement. Finding an optimal solution is not important; coordinating 
people around an imperfect world is important. This approach is underpinned by an 
epistemology of social constructivism. It accepts the uncertainty in the system and 
attempts to acknowledge and better understand the uncertainty. Soft OR recognises 
that some factors cannot be measured and need to be treated differently. Soft OR 
sees value in information that is non-deterministic and thus allows for learning. There 
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may be less data, but that data may be more transparent what it represents. In this 
soft approach data distortion and data unavailability are acknowledged, increasing 
trust.  
 
In construction, the industry has been criticised over time for poor performance and 
high costs on the basis of high profile projects (See Section 1.1). Though not all 
agree that the construction industry is a poor performer, it is generally agreed that 
improvement, including cost reduction is desirable. But a guiding set of interventions 
to deliver improvement in construction are far from established, uptake of 
interventions promoted as best practice is slow, and where improvement is 
reportedly delivered in demonstration projects evidence is anecdotal and the 
improvement is not agreed on as good by everyone in the supply chain.  
 
Supply Chain Management is a broad category of interventions that could potentially 
deliver change agreed on as good by everyone in the supply chain. Section 2.4 
detailed supply chain management interventions in manufacturing and their adoption 
in construction. Many views on importing supply chain management into construction 
conclude that one or more barriers exist due to the adversarial nature of 
relationships, fragmentation of the supply base, an inability to innovate, and an 
attachment to competitive bidding. However attempts to import supply chain 
management into construction have been made. Supply chain management 
interventions adopted by construction can be classified into consolidation between 
firms, process improvements and procurement interventions.  
 
Section 2.4.3 shows that there are a few examples of consolidation of the supply-
base in construction industry in certain trades. Moves to modular design and off-site 
manufacturing have also resulted in a smaller supply base in some trades. Not all 
agree that significant consolidation of the supply base into fewer, bigger firms is 
advantageous because the cyclical market for construction is seen to favour the 
dynamic capabilities that come from a larger number of smaller firms.  
 
Section 2.4.3 reports on efforts to adopt process improvement through lean thinking 
in the production phase of construction projects, termed lean construction. Lean 
construction tends towards a hard systems approach, which takes the view that it is 
possible to model ideal tasks and activities for site operations and ask the contractor 
and subcontractors work towards them. This approach attempts to remove the 
uncertainties in the system. This does not address the contextual problem that 
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construction tasks are carried out in changing conditions. Construction projects are 
people-paced environments. This contrasts with the machine-paced environments of 
manufacturing where the dominant costs in the system are inflexible and fixed. In a 
construction project, the dominant costs in the system are labour costs, which are 
flexible and negotiable in an ever-changing environment. 
 
Given the continued fragmentation of the supply base, construction has tried new 
methods of co-ordination and control through procurement that sets up different 
relationships between firms, usually for a single project, occasionally two of more 
projects. Procurement options were covered in literature Section 2.2.3. The range of 
procurement initiatives cover consortia, partnering, alliances, frameworks, early 
contractor involvement; clustering also known as building down barriers. These 
approaches accept the uncertainties in the system and adopt a soft system approach 
that attempts to change the culture and behaviour in the system. 
 
Solid evidence of agreed cost reduction for clients from improvement efforts such as 
lean, partnering and clustering is sparse, even from promoters. There is very little 
literature about how people who are asked to achieve improvement respond to cost 
information. However there are examples of authors who have found efforts towards 
pushing the purpose of contractors’ cost information to accounting for improvements 
to be problematic. The Tavistock Institute (1966) identified cost handling as a 
fundamental barrier to improvement. They took the view that the cost information 
during design, at the contract and at the final account “cannot, without making many 
assumptions, be related to one another nor validated one against another”. They said 
that “as long as the different parts of the process [of construction] and its costs are so 
divided, with independence and even mistrust between parties, it would seem 
impossible to get a more rational system for costing the whole”.  
 
More recently the introduction of incentive contracts in demonstration projects has 
required more from cost information than traditional contracts. The most strident 
voice that holds the view that incentive contracts throw into relief the prevailing 
problem in cost information is perhaps Nicolini et al. (2000) who said “the lack of 
most basic knowledge on the supply side regarding costs and the cost drivers means 
that target costing approach is not viable in the current state of the industry”. Nicolini 
et al. (2000) also found that contractors responded to cost information presented by 
the client’s quantity surveyor in a pain / gain share contract with scepticism, because 
there were no feedback mechanisms from outturn costs or differing contexts of the 
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previous projects behind the cost information presented. But nevertheless, the cost 
information was still viewed as effective enough for all parties to use it in the one off 
situation of an exemplar project. Winch (2010) acknowledged the view of Nicolini et 
al. (2000). But saw the solution in the fee model for designers, not in construction 
cost information.  
 
Research into improving cost information in construction has been motivated by the 
advent of BIM (Section 2.6.2), and has worked towards increasing the detail in the 
hard data available about individual parts. Tsai (1998) pursues more accurate costs 
of quality in estimating so that cost information can lead decision-making. But a large 
proportion of the new cost information required to achieve this relies on judgement, 
not direct measurement. Foruges et al. (2012) and Staub-French et al. (2003) pursue 
more accurate costs in estimating by identifying new attributable features of the 
product in the design. O’Brien and Fischer (2000) pursue new measures for intra-firm 
costs. They looked at capacity costs to more accurately account for fixed expenses 
incurred by construction firms across their portfolio of projects. Other authors such 
Peleskei et al. (2015) pursue Monte Carlo simulation approaches to more accurately 
costing risk contingencies. Smith et al. (2000) explore stochastic calculations for the 
performance of excavators in earthworks. This is of benefit in civil engineering 
projects where a high proportion of costs are incurred in earthworks and the current 
historically determined norms do not reflect the large variation in conditions between 
projects. But the assumption that evermore ideal or perfect models can be created 
and the industry can work towards ideal or perfect models has a limit. Modelling that 
better links costs to activities is of advantage in accurately pricing projects. 
Probabilistic modelling that tames uncertainties is also of advantage in that it can 
price projects more accurately. But efforts that seek completely accurate information 
for pricing purposes are unattainable.  
 
Outturn costs at the end of projects, as represented in final accounts, are a potential 
source of feedback, hence learning, to costing methods and processes. But cost 
models in final accounts are a poor match to realised, as-built costs. The primary 
data section 4.8.2 shows that the realities of construction are that everyone working 
on the costing routines knows that different companies hold different outturn costs 
within their firm and contractors continually win or lose in relation to costs on different 
projects. So the final account does not represent as-built costs and every firm holds a 
different version of outturn costs. This also presents a problem for the operation of 
Open Book Accounting (Section 1.2) in construction because the system of costing 
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includes different versions of costs in different firms. Sacks et al. (2010) and Sunil et 
al. (2015) in lean construction see opportunities for new information on outturn costs 
to be collected from site feedback (Section 2.6.2). The primary data (Section 4.3.4) 
and literature (Section 2.2.2) found that feedback mechanisms from work done on 
site to estimating databases are hard to find. It is particularly difficult to observe 
construction activity on a project and no two projects are the same. An example from 
the primary data (Section 4.3.4) shows that SCA1 collected hard feedback on out-
turn productivity rates for a particular activity, but the data was not deemed to be 
relevant for updating their estimating database because the economic cycle eclipsed 
the relevance of this feedback from site. Ross and Williams (2013) similarly pointed 
to the same problem (Section 2.2.2). 
 
The system of costing contributes to the current situation where there is no universal 
agreement deep into the supply chain on cost reductions from different types of 
improvement effort. Nor is there universal agreement deep into the supply chain on 
why agreement has not been forthcoming. Clients may believe they have realised 
cost savings on projects. But this may be short-term and cannot be agreed on when 
improvements are not readily attached to cost.  
 
5.2.4 New surrogates for costs in commerce 
 
Section 2.5 set out literature from management accounting in the field of supply 
chain management that has explored some alternative cost surrogates to support 
inter-firm decisions. The literature review set out the detail of these alternatives and 
Table 9 summarises the purpose, core cost surrogates, and emphasis of five 
different cost management tools: Activity Based Costing, Lean Accounting and 
Throughput Accounting, Strategic Cost Management and Target Costing 
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Cost management 
tool 
 
Main purpose Core surrogates for 
cost 
Emphasis 
Activity Based Costing 
(Cooper and Kaplan 
1998) 
Analysing 
profitability of 
specific products 
 
Assigns indirect 
overhead costs more 
accurately to specific 
products 
 
To provide more 
accurate estimates for 
pricing decisions for 
individual products 
 
Lean Accounting or 
Value Stream Costing 
(Womack and Jones, 
1996) 
Aggregation of 
direct costs by 
value stream.  
 
Records weekly 
outturn costs of 
operations  
Changes in the overall 
outturn profitability of 
a firm based from 
removing waste 
 
Throughput Accounting 
contributes to Theory 
of Constraints 
(Goldratt, 1990) 
Whole system 
profit 
optimisation 
 
Records sales price 
minus outturn costs of 
materials. Some 
authors record sales 
price minus outturn 
costs all variable 
inputs 
 
Changes in specific 
product outturn 
profitability from 
removing constraints 
Value Engineering and 
Target Costing 
supported by open 
book accounting 
(Ansari et al., 1997) 
 
Analysis of a 
product design 
and production 
process related 
to customer 
needs 
 
Rules for assigning 
estimated input costs, 
(direct costs and 
overhead costs) 
absorbed by products 
and adding a profit 
margin. A cost-plus 
basis to establish a 
target. Followed by 
open book accounting 
for records of outturn 
costs. 
 
Design stage 
improvement plans for 
cost reduction in 
product and process 
design at the same 
time as increasing 
function and quality. 
To bridge the gap 
between target costs 
and outturn costs.  
 
Strategic Cost 
Management (Porter, 
1985) 
 
Assessing 
competitive 
advantage 
 
Integrates cost 
information on outturn 
costs from across 
firms. Assigns outturn 
costs and target costs 
to each firm 
 
Design stage 
improvements to 
assist invest to save 
and make or buy 
decisions across firms 
 
 
Table 9: Surrogate measures for costs associated with improvement interventions in 
commerce 
 
These interventions lean towards the hard approaches of measuring more detail. 
Target Costing, Lean Accounting and Throughput Accounting all involve collection of 
outturn costs. The more controllable environment of manufacturing lends itself to 
interventions that take a hard approach to cost measurement. But even in 
manufacturing environments these accounting interventions are far from universal. 
This lack of agreement on the benefits of supply chain costing techniques in 
manufacturing and the nature of construction supply chains as a short-term, project 
supply chains formed to deliver a one off asset, both raise the question of the value 
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of importing ideas of supply chain costing from manufacturing where long term 
supply chains are formed to deliver repeat products.  
 
The construction industry is wedded to a specific system of surrogate cost 
information and has learned to make the surrogates work for short term, project 
based tendering and payment purposes, rooted in a belief that the surrogates work 
for getting the best price possible. Surrogates may be good for one purpose but poor 
for other purposes. When a different purpose of longer-term, industry-wide 
improvement is taken, the current surrogates do not work well. Alternative surrogates 
that better serve the purpose of improvements in organisations and projects could be 
established. There is no simple intervention. Interventions are needed that are more 
holistic and therefore work for more people. If rewards were tied more to the system 
of operation of the supply chain, main contractors and subcontractors would have an 
incentive to change.  
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Part 2 
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5.3 New representations of cost 
 
5.3.1 Redefining the problem 
 
The current system of costing works for the problem of establishing payments to 
individual firms delivering packages of work, but does not provide information that is 
agreed on by all for costing improvement across the supply chain. This Section 
considers a new costing ontology that could change the system of costing through 
acknowledging the different problem of establishing improvements though the supply 
chain. 
 
The search for new improvement interventions and associated costing methods that 
can account for improvements (identify change, measure it and put a cost to it) is not 
new. Some approaches to improvement have attempted to engineer situations to 
take the uncertainty out of the system. They, and their associated methods of 
costing, have worked on accuracy and detail. These approaches have tackled, but 
not resolved, the problem of representing improvement in a way that can be costed 
and rewarded. This approach is partly the lean model for improvement (Section 
2.4.2). This is a hard systems approach in which optimising the parts (making small 
changes close the symptoms) results in the whole working better.   
 
But approaches to improvement designed to work in hard systems are difficult in 
construction, as construction projects are soft systems in which sociological aspects 
are of key importance alongside technical aspects. Amongst authors who take such 
a socio-technical view of construction (Section 2.7.1), Winch (2010) describes the 
construction system as a dynamic system of information flow on three interacting 
levels. Dubois and Gadde (2002) similarly observed the industry to be a loosely 
coupled system that operates through negotiation. The Tavistock Institute (1966) 
characterised the construction industry as a system of interdependence and 
uncertainty. They identified the importance of uncertainty because they saw 
uncertainties throughout the construction process; including doubts about 
information, faulty information and limited attempts to plan. They identified 
interdependence as the second important characteristic because they saw that any 
decision taken set in train a chain of consequences that could change the decision, 
thus decision and actions depend on one another. This concept of interdependence 
and its management provides an opportunity for taking forward the measurement of 
improvement. 
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The loose-coupled system of construction presents problems that are more complex 
than those in hard, tight-coupled systems, which is in part the manufacturing model. 
In construction, efforts that seek completely accurate information are unattainable. 
There are limits to the level of detail that people can measure and manage, as many 
aspects of site operations are unobservable or unacknowledged. In fact interventions 
and their associated methods of costing that work on accuracy (such as activity 
based costing, lean accounting, and throughput accounting) can be poorer at 
representing problems, as greater detail in one area can involve greater exclusion of 
what the problem actually is, and because optimising a part might cause greater 
problems in the whole.  
 
The system of construction also presents problems that are too complex for single, 
simple interventions to solve. A different approach to improvement to the lean model, 
are approaches that seek to acknowledge and tolerate the uncertainty in the system, 
and advocate culture change throughout the system. This approach is partly the 
partnering model for improvement (Section 2.4.3). But no simple intervention will 
provide a solution and approaches to improvement that accept uncertainty and 
attempt to change the culture in the system have not tried to tackle the problem of 
representing improvement in a way that it can be costed and rewarded. 
 
One participant described how improvement initiatives in construction need to take 
account of a bigger picture.  
 
“When you get involved in the value engineering process, you start off with the job 
that's been well considered, but then we embark upon this period when we undo all 
that work and we pick at all the edges of it. So that the coordinated piece of design 
now has got different assumptions.” MC (30) 
 
This Section therefore redefines the problem of improvement and accounting for 
improvement in construction project supply chains, from the pursuit of ever-greater 
detail in cost models to new cost models that are simpler but purposefully designed 
to motivate improvement deep into the supply chain.  
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5.3.2 Addressing common interests 
 
Participants described the potential for improvement through joint planning, in which 
multiple people across a supply chain are involved in defining problems and finding 
holistic solutions around common interests.  
 
“Getting round the table and really discussing sequencing with your key supply chain, 
really looking at the project, getting into the design. We built rooms in our mind, drew 
them and built the programme around that.  Then we built the bigger 
programme…we suffered problems, but those problems… for everyone involved 
would have been a lot worse.” T1 (39) 
This example shows an approach to improvement that establishes common 
interests, explores problems collectively in a way that recognises that different 
people hold different views, and leads to more holistic solutions that work for more 
people. It also sees dependencies as key. This is a soft systems approach to 
improvement. Construction projects lend themselves to analysis and decision-making 
using Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (Section 2.7.1). SSM makes soft systems 
ideas - ideas that are concerned with the interactions between parts of the whole and 
emergent properties of the whole - fundamental to finding improvement solutions in 
construction. SSM makes six major assumptions in its method for identifying 
improvement solutions (i) there is an ever changing flux of interacting events and 
ideas (ii) different meanings are attributed to events by different people (iii) because 
of this system ideas are appropriate, a concept of the whole and its emergent 
properties (iv) individuals are trying to take purposeful action in accordance with their 
worldview (v) it is therefore appropriate to create models of human activity systems 
(as a device to explore the real world) and map them on to real world action (vi) 
learning about real problems takes place by comparing real world action to the 
model. 
 
Such soft system approaches thus seek to better understand situations, develop an 
approximate ideal, then manage the situation towards this approximate ideal and 
finally feedback information to make better predictions in planning for the future. This 
in turn brings about system change. But the link between improvement solutions 
generated through soft system approaches and information requirements that 
support soft system approaches so that they can represent the change brought 
about, and put a cost to that change, needs careful consideration.  
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There is a tension between SSM and its information requirements, as information 
systems can only deal in hard information. Rosenhead (1989) (Section 2.7.1) 
suggests that using SSM as a front-end to a more traditional, hard information 
systems design potentially offers an opportunity to bridge the gap between soft and 
hard worlds. SSM is used to structure a debate about activities and processes. The 
method then takes the position that once new activities and processes are agreed 
on, the information requirements to carry out those activities can be defined. 
However Beynon-Davies (2011) is cautious about the achievements of soft system 
approaches in practice in considering information requirements fully. He recognises 
SSM as a systems model, and sees SSM as a device that promotes change through 
redesign of organisations, or parts of organisations, in dynamic situations. However 
he argues that definition of the information requirements that can represent the 
change brought about through SSM has been poor. He said that SSM “has little 
consideration for signs, and as a result communication and representation are seen 
within the design method as if to magically emerge from the consideration of the 
proper ordering of activities or processes”. Thus a much richer information model is 
required, 
 
5.3.3 Information requirements of soft system approaches to improvement  
 
Information requirements will clearly not magically appear just by using soft system 
methods. Information Technology (IT) is the enabler of change in that is the provider 
of information, but IT can only deliver hard information.  The problem of using soft 
systems thinking effectively is therefore a problem of how to bridge the gap between 
the soft world of organisations and the hard world of Information Technology. This 
Section takes the example of construction cost information to make this transparent.  
 
Returning to the idea that IT provides a means for communication through signs, 
shown as representations. All representations are hard information in the modelled 
world of IT, but representations also contain the significance of the soft world of 
reality. This Section argues that the gaps between the soft world of organisations and 
the hard world of IT can be bridged by making the softness in representations more 
transparent though the concept of signs. Figure 15 draws on Beynon-Davies’ (2010) 
concept of information-use through cycles of formative, informative and performative 
acts to illustrate that the system of costing includes significance from the soft world of 
reality. This is illustrated through the examples of two signs of work to be done and 
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their costs represented by a lump sum cost for a product and a composite cost of a 
product in a measured item of work. The forma, informa and performa attached to 
these signs were described in Part 1 of this Discussion through the example of 
supply chain B. IT can only model forma, hard information, in methods of costing. But 
the significance of the soft world of reality arises in the signs from informa and 
performa. The illustration puts a greater significance on informa and performa over 
forma, even though forma is the only the representation that can be made in IT. 
 
Figure 15: The make up of signs for work to be done and its cost 
 
As said before, all representations are hard information, in the sense that they are 
fixed in forma. However meaning for improvement arises from the softness attached 
in a sign. The informa and performa, the softness, needs to be acknowledged in 
order to show the limitations of the forma. If the limitations of the forma are made 
transparent there is opportunity for increased data credibility. This Section takes this 
approach of increasing the transparency of the way in which cost information can 
only be presented as forma in IT, but in fact contains softness. 
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5.3.4 Dependencies as an information requirement for improvement 
 
What is needed is information requirements that can identify and put a cost to 
improvements for the supply chain. This section thus proposes new surrogates that 
can better represent the system, prompts discussion about change and 
measurements that can be used to cost change. 
 
The Findings (4.8.3) reported on what improvement that reaches deep into the 
supply chain would look like. They showed that better project programming was 
important to all parties, but important in different ways. Subcontractors expressed a 
desire for more collaborative and detailed planning throughout a project; they wanted 
to reduce uncertainty. The main contractor wanted to maintain flexibility in planning; 
they accepted and managed uncertainties through projects. During workshop 3 the 
main contractor explained their current ideas on improving their project planning 
practices. They explained that they were in the process of reducing their planning 
timescale to daily planning for activities concerned with the commissioning of the 
mechanical and electrical services. These activities occur at the end of a project. At 
this point, there is a concentration of activities and the interests of the main 
contractor and their subcontractors converge onto short-term daily planning. Daily 
planning becomes of the interest to the main contractor at this point because they 
have reached the end of a project and used up the contingencies in their plan. This 
section develops information requirements that identify what it calls hotspots of 
activities that would benefit from increased collaboration through joint planning at 
earlier points in projects to bring about improvements across the supply chain. 
 
What is needed is an approach to improvement in construction project supply chains 
that better understand situations, and generates requirements for information that 
has attributes that make better sense of the realities a situation. This requires 
surrogates that are hard and measurable, but in which their softness is not hidden.  
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This Section defines four criteria for good surrogates: 
 
• Meaningful: a meaningful surrogate is given when every representing symbol 
(or entity) is linked with one corresponding concept.  
 
• Measurable: a measurable surrogate is given when a representing symbol is 
available, it is linked to a known dimension of reality, 
 
• Manageable: a manageable surrogate is given when a representing symbol is 
linked to the actors who are involved and can take action. 
 
New surrogates that meet the criteria of being meaningful for improvement that is 
agreed on through the supply chain must represent the construction system, that is 
be concerned with the interactions between parts of the whole. Interactions can be 
represented by dependencies and interdependencies between entities in a system. 
Participants knew this when they said that the current system works on knowing 
people. If you know someone you can get things done (Section 4.5.2). IT brings the 
potential to make cooperation between everyone in the system more visible. 
Dependencies are suggested as a new surrogate that reflects the whole system. The 
process of identifying entities and their dependencies starts with defining what is 
included in the system, and therefore what to exclude. Then defining what the 
entities are and what the dependencies and interdependencies between them are. 
This is not a simple task. 
 
5.3.5 Dependencies in BIM 
 
Technology can give opportunities to measure and work with a new surrogates of 
dependencies to account for improvement deep into the supply chain. It needs to be 
acknowledged that all representations in Information Technology (IT) are only the 
forma but contain the softness, the informa and performa, in the sign. It also needs to 
be acknowledged that IT biases discussion towards hard information, information 
associated with the assumption that the world can be perfectly represented and 
made perfect. In costing, the quantity surveyor has traditionally done a job of 
providing seemingly hard information against a product breakdown structure. But as 
revealed in Part 1 of this discussion cost information in fact contains a degree of 
softness and users make cost information work for pricing, payment and cost control 
within a particular band of assumptions. Literature presented that describes the 
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ambitions of BIM (Section 2.6.1) sees its successes in design models (made up of 
objects linked by coordinates) that are used for visualisation and simulations, 
including immersive virtual reality simulations and decision support analyses, such as 
design clash detection or analysis of regulatory requirements. Delivery of design 
management in BIM is more advanced than delivery of construction management in 
BIM. Construction planning is slower to move into BIM but as contractors’ work 
planning information moves into BIM, physical work represented as tasks with 
durations and dependencies is represented in planning models. This provides new 
representations of the construction process and the resources of labour, plant and 
materials can be linked to the planning model.  
 
The adoption of cost management in BIM (Section 2.6.2) has focused on automation 
of current practices of quantity take-off, linking the measurement of quantities to the 
design model. These routines are the same as those already carried out on spread 
sheets and in costing software. Thus automation of the measurement of quantities 
assumes the problems of costing are already clear and well defined. Section 2.6.2 
presented some research (Foruges et al., 2012; Sacks et al, 2010; Sunil et al., 2015 
and Lawrence et al., 2015) into taking more complete or complicated measurements 
from the design model and automation of the new measurements for subsequent 
cost estimation. Some authors (Eastman et al, 2011; Monteiro and Martins, 2013) 
see automation of cost estimating in BIM as problematic because of the level of 
interpretation and judgement used in creating cost estimates. But the lack of real 
competition in construction and the existence of a system of costing that, more or 
less, works for firms across projects, results in a lack of pressure for systemic 
improvement. Thus there has been no incentive to search for new solutions. Cost 
management in BIM to date has involved itself in minor changes to existing sub-
optimal costing processes, rather than been developed as a tool to enable systemic 
improvement.  
 
There is potential for technology to help create new knowledge about the operation 
of the supply chain that has meaning for improvement and can be fed back into 
either managing the current situation or planning the future. But to date all disciplines 
in BIM have been criticised for delivering technological but not organisational change 
towards greater collaboration (Section 2.6). This requires a new surrogate for 
improvement, and an associated method of costing, that can reward improvements 
deep into the supply chain, contain softness and represent the system. 
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Although BIM offers opportunities to increase the creation, storage and transmission 
of hard information on costs in a digital form, and to automate this, technology offers 
greater opportunities when it is used to deal with the softness too, through its ability 
to show information on the whole and the parts. This extends the reach of model-
based analysis: either by manipulating hard data faster and more extensively, or by 
taking more complex measurements (measurements from different places), 
compounding them and analysing them collaboratively. This can be seen as using IT 
to informate (Zuboff, 1988), which is to acquire and create new knowledge in a 
process of continuous feedback from interaction between the technology and its 
users. This Thesis acknowledges that the computable world cannot deal directly with 
soft issues, but argues that it can create new surrogates that can represent the 
system to help deal with non-computable things through analysing them 
collaboratively. Informating cost management in BIM involves hard information on 
costs with a soft approach to its analysis. The goal of informating cost information in 
BIM is one of creating feedback into more rational practices for identifying 
improvement in the whole, measuring change and putting a cost to the change.  
 
Previous work (Tavistock Institute, 1966) and this research identified dependencies 
as good surrogates for the purpose of improvement that are meaningful, measurable, 
manageable and represent system. Dependencies between the objects that make up 
the finished building lie in the design focused BIM model of the building (product). 
Dependencies can be extracted from design models with parametric information in 
BIM, from objects that know what they are and how they interact. Other 
dependencies lie in associated BIM models that can be linked the design model and 
to each other. Project planning in BIM can link the design model to construction 
activities, resources, time and space. Project scheduling software can extend to 4D 
planning with associated applications that allow visualisation and decision support. 
Feedback about changing situations on site can be collected through Site BIM. Site 
BIM can provide feedback from site via GPS and photography. To date Site BIM has 
ben used to monitor progress and quality of work. Another link for the design model 
is a geographical link to GIS information.  
 
There are as many dependencies in construction projects as there are products, 
people and rules. Table 10 provides examples of dependencies, showing how 
dependences interact with work to be done. This Thesis takes an approach of 
managing dependencies, not necessarily reducing them. This Thesis provides a 
route to managing dependencies through informating construction projects from early 
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in a tender to final account: acquiring and creating new knowledge on dependencies 
in a process of continuous feedback from interaction between the technology (BIM) 
and its users.  
 
Model Dependencies 
 
Design model Intersections between different products from (such as 
bulkheads between walls and ceilings) 
 
Planning models Dependencies between different trades in sequencing (such 
as plaster boarding and electrical first and second fix) 
 
Organisation models Dependencies between different firms (such as drawings or 
other information requirements, or plant to move materials 
around) 
 
Regulations, codes 
and the market 
 
Dependencies between institutions and projects (such as 
planning approvals for materials, requirements for 
equipment and their permits or availability of labour) 
 
 
Table 10: Examples of knowledge on dependencies in BIM 
 
5.3.6 A systems ontology of costing 
 
Dependencies need to be placed in the system of construction. Ontologies (Section 
2.8.1) are a way of representing the world. This Thesis argues that what is needed is 
a new information ontology, that represents the costing of the system of construction 
delivery. This will be called a systems ontology of costing, rather than a structured 
model of costing. Staub-French et al. (2003) have developed on an ontology linked to 
design features in a design model (Section 2.6.2) and developed this in BIM. They 
identified design features based on estimators’ views on design features that were 
previously unmeasured but important for costing, such as features that define where 
work will be done in open areas or restricted areas. Staub-French’s et al. (2003) 
representation of design features includes connections (dependencies) between 
objects from geometry. This ontology of design features is important to the 
measurement of dependencies. But this Thesis goes further to identify the 
dependencies from additional models that between them can approximate a 
representation of the system of construction throughout the construction process. 
New measurements can be undertaken of a situation and of change in the situation 
in a way that better represent the whole system, not a work package The 
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measurement of change in the whole, and the ability to cost the change, is more 
meaningful than measurements that work on accuracy through detail.  
 
Figure 16, below suggests a systems ontology of cost information that takes 
information from a range of models in order to provide a new surrogate of 
dependencies from across models that between them better represent the system of 
a construction project, not the parts. The ontology provides a means of representing 
the world of a construction project at and between the three system levels related to 
Winch’s (2010) construction system (institutional, governance, and process). The 
ontology divides processes into construction and design processes. The ontology 
then identifies potential sources of new forma, in the form of dependencies, which 
can be measured from across BIM models: from national regulations to work 
breakdown structures. The ontology makes the representations explicitly meaningful 
for supply chain improvement. The ontology identifies measurable quantities 
highlighting dependencies to provide information across the supply chain 
(encompassing dependencies that arise from regulations, organisations, activities 
and component design). The ontology recognises that looking any lower, such as at 
the task level, would involve records that are too detailed to collect, too late to do 
anything about on a one-off project and too specific to individual subcontractors. 
Finally the ontology identifies spatial mapping and planning of hotspots of activity 
from the dependencies to identify problems that are manageable, therefore bring 
about change that can be measured and costed. 
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Figure 16: Schematic diagram for a systems ontology of costing 
 
This systems ontology for costing seeks to represent costs in a way that forma 
(surrogates in BIM) are used in way that they are transparent as signs, in that the 
forma contains the significance of the informa and performa that influences change 
that brings about improvement. The systems ontology facilitates this through making 
dependencies visible with the intention of managing dependencies for the overall 
benefit of the supply chain. Collaborative problem identification and solution building 
from soft systems methodology can achieve this, based on discussions using new 
surrogates of dependencies. This takes a bottom-up approach, thus it recognises 
that real improvement takes place when subcontractors at the bottom of the supply 
chain can work better on site, with the main contractor accommodating change in the 
system across subcontractors. This establishes improvement that has meaning for 
the overall supply chain. This requires that dependencies can be measured in BIM, 
used effectively to identify hotspots as tools for discussion about change and the 
measurement of agreed improvement. This identifies change that can be 
acknowledged costed and rewarded at an earlier stage to gain benefits when the 
market holds greatest sway. This needs to develop in time, as dependencies are not 
fully planned at tender and change as uncertainties reduce during the course of a 
project. 
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The process level offers the greatest potential scope for dependencies from the work 
breakdown model and subcontractor’s plans. However before rushing to take new 
measurements from work planning models, the nature of the surrogates in planning 
models needs to be understood. Just as cost models contain a high degree of 
distortion (as described in Part 1 of this Discussion) planners rely on intuition to 
estimate durations of work. Winch (2010) argues that Critical Path Method, Critical 
Chain Method and Critical Space Analysis based on sequential task dependencies 
are viable to help improvements on site. Dependencies and interdependences in site 
operations arise from the level of detail that it is viable for the designer to model and 
the main contractor to schedule. This approach relies on understanding the nature of 
project planning through its forma, informa and performa, in the same way that this 
thesis has understood the nature of costing. It also relies on a better understanding 
of the tensions identified in the findings Section 4.8.3 between the main contractors’ 
desire for flexibility and subcontractors desire for certainty in construction planning. 
Only then can project schedules be used to better understand and learn from the soft 
system of project scheduling. This thesis contends that this task needs to be done 
before working on better attaching costs to the plan. 
 
This Section started from the desire to find representations of cost that have a 
transparent purpose of improving site operations. Dependencies are a surrogate for 
uncertainty arsing for interactions and can be visualised. Dependencies visualised 
through IT and the identification of hotspots could enable contractors and 
subcontractors to be better informated. Everyone would know more about what was 
really happening. This would contrast with the current approach of hiding what is 
really happening through the use of IT for automation. To exploit the potential of 
technology in BIM, this Section has considered how new surrogates of dependencies 
that better represent physical work carried by the supply chain by better representing 
the system, might improve cost information. To achieve this, this Section accepts the 
uncertainties in contracting and concentrates on managing dependencies and 
interdependencies under conditions of uncertainty. This Section has therefore 
proposed a new systems ontology for costing that motivates improvement by 
changing the system, not just part of it.  
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5.3.7 Technology that changes the system 
 
To exploit this potential of technology in BIM, Part 2 of the Discussion has 
considered how new surrogates of dependencies, that better represent physical work 
carried out by the supply chain by better representing the whole and better reflecting 
the softness of what is really happening on site. Dependencies can provide the basis 
for cost information that is a good surrogate for identifying and rewarding for 
improvements. The surrogates are envisaged as being used within a new system of 
costing that has a purpose of motivating improvement in site operations through cost 
reward. For a new system of costing to be taken up people have to see either the 
fairness in it for the whole or the way they can use it for their own advantage. It also 
needs to be developmental to allow the system to change. 
 
This Section has taken an approach that looks across BIM models for measurements 
of dependencies that can help make situations in the whole supply chain more 
visible. Then hotspots can be used to prioritise areas that will benefit from managing 
uncertainly more collectively and actively. This may be able to encompass feedback 
about work progress that can be used to manage site operations in real time 
situations and make future predictions to create work methods that are more 
efficient, thus introduce learning, and change the system. 
More active collection of data and management of data, linked to cost, could provide 
the mechanism for fair reward as well as improvement benefits for the supply chain. 
Costs provide an incentive to try to improve, rather than using the contractual method 
of buying cheaper. 
 
The difficulty in obtaining suitable measurements is formidable. The measurement of 
improved teamwork and the like cannot be measured by piecemeal calculation of 
individual incidents. The field of measurement must be the complete construction 
system, rather than an individual feature of its design or production But the rewards 
of a system of costing in which it is possible to measure the effects of change aims to 
lead to a lessening of resistance to change.  
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CHAPTER 6 
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CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of thesis 
 
This Thesis has developed a preliminary systems ontology for the identification, 
measurement and costing of improvement through the use of BIM.  
 
Chapter 1 presented the research rationale. This comes from the challenge to the 
construction industry to improve its work processes and reduce costs at a time when 
new technologies are driving growth in the complexity of projects. This is a problem 
for all industries. But collaboration is more problematic in construction where main 
contractors subcontract most of the work, to mainly small or medium sized, local 
firms, who work together in short-term, project-based relationships. So solutions to 
improvement require working collectively. BIM is promoted as a solution to obtain 
greater efficiencies through information processing in technology and organisational 
collaboration. The link between IT and organisations is fundamental to achieving this. 
Organisations are fundamentally affected by money; every firm in a supply chain has 
strong obligations to their own financial requirements, separate to their obligations to 
projects. Whilst formal cost models prescribe how costs should be presented to the 
client for pricing, payment and cost control, the actual process of how contractors 
and subcontractors create and use cost information is not clearly articulated in 
literature on costing and largely absent in literature on improvement. 
 
Chapter 2 presented literature on contractors’ methods of costing that prescribe how 
formal project cost models should be presented and how contractors should build up 
costs for work from the constituent resources of labour, materials, plant and 
overheads plus profit. Literature on the influence of commercial pricing decisions that 
recognises a wider set of forces acting on the formal cost models was also 
presented. The emergence of new financial incentives for improvement, through 
Target Costing and Supply Chain Cost Management, was set out with the arguments 
of a few authors who have found that a lack of basic knowledge on costs on the 
supply side and an adherence to competitive tendering on the demand side of the 
industry are barriers to improvement. Improvement concerns, in construction in 
particular and in commerce in general, were presented with associated 
developments in intra-firm and inter-firm management accounting. The Chapter 
moved on to the arrival of BIM in construction and cost modelling in BIM. Finally 
literature was presented that looked upwards to systems thinking and associated 
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hard and soft views of systems, along with literature from information theory that 
specifically seeks to link IT to the organisations it is used in. 
 
Chapter 3 presented the research methodology. The research was carried out 
through a partnership with a main contractor who sponsored the studentship for this 
research. The primary research took a critical realist methodological stance to 
understand current contractor costing in its social context, grounded in practice to 
uncover the actual processes of how the main contractor and subcontractors create 
and use cost information through projects. A case study of a supply chain was 
assembled from the primary research. The primary research involved semi-
structured interviews, workshops, observation of site meetings and in-depth reviews 
of documents from a main contractor and five subcontractors to investigate current 
approaches to the creation and use of contractors’ cost information. This provided 
insight into how cost information is created and flows from forecasts of work to be 
carried out, to costs to the client.  
 
Chapter 4 presented the research findings. The findings showed that cost information 
that flows through the supply works as agreed costs for establishing a price. Current 
costing practices were described that showed that contractors and subcontractors 
view agreed costs as commercially rational decisions, in which all parties accept the 
uncertainty inherent in what will be required to fulfil their part of the bargain and all 
pursue their subcontractors and suppliers for cost reductions. The findings show the 
disconnection between the formal cost model shared with the client and the informal 
practices in the negotiable world of costing in the supply chain. Cost information that 
is tied to physical work carried out in the supply chain, which would be useful for 
evaluating and rewarding improvements, is either not created, or is obscured or lost 
when cost information passes between firms in the supply chain. It was found that 
cost information that is agreed on for pricing and budgeting, is not agreed on for 
assessing and rewarding change and hence improvement. The findings also showed 
that project planning also involved much negotiation in which planning and re-
planning of work and construction methods was undertaken during the delivery of 
projects. Thus moves to automate planning processes in BIM may produce non-
viable results and cannot be justified for the assessment of improvement. 
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Chapter 5 presented the discussion. Part 1 of the Discussion used the information-
use model of Beynon-Davies (2011), involving the concept of signs to encompass 
the forma, informa and performa that interact with cost information. Through the 
detailed analysis of the cycles of formative, informative and performative action in 
creating cost information, the Discussion identified the distortion in cost information, 
the practices that remove cost information away from a good representation of work 
to be done. Thus surrogate numbers are created that become fixed reference points 
in formal cost models, but are disconnected from the informal routines of cost 
handling as established in the Findings. The ideas presented so far were brought 
together in a description of the current system of costing that includes its 
acknowledged practices. Part 1 of the discussion argued that new surrogates need to 
be found, enabled by BIM, and agreed for effective representation of improvements. 
Part 2 of the discussion proposed a new systems ontology of costing for the specific 
purpose of improvement across the supply chain. The proposed ontology in turn, 
through a developmental introduction, changes the system of costing from a system 
based on buying more cheaply to a system based on identifying and fairly rewarding 
collaborative improvement that works for the supply chain as a whole. The 
Discussion took the position that new surrogates need to be measurable, 
manageable and meaningful for representing the system. The systems ontology of 
costing proposed is based on measurement of dependencies to achieve this. The 
Discussion argued that the measurement of dependencies from a wide range of BIM 
models can provide a measurement of the whole, not just the work package parts, 
and allows hotspots of dependencies to be identified. This information can then be 
used for collaborative discussion and decision-making about improvements deep into 
the supply chain following soft systems methods. Change can then be managed, 
represented and costed for fair reward across the supply chain and through projects 
from tender to final account. 
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6.2 Reflections on research achievements of objectives 
 
This research aimed to develop a framework of costing that supports more efficient 
supply chain practices through the use of BIM. In order to achieve this aim the 
following objectives were set: 
 
Objective 1: Determine how current approaches to supply chain costing affect supply 
chain operation and overall construction costs in a project.  
 
In order to achieve this objective the research accessed commercially sensitive 
information on the detailed costing methods and practices of a main contractor and 
six firms across three subcontract supply chains. This established comprehensive 
accounts of current approaches to supply chain costing from interviews, document 
review and workshops. The findings revealed the surrogate nature of costs created in 
their representation of work to be done, and the disconnection between the surrogate 
numbers held in contractors’ private cost models and the surrogate numbers held as 
fixed reference points in the formal cost model presented to clients. The findings on 
current approaches to costing were also confronted by literature from information 
theory in the Discussion. This provided a new analysis in the Discussion, of the 
nature of the data distortion that cost models are built on. The analysis of current 
approaches of costing revealed that the practice of forcing cost reductions onto the 
lowest tiers of the supply chain fundamentally affects collaboration across the supply 
chain, whilst reducing overall costs. The client thinks they are getting a cheaper 
building, but reductions in cost that could arise from greater collaboration remain 
unknown. 
 
Objective 2: Determine how different approaches to costing of supply chain operation 
can be used to deliver efficiency and cost savings in projects. 
 
In order to achieve this objective the research presented literature that encompassed 
the fields of supply chain management, construction improvement, management 
accounting, systems thinking, and information theory. Each of these fields are vast in 
themselves. There is much more to the work in each of these fields than is presented 
across this thesis. However it was necessary to cover this ground broadly, as to 
leave any of these fields out of the consideration of the research aim would give an 
incomplete consideration of the problem. The ideas presented in each field have 
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been chosen as a way to analyse “cost as information” from improvement in supply 
chains in construction projects.  
 
Objective 3: Examine costing through the lens of information theory to identify 
different, more useful costs of supply chain operation throughout projects 
 
In order to achieve this objective the research presented literature from information 
theory to establish new foundations for the development of cost modelling. It was 
established that automation of the current system of costing will not produce new 
cost information. New criteria arising from information theory have been developed 
for an information model of costs that are measurable, manageable and meaningful 
across the supply chain. 
 
Objective 4: Develop a schematic information model of costing that represents the 
whole system of costing in the supply chain to inform the development of information 
approaches such as BIM 
 
A schematic information model of costing has been created. The model takes the 
form of a systems ontology of costing that makes improvement by everyone across 
the supply chain more visible. This research argues that the systems ontology of 
costing can assist thinking about the development and testing of models of costing in 
BIM. 
 
6.3 Research contributions 
 
This research has revealed new elements of the current situation. Firstly the 
importance of the question it is trying to answer. Money is a driver of the industry and 
of collaboration. One participant illustrated the importance of money in construction. 
 
“You can go on to a site and within twenty minutes of walking round you know 
whether that site is running as it should do…everyone is starting at the optimum time 
and the process is running correctly…everybody is making the margin they should be 
making” MC (30) 
 
It became clear during the course of the research that good site operation goes hand 
in hand with fair cost recovery. Therefore tackling costing is fundamental to any 
programme of change. Any programme of process change will only work deep into 
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the supply chain, if it considers costs linked to the supply chain as a whole. The 
industry is making progress towards easing cashflow in the supply chain by tackling 
the bad practices of late payment of money due and non-payment of retention 
money. But the ability to measure the effects of change in work done and reward it 
financially remains elusive. The position taken by this thesis, that work on linking the 
cost modelling and work done in a way that represents the system and can be 
agreed by all as improvement, is not being suggested elsewhere.  
 
The research has revealed the importance of seeing “cost as information” in order to 
understand the limitation of current cost information and directions for new types of 
cost information. Beynon-Davies (2011) highlighted the advantage of a clear 
conception of systems and their associated information requirements. The concepts 
of forma, informa and performa in information have been used to unpick the bases 
that current cost information is created from and how it is used. This illustrated the 
distortion in the current cost information created from a good representation of work 
be done, thus losing its meaning for direct measures of and improvement in work 
done. It described how distortion arises from the use of standard measures, 
bargaining, judgements and intentional errors in cost modelling. It also illustrated the 
disconnection between formal project cost models and informal cost models held 
within firms, in a way that has not been done before, and in a way that shows why it 
is difficult for firms to pool current cost information. Both the distortion and 
disconnection of cost information arise from the negotiation inherent in the current 
system of costing, thus the meaning of cost information resides in its performa.  
 
Efforts that pursue greater detail in costing have not investigated the level below the 
representations of cost they have to work on, or the system of costing that the 
representations are used. This thesis showed that the problem of change is not one 
of gathering more data, because the data created is distorted and disconnected in 
the current system of costing. Change needs to be evolutionary as the current 
system of costing is so ubiquitous. Announcing a change will not make it happen. 
Change needs to progress in a way that allows people to learn to trust the 
information in the system. The systems ontology of costing proposed involves the 
creation of data that can be pooled across the supply chain, and data that better 
represents work done, because it better represents the system of construction. The 
systems ontology is based on the measurement of dependencies through BIM. 
Dependencies are chosen because, when taken from across a range of models in 
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BIM, they provide a representation about the reality of work done. This involves the 
measurement of dependencies from early in the tender stage to the final account. 
 
Lastly, this research contributes substantially to different fields of literature. It 
contributes to literature on standard project costing and the commercial management 
of construction projects as it describes current practices of contractor costing deep 
into the supply chain. It also contributes to literature on management accounting by 
looking at how developments in management accounting relate to construction 
project costing. It further contributes to literature in information theory as it applies 
Beynon-Davies’ (2011) preliminary framework of formative, informative and 
performative acts at a concrete level to current practice in construction project 
costing. Finally it contributes to literature on cost modelling in BIM, calling for a pause 
in automation of cost modelling in BIM, and a consideration the information 
requirements, viewing ‘cost as information’, alongside improvement efforts.  
 
6.4 Limitations of research 
 
The research does not include the view of members of the construction team other 
that contractors and subcontractors. Clients, designers and the client’s quantity 
surveyors would have a particular view of how contractors’ commercial interests play 
out in projects. The case study approach to establishing current methods of costing 
and system of costing is limited to one main contractor and seven subcontractors. 
But each said that what they described is usual on all projects. The research has 
relied heavily on Beynon-Davies’ (2011) work. His framework of forma, informa and 
performa is not simple and not easy to work with. It is also just one view, although it 
is consistent with the view of others that information arises from data plus meaning. 
Evidence for the suggested way forward, a systems ontology of costing, is based on 
one case study, but supported by argument. But information theory contributes and 
defines the idea of ontologies as the basis of a good data model. Finally the research 
is limited by the fact that the issue of main contractors’ construction planning was not 
researched in detail. This is because its importance to a new method of costing for 
the purpose of rewarding improvements was not established until the late stages of 
the research. These limitations are addressed under future work (Section 6.5) 
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6.5 Future work 
 
This research has suggested one approach. The approach is theoretical, but needs a 
comprehensive evaluation and critical analysis of planning to be brought together 
with this evaluation and analysis of costing. An analysis and evaluation of 
construction planning would provide data for specifying the nature of future 
measurements of dependencies that would better link costs and work done. The 
measurements would reflect a much wider reach of interests for the purpose of 
reflecting improvement in work done than the measured items currently harvested 
from BIM models. Dependencies can be made visible early on in a tender and 
though the project delivery, thus taking account of the continuously changing 
conditions of construction projects on work done. This would address the current 
disconnection between costs and work done through connection to the whole 
system, not parts of the system. Then a theoretical model can be set up and tested in 
practice.  
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access.  Although the project will have joint academic and business aims, the 
academic will take precedence to ensure appropriate and timely progress to a PhD.  
The student will be employed by the university but can undertake work for MC, 
relevant to the PhD study, but the request for this will be through the supervisory 
team. 
 
The project will produce journal and conference papers, articles etc as well as a PhD 
thesis.  External publications will be submitted for review by MC prior to publication; 
however, consent for publication will not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
Whilst on company premises the student will adhere to MC’s policies, particularly 
relating to health and safety, as if they were a company employee.  Appropriate 
briefings will be provided. 
 
The student’s progress will be reviewed formally every 6 months by the supervisory 
team.  The student and supervisors will provide a written and verbal report to MC 
every 12 months detailing achievements and developing directions. 
 
The project’s research ethics will be reviewed by the University.  The project may 
require and generate confidential information.  This will not be communicated outside 
the collaborators and the supervisors without prior permission from MC and any 
specific individuals involved.  
 
All intellectual property and knowledge generated in the course of the Project 
(“Arising IP”) shall belong to the Collaborator(s) generating the same.  Each 
Collaborator hereby grants to the other Collaborators a licence to use its arising IP 
only for the Project and associated teaching and research purposes.   All outputs of 
the Project will be available for internal teaching and research purposes by each or 
all of the Collaborators and in on-line research archives. 
 
Any disagreements during the course of the project will be discussed openly by the 
collaborators with a view to finding amicable solutions.  The project will not be 
terminated without 6 month’s notice.   
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Research into Contractor Costing in BIM 
 
Subcontractor interviews – commercial and managerial employees 
Interview Guide 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
Timing Key Questions Notes 
  
Abigail Robson from Birmingham City University 
Research in partnership with Main Contractor (MC) looking 
at how contractor costing can be enhanced across the 
supply chain, enabled by BIM 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed 
The conversation should last half an hour to an hour 
 
Outline research aims (see accompanying sheet) 
 
I’m trying to find out: 
How costing is done by contractors and subcontractors 
Gather views of different people working in subcontractor 
companies (commercial managers, QS’s and site 
managers). All opinions are valid. 
 
Most companies are already using or developing BIM on 
projects but this work is a longer term, in depth piece I 
research about systems development, potentially changing 
that we do. 
 
As a large subcontractor you’re a sophisticated 
subcontractor who inputs into design, manufacturing, 
production on site and maintenance.  
 
I will treat all information that you give in confidence. MC 
will not be able to associate your name or details with your 
responses. Although some MC staff may know that your 
company have taken part in this research.  
 
Permission to record this interview? I’ll use the recording 
for analysis purposes only (the recording will not be 
passed to MC) I may include quotes from your comments 
in reports, although not in a way that would allow you to be 
identified. If at any point you would like a response not to 
be recorded just let me know and I’ll stop recording. 
 
I’ll be using the answers that you and other interviewees 
give in written reports, journal and conference papers and 
my thesis, which will be finalized in early 2016. The 
information you give will only be used for this research 
project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome; 
objectives of 
research; 
researchers 
role; ‘rules ‘ of 
the interview 
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 Your currant position and qualifications? 
 
How long have you worked in this company? 
 
How long have you worked in the construction 
industry? 
 
 
Introduction 
about the 
interviewee 
  
Who’s involved in putting the PRICE together for a 
tender during the procurement phase and how does 
the company go about it? 
 
• Extent of downstream subcontracted packages? 
• Extent of directly employed labour, materials and 
plant priced from first principles? 
• Overheads and profit? 
• Extent of collaborative programming at this stage? 
 
Would you share one of your build-ups with me? 
 
Once you’ve been notified that you’ve won a tender, 
are package prices renegotiated before placing an 
order? 
• Buying gains? OR 
• Integration / production gains? 
 
Does a BQ provide you with a useful cost model for 
the business process of managing costs to achieve 
the greatest value and economy? 
• Your package prices? OR 
• Your direct costs 
 
As a project progresses or at the end of a project, do 
you record and use actual COSTS (wins and losses) to 
assist decision-making? 
 
Final price paid for packages? OR 
Your direct production costs  
• Activity-based costs (an intricate allocation of 
costs) to capture the true costs? Is this worthwhile 
for decision-making? Or are all activities 
meaningfully allocated to objects? 
• Does the company record any transaction costs 
(an assessment of the costs required to in control 
work between companies) 
• Building in buffers / waiting 
• Waste 
• Adapting processes 
• Adapting / redoing work  
• Renegotiating costs to get a better deal 
• Dealing with people / technology 
 
Are you costing what you need to manage? 
 
 
To find out 
what cost 
information is 
held and in 
what format? 
 
To find out 
how methods 
of costing 
reach through 
the supply 
chain 
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 What are the key relationships for your company and 
how do they affect collaboration? 
• Design manager? 
• Main contractor’s programmer and site manager? 
• Preceding trades? 
• Following trades? 
 
What could the main contractor do to manage your work 
more effectively? 
• Ask for more information? 
• Provide missing information? Design 
underdeveloped?  
• Late information? 
• Late changes? 
• Critical delays? 
 
How does your company incentivize value and economy 
across its upstream supply chain? 
 
Have you ever worked on a project where there is a third 
party whose incentive is to achieve total profit 
maximization? 
• Does anyone record and share the aggregate 
financial wins and losses across the supply chain? 
• Is there information that would benefit everyone? 
• Does anyone have an overall model of the wider 
system? 
• Does the client have the most to gain in doing this? 
• Could BIM model wider interactions? If you could 
see more, could you control more? 
 
Do you think that the financial performance of your 
company affects its conduct? 
• Restrictive practices versus innovations 
 
To find out 
about 
organizational 
behaviour 
and 
organisational 
decision –
making in 
relation to 
supply chain 
management  
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INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (EXAMPLE) 
 
I: Okay, so this is about finding out – the first of the aims and objectives really 
– finding out what current approaches to costing are. So I wondered if you 
could tell me perhaps who is involved in putting the price together at tender 
from [SCA1]’s point of view, during the procurement phase, and how the 
company goes about it. 
 
R: Okay so we have – it’s probably changed over the recent years – but we 
now have what we call a preconstruction or a pre-contract team. Which we 
never really used to have; they were an estimating department. Essentially 
it’s the same thing, but it has a bid manager and a preconstruction manager, 
or pre-contract manager as we’re now calling it, we’re just going through 
with the change. Their responsibility will be to…not only are they looking as 
business development – so the business development manager feeds into 
that as well: he’ll be out in the marketplaces talking to people, getting the 
inside knowledge that we can and trying to look at opportunities. For 
example if there was an opportunity coming up with a university we might try 
and support, go and make contact with them to start with, maybe sponsor 
some students, that sort of stuff. So we’re always looking at that with 
regards to business development.  
 
And then as a bid comes to fruition and a tender comes in, or a request 
you’re interested in tendering – they often come as an expression, at least to 
start with, so, are you interested? And you might do a prequalification 
document, which would be a short synopsis of why you’re interested and a 
bit of detail about the business, who we are and what we can do. Obviously 
from our point of view we’ve got quite a big name, we’re well known, so we 
most of the time get on to a tender list by doing a prequalification, unless 
there is somebody in the business that you’re prequalifying to that has had a 
bad experience with [SCA1]. Because it’s amazing how long they last: ‘I 
worked with [SCA1] 20 years ago and I don’t like them, so they’re not going 
to tender this job.’ 
 
I: That’s an interesting one isn’t it? 
 
R: It is, yeah. It does stand, you still hear of it now. So we would prequalify 
hopefully, and if we prequalify then we proceed to the tender pack. That 
comes in varying ways. Most common would be from a main contractor 
who’s already been engaged. 
 
I: Yeah. 
 
R: Actually I’m saying that, it’s not necessarily now: a lot of what we see now is 
the overall bid coming out and then we would align ourselves with a main 
contractor. 
 
I: So you would approach the main contractor? 
 
R: Or they’ll approach us, which you call a back-to-back bid. So, for BCU here 
[MC] tendered the project, and on phase one we went back-to-back with 
[MC]. So they named us in their documentation, their bid, and then we did a 
combined bid for the university to say, look, you’re taking on [MC] but also 
[SCA1], and we come as a package. 
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I: Were there any others named back-to-back, do you know, or was it [SCA1] 
because of the importance? 
 
R: What often happens is that there’s a bit of a scenario there where each of 
the builders would be looking to who they’re going to name. So we might get 
asked by two builders or three builders to go back-to-back with them. Again, 
potentially because of our name and because of our reputation, we 
sometimes find ourselves in that situation. And then at other times we just 
end up saying we’re just going to bid everybody because we’d rather have a 
competitive bid in the market. If you will want to name us then that’s fine, but 
we’re not going to just go back-to-back with you, because we end up in a 
position there where if the main contractor loses the project because they’ve 
done a bad bid, we might have done the best M&E bid out of everybody, but 
the main contractor’s bid is two million over, and that’s it: we’ve lost the job 
because of it. So there’s this whole backing the wrong horse or backing the 
right horse, which is awkward, but a lot of large contracts require you to 
tender that way, so... 
  
Just strip that back a little bit, sorry: when a bid would come in we have our 
own internal bid/no bid process. So that’s a big three, four hour meeting, 
standard set of questions, such as ‘Have we worked with this client before?’ 
‘Yes.’ ‘Have we had good jobs with them?’ ‘Yes.’ That’s good: ticks, ticks. 
‘Do we like the client?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Do we like the client?’ ‘No, actually he was 
really hard work, didn’t pay us.’ All those sorts of questions, all the sensible 
questions to ask yourself. ‘Is it worth us investing in this bid?’ Because on 
these large projects they can be time consuming, they can be costly.  
 
There’s a bid at the moment – I was talking in the office to the 
preconstruction manager – we had anticipated that we were going to have 
spent £100,000 just to bid it. Large contracts, really large contracts, quite 
attractive, but can we afford it at the moment? Does it really fit in the 
business plan? Actually if we’ve got this job and we’ve got this job then 
we’re going to be stretching ourselves a little bit with that, so we might 
choose not to. So there’s that whole bid/no bid process. Lots of other things 
are assessed: you know, do we have the right resource, do we have the 
right people to deliver it, are we going to provide the client with a good 
project or are we going to be…we’ve currently got a £40,000,000 workload, 
and we’re full, so actually we’re going to be taking it on and not be able to 
deliver. So there’s a whole process that we go through. 
  
If we’re happy that we do want to bid it then all those discussions take place 
as to whether we’re going to back certain people or whether we’re just going 
to price the market, so. 
 
The other way it sometimes happens is that the main contractor will have 
already been appointed by the main client, and then the main contractor will 
be coming out to four or five M&E contractors. Best price not particularly 
attractive to us, because we don’t normally see ours…although we 
are…actually we are competitive, but we sometimes think that we’re not 
going to be quite as competitive as a smaller contractor who’s perhaps not 
going to do everything perfect. We like to think that we do. They might cut a 
few corners, but might assume that they’re going to get some...we’re getting 
into some details then. So for example a lighting manufacturer might have 
been named in the bid, [Inaudible 00:06:26] approved, we’ve gone in on the 
lighting manufacturer, but somebody else might go in on lower cost lighting 
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assuming that they’re going to get it agreed.  May or may not get it agreed, 
may force the client to agree because of the equal or approved – well, why 
can’t we use it? So if we’re going in bid [inaudible 00:06:43] we sometimes 
think we might not be the most competitive, which can obviously be an issue 
if we’re going into an open competitive market. So again those are contracts 
where we might sometimes say we’re not interested: we’re going to be one 
of five at least, sometimes they’re going out to more. So in the past few 
years with the recession people have just been looking at the lowest price. 
 
I: Can I ask, do you know, if a main contractor comes to you at tender stage, 
and then they are awarded the contract, do they come back to you and try to 
renegotiate? 
 
R: Yeah. 
 
I: Yeah. Is that standard practice? 
 
R: It’s a…it’s not unexpected. I wouldn’t say it’s a standard practice, and it 
depends on how…what often happens is that we would put a bid in, say it 
was £10,000,000, and we’d say that’s our best offer. The main contractor 
would win the work but it wasn’t necessarily with a named M&E contractor, it 
was just that they’ve used our price. And then they might come back and 
say ‘Right guys we’ve got the job now, we had to knock £2,000,000 off this 
entire project to get this job: you need to come along with us, and you need 
to make some savings and knock some money off otherwise we’re going to 
go elsewhere.’ So yeah, that does happen. 
 
I: And would that be through…are they trying to get a buying gain, or are you 
looking at process improvements and what might be called value 
engineering? 
 
R: In all honesty it’s a buying gain. It might be badged up as something else but 
realistically that’s what it is. The question is then asked, did they or didn’t 
they really knock that £2,000,000 off? Or are they just trying to get some 
better margin on our package? I don’t think that’s quite as common now but 
it’s always expected, we do anticipate that happening. And then we have to 
decide how strong we’re going to be and how confident we are in our 
position, in saying okay if that’s what you want then you’ll have to go 
elsewhere then. Or do we – which we often do, and certainly did in the past, 
because of the market as it was, and we were like everybody else trying to 
chase work – knock some more money off to get going, and get the job over 
the line. But things are picking up at the moment now so I think a lot of 
people now are being more selective, and can afford to be more selective, 
because some people have gone bust, there are less people in the 
marketplace, and there’s an opportunity to be a bit more selective about 
your work. 
 
I: It’s changing isn’t it? 
 
R: It is changing definitely, yeah. 
 
I: Quite a lot of people are saying that. 
 
R: And you can say well actually, if you’re going to behave like that, then we’ve 
got this other option and opportunity over here, which might not have looked 
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as lucrative to start with, but now you’re telling me that, then fine. If that’s 
how you’re going to behave we’ll go for this one. So we can afford to be a bit 
more selective now, which is nice: to be back in a marketplace where you 
can be…I mean if you looked at our accounts over the past few years it’s 
been some economic margins to keep people employed really, so. 
 
I: Yeah. And in this situation you’re a subcontractor. 
 
R: Yes. 
 
I: But you’ve got subcontractors down then line as well? 
 
R: We do, yes. 
 
I: Do you know, ish, what proportion of your work…are you doing direct costs, 
materials, and then a proportion of subcontractors? 
 
R: Yes, so generally we’d buy all the electrical materials ourselves. So lighting, 
power, containment, cables, all that: we’ll buy all that ourselves through our 
own supply chain arrangements with lighting companies or wholesalers, like 
Edmundsons or [Newin Ayres 00:10:23], people like that. And again it’s 
been influenced by the downturn; we carried 200 plus direct employees – 
electricians and pipefitters – and when the downturn came we had to make 
redundancies. So now it’s picking back up again we’re in a position where 
we’ve got less guys, so then we are looking at, and we do sometimes, 
subcontract the labour element: we might employ a company just to come 
on board and do the electrical labour on a project. As we are over there 
actually. 
 
Now that might change over the coming years. If the market picks up and 
we get steadier again then we would probably increase our direct labour 
force again. That’s how we’d prefer to deliver a project, because you’ve got 
much better control over the quality, and the people, and who’s doing what, 
et cetera. But you can appreciate that when it turned down, and suddenly 
you’ve got 200 guys and you’ve only got work for 100, you just can’t carry 
them. If they’re directly on your books you can’t do anything about it, 
whereas if you’re sticking at a lower level and supplementing that with 
subcontractors to deal with the peaks you can afford to go through a leaner 
time and not pay people to sit at home, for example, which is obviously a 
loss of revenue. 
 
I: Do you have specialists that you always use subcontractors for as well? 
 
R: Yeah, that’s sort of general electrical, and then fire alarm and security 
systems – we’ve at times done it ourselves but generally we would go to a 
specialist subcontractor for fire alarm systems and security systems, access 
control – and that would be a sublet subcontract package to the likes of for 
example an ADT or a Protech or somebody like that, we would use them 
and, they’re a supply chain partner of ours that we would use regularly. They 
would tender the project with us – I’m jumping around a little bit now – 
during the tender process they would have anything between three weeks, 
which is not a lot of time, to five, six weeks, seven weeks to actually…we’d 
go out to our market and put together the bid. We might go to three fire 
alarm companies, and at that point then we’d choose the best or the most 
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competitive, or the one who’s got what we assess as the right price to use in 
our bid for the final submission as [SCA1]. 
  
But then on the mechanical side we would always subcontract ductwork: 
that’s a supply and install package, the ventilation ductwork. Pipework, 
again that varies: we carry our own direct labour but we would also often 
subcontract pipework systems, and we would we might subcontract 
materials and labour for that as well because there’s an element of risk with 
delivery issues. We can say right, we’ll buy all the pipework, because we 
think we can make a bit of money buying it, we’ll supply that for you, but if 
we’re not getting the materials onsite in time then we would be buying a 
subcontractor for delays and costs for…so often we would package it all up 
and say you’re going to supply it all, keep yourself supplied: and then we 
would oversee that and manage that and make sure it’s being done 
properly. So yeah, we have a large supply chain. I don’t know as a 
percentage really what we do. I could probably find that out for you. 
 
I: I might come back to you for that at some point. 
 
R: Yeah, just drop me a few questions off the back of it and I’ll find out what 
that is, I’ll tell you what that is as a business. That varies from South to North 
actually as well. 
 
I: Oh, are you in two…? 
 
R: So we’re, well, for various reasons… 
 
I: You said you were going through a restructure. 
 
R: No, we’re not as a business, just some of the internal reporting mechanisms 
and the way we do stuff, we’re just… 
 
I: Right, so South and North. 
 
R: It’s perhaps not linked to this but the recession has hit everybody hard and 
focused everybody back in on cost certainty, and being more focused on 
cost certainty, so it’s just made people look again at the controls that we 
have. So there’s a bit of a restructure going on with the controls, how we 
look after things, how we report internally, and avoiding the fact that we’re 
reporting we’re going to make a profit on a project and suddenly there’s a 
big overrun and we’ve lost loads of money. So there’s a restructure of that 
sort of stuff at the moment.  
 
But traditionally, London…we started in Leeds and traditionally directly 
delivered. So the Northern region has mostly direct delivery with less 
subcontracts. Ductwork would always be subcontract, and the specialist 
security and fire systems, but the electrical lighting, the power, and the 
pipework are all direct delivery. That reduces a bit as you get to the 
Midlands, and then in London it’s pretty much all subcontract, we don’t carry 
much of a labour force at all. That’s just traditionally the market in London. In 
the Midlands now we end up employing subcontractors: so the 
subcontracted electrical labour that comes on board is often some of the 
guys that we made redundant in the past, so we know we’re getting a good 
quality labour force, but it’s a different approach. So it does vary across the 
country really. 
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I: Yeah. And do you know if your estimators work on from first principles? So 
labour material, plant, and profit. It might be quite interesting at some point 
knowing a bit more about that? I don’t whether that’s something – again I 
could put this on an email – whether those build ups could be shared with 
me, or an example?  
 
R: Yeah, just to briefly tell you: again, tenders come out in different guises, so 
you might get a project where you’ve been asked to just declare overhead 
and profit and margin, and the way that the client is going to engage you is 
in what they call a two stage process. There’s less of that at the moment. 
But where you’d come on with a GMP – a gross maximum figure – and 
declare your overhead and profit, and then you’d work through with the 
design team from stage D, E, in the old RIBA stages, up to F, developing the 
design and developing the costs alongside it. All declared all open with the 
clients. I say open: we’d have quotes to back it up and we’d have take-offs 
to back it up, and then we’d put our mark-up on it. And the idea of that is that 
you build up a good, solid coordinated design together. And that works for 
us, we like those, because we’ve got almost a guaranteed margin that we 
can work up.  
 
There’s less of that at the moment but that works better with the bid 
approach, getting us on board earlier and working it up together as a team, 
an open and honest approach to everything. There’s trust, obviously, that 
gets thrown into all of this. But then what’s been more recent has simply 
been a stage E type design, which is a quantified level of drawings, where 
we’d literally sit there and we’d count off the lights, we’d count off the power, 
we count it all off and then we tender against that, and that would be our 
price. And it would be on a design and build project, so we’d build it up from 
materials, and we’d have per light fitting – we’d have half an hour or twenty 
minutes or whatever it is – so we’d build it up literally to that much detail, 
and then we’d sit in a meeting and we’d talk about the marketplace, how it is 
at the moment. We would scope that, we’d look at it and say okay, we’ve got 
a lighting quote…I mean, we always talk about prime cost and getting to 
your prime cost at tender, and that means getting the best price off 
everybody at tender: that’s essentially what you’re going to place the job at. 
And then mark that up properly with a margin for overheads, to cover our 
overheads, and to make a profit, which is what we are all here to do. With 
some prelims, management charges that we’d put on top as well, et cetera.  
 
The problem is that, we’d love to, but we don’t ever seem to be able to get to 
that prime cost at tender, because it’s done in four weeks sometimes. We 
might get three bits back that are all at different levels and not necessarily 
get the time to analyse those properly, and you take a view. So you take a 
view on it and you say okay, so when we get this detail worked up and we 
get the design worked up more to a stage F, we go back out to those guys 
and we say, ‘Right, this is your fixed product that I want to buy from you 
now. I’ve got the job now. What’s your best price?’ And often you can see a 
slight reduction in their prices. So we try and anticipate that at tender. We 
build up the price and then we say right okay, we probably knock another 
five percent off. 
 
I: As the design gets firmed up? 
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R: As the design gets firmed up, and when we go back to them and the job’s 
won and they’re being a bit more focused on it, and they’re having time to 
look at it, and they’re having time to look at…for example on the air handling 
units, where they can make a few savings on components or whatever. 
When we get to that stage we think we can knock another five percent off 
the air handling unit price, so we’d take that off, and that would be what we 
call our prime cost at tender, and then we’d mark that up. What then 
happens – and what’s happened for the past couple of years – is that we 
might mark it up a couple of percent, or three, four, five percent, which is not 
enough for us to make a margin, so then we have to make further gains out 
of the supply chain. So then when we go back to it we are, we have to, 
because otherwise we would be at a loss. You know, we have to breaking 
ten percent to be actually making a profit. So we’d be back at the supply 
chain then and we’d be looking at reengineering, perhaps trying to design a 
few things down, reengineering systems, so that the client is getting the 
same deal of rubble but in a slightly more efficient way for us, or more cost-
effective way for us. Client gets what he wants, he gets his output, and 
we’ve managed to make some gains to get us back up to a profitable place. 
Which is a bit ridiculous really – the whole process – but it is how it works. 
 
I: Yeah. It anticipated my next question actually, which was good: we’ve gone 
right in the same order. You’re describing, once you’ve won the tender, that 
you’ve got to renegotiate the package with your subcontractors before 
placing an order with them. 
 
R: Yes we do. 
 
I: But you’ve described doing that on the basis of production gains and 
innovations? 
 
R: Innovations, yes, production gains: a simple thing might be that the original 
ductwork drawings show the duct coming into this room and it came right to 
the middle of the room here, and was supplying air under the floor, when 
actually we only need to just poke it into the room. So we might save a 
metre of ductwork. If you do that on 100 rooms then you’ve saved 100 
metres and suddenly you see some savings come out the package. 
 
I: Do you ever see main contractors go through the same process with you? 
Or are they usually just coming back for buying gains? 
 
R: They might…okay so I said it was buying gains but that’s how…they might 
come back to us and say ‘We’ve got to make another £200,000. Go away 
and do it.’ Then we’d have a bit more time then you see, because we’ve 
tendered this job in four weeks, so we’ve got some more time, so we say 
let’s get the design drawings out now, let’s have another look at these. We 
think we can scope this a little bit, we think we can make some savings on 
the ductwork. Actually we’re looking at how it’s sized originally from the 
consultant and we think we could let the velocities increase a little bit in the 
ductwork and actually reduce the size of the ductwork a little bit, as well. So 
we think there are some savings in there that won’t affect anybody, and it 
will allow us to get to those costs that they need us to, so yeah, if we’ve got 
the time we would look at that in that sort of detail. But often it’s just the 
main contractor looking to make some gains. It’s just how you badge it up 
really.  
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I: So you’re sitting in your office looking at your drawings to make gains. Have 
you had much experience of them at that stage saying let’s look at it with 
you, your preceding trades, your following trades, and us as a main 
contractor? 
 
R: Yeah definitely, they’re better and better at that now. Different contractors 
are different as well. Willmott’s are pretty good, they’re quite joined up in 
partnering approach, but then there are others that just want your lowest 
price, that don’t really care how you do it, don’t care how you get there, just 
need to knock another £500,000 off type thing, so. That’s a big figure: not 
that sort of figure, but you know what I mean. 
  
But yeah, no we certainly go to reengineering workshops and the like with 
the main contractor, and others trades, and how can we do this more 
efficiently. 
 
I: So there is an area of cooperation? 
 
R: No there is, definitely, yeah, and people recognise that more and more now, 
that you need to do it that way as opposed to just trying to ask somebody to 
lop some money off. But I don’t think it’s…I wouldn’t say it’s necessarily the 
norm to do it that way, but it does happen. 
 
I: Yeah. So that’s useful. Now this next question is kind of the one that I think 
I’m probably going to have to…I probably can’t actually ask it like this.  I’m 
going to ask you like that. 
 
R: Okay, go on then. 
 
I: The nub of the question is: are bills of quantities providing you with a useful 
cost model for the business decisions that you’ve got to make? So whatever 
the situation you want to do the job with the greatest value and the greatest 
economy. Do bills of quantities help you in decision making? And I guess it 
might be worth looking at it as in your direct work, and then your 
subcontractors. 
 
R: Okay so, having… 
 
I: So you’ve got the costs of objects and metres, cubes of concrete, do you…I 
guess the question is, is the bill of quantities a working document? 
 
R: In our business? 
 
I: Yeah. 
 
R: Yes. Okay so I see what you’re asking now. 
 
I: I told you the question was wrong. 
 
R: No, I’ve got it. So we use a product called Estimation, which you may or may 
not have come across, but that’s updated every couple of weeks with the 
latest rates for conduit, trunking – so if steel work has gone up in the world 
then the rate for trunking might have gone up from a pound a metre to a 
pound and two pence a metre – so when we’re tendering we would always 
be using the latest figures that we can buy that equipment for. 
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I: As a business? 
 
R: As a business, yes. But that would be generally around about the base 
materials such as containment, metal containment, plastic containment, 
dado trunkings, the sockets and switches, accessories, so we’d have a rate 
for that type of switch and socket in the bills. So yeah we would build it up 
from that. But then a lot of chunks of the work are in subcontract, so that’s 
where we’d go out to the market and we’d get prices from two or three 
subcontractors. We go through different stages of getting solid bills of them 
that we can check from project to project. So, fire alarm: we know roughly 
how much we pay for fire alarm, for a square metre, we know roughly how 
much a device costs, but it does vary from project to project, and it varies 
from subcontractor to subcontractor. So we might go out to the market one 
month and get the best price from Protech and we might go out the next 
month and get the best price from ADT and we might go the next month and 
get it from somebody else, because their internal businesses are changing, 
their margins are…they’re looking at it now, ‘Actually we need some work so 
we’re going to drop our margin a little bit and accept that we’re not going to 
make as much money on a project.’  
 
So it’s a bit hard to get defined bills off the subcontractors, until we get into 
contract, and then we’ll get a schedule of rates out of them: which is 
schedule of rates based on what they’ve won the job for. So if they’ve just 
won £1,000,000 worth of pipework, that’s how much a metre of pipework 
costs; if they’d won it at 1.2 million, it would obviously be a bit more 
expensive. If that makes sense. 
 
I: Yeah. And do you hold back your bills of quantities from a main contractor, 
similarly? 
 
R: Yeah, as stupid as it sounds. We tend to have an aversion to giving what we 
call a schedule of rates for the contract. Bills of quantities we would never 
supply – that’s the stuff that we would use to price a job – but we would 
supply is a schedule of rates, which is…in a luxury day where we’ve 
managed to mark a job up 50 percent, which would never happen, but if we 
had, and we’d marked that socket up 50 percent, then they would have that 
rate. So if they bought them, if there was a variation for an extra ten sockets, 
we would be selling them at the price that we sold the job at. But on the 
same note if we’d only marked it up a couple of percent then we’d be selling 
them at that rate, so there’d be a schedule of rates based on what we sold 
the project at. So if we’ve sold it for £1,000,000 and it’s got 100 sockets in it 
then it would be that price for the socket, but we would never declare what 
we actually buy it for. That’s kind of the protected stuff. 
 
I: So you give a schedule of rates rather than a document that adds up to the 
final contract sum? 
 
R: The schedule of rates would add up to the final contract sum. 
 
I: Oh, it would? 
 
R: Yeah, but it wouldn’t show you our overheads and mark-ups that we’ve put 
on the product. It wouldn’t show you that we’ve knocked five percent off and 
then put ten on, for example, it would just show you the final figure as a rate 
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against each item. And that’s based on so that if there are any variations or 
change or cost change on the project then that would be used as the base 
to measure that change. But yeah the information as to actually how much 
we buy it for, that wouldn’t get declared. That’s kind of the sensitive stuff I 
guess if you like. It sounds like I’m protecting it because we make loads of 
money, but… 
 
I: It’s the opposite actually. 
 
R: You don’t need to worry about that. If you’ve had a building built in the last 
five years you’ve had a deal, you’ve had a bargain, because nobody’s made 
money. 
 
I: [BCU 00:29:04] haven’t done badly, have they? 
 
R: You’ve built buildings at the right time.  
 
I: Yeah, yeah, just like Grand Designs it’s accident rather than, you know, it’s 
luck isn’t it. 
 
R: Yeah, it is when you enter the market. If you had gone to the market and 
built these buildings over five years ago they’d have probably cost you more, 
even with inflation or whatever they’d have probably cost you more. 
 
I: And next year. 
 
R: And in the coming years they’ll probably cost you more than you’ve got – 
certainly phase one and phase two – because people are getting back to the 
stage where they’re saying let’s mark this up properly and actually make 
some money for the business. We had losses of, last year…we had a 
couple of real problem jobs, and if we hadn’t had had those we’d have made 
£500,000 profit on £500,000,000 worth of turnover. 
 
I: Hardly worth getting out of bed isn’t it? 
 
R: It’s ridiculous. Especially when you listen to the margins of supermarkets 
and things like that, what they make, it’s shocking really. And the risk that 
we carry is massive. We had a couple of substantial problems last year that 
cost us 6 million so we ended up coming into a 6 million loss for the 
business. So yeah, it’s high risk, but the margins were just not there 
previously, but they are starting to come back in and we can afford to put 
them in now and still be competitive. Because everyone’s doing the same. 
All the main contractors now, and the main subcontractors, have gone this 
can’t go on, we can’t continue to do this, we’re all fighting each other, 
causing ourselves problems, and then we’re trying to understand why we’ve 
lost money: because we’ve taken the work on at sub-economic rates. Can’t 
deliver it. You can’t deliver a quality project at that low a price. 
 
I: And have you got a sense whether demand is increasing or people are 
leaving the business, or a bit of both? 
 
R: We’re pretty good at retention actually. I did a training course yesterday 
delivered on preconstruction, there were only ten [SCA1] guys and I don’t 
think anybody was less than 13 years’ service. There was a 23, there was a 
40. So yeah, we have got good retention, but there are opportunities now 
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though, you’re getting the phone calls again now: ‘Would you be interested 
in coming and having a look at this?’ I had one a couple of weeks ago for a 
project manager role for another M&E contractor, and the wage was 
relatively attractive actually as well. For me phase two over there is 15 
million give or take services, this was for a £6,000,000 job, so a smaller job, 
less stress, less strain, and it was more money than I’m on.  
 
I: Yes, that’s a real example of the market picking up. 
 
R: It is picking up, definitely. Certainly in the Midlands as well, noticeably in the 
Midlands compared to the North, the North is still struggling more. And 
strangely for us, London; but that’s our business model not so much the 
market down there, because that’s not really changed much I don’t think. 
But yeah it certainly is picking up, from what we can see, which is good 
news for us all really. 
 
I: That is good news. In terms of the costs again – again I’m not sure if this is 
worded right – when you go through the project, and at the end of the 
project, does the business record actual costs? Well there are wins and 
losses to assist decision making, but I’m not thinking of the big wins and 
losses I’m thinking of an analysis of where those wins and losses came 
from. 
 
R: Yeah we do some, but not as much as you’d have thought we would.  
 
I: No. That kind of leads on to the other things in terms of your direct 
production costs. You can use activity based costing, which is quite an 
intricate allocation of costs, to capture true costs. Do you know if the 
company has done any of that? 
 
R: Yeah, we have. Under the banner of BLIS: [SCA1] Lean Implementation 
Strategy, which was essentially best practice. We did a load of videoing and 
value add and value analysis basically, as we call it. So there’s value add, 
which was actually screwing something to the work phase, non-value add, 
which is things like putting your steps up to get to the work phase, sorting 
your drill out, collecting your screws and your nuts and your bolts – so it’s 
not adding specific value but it’s essential to the project – and then waste, 
which was going to the toilet or stopping and smoking a fag, that sort of 
stuff. So yeah we’ve done all that, and your value add is really about 38 
percent. There’s a lot of analysis on that. 
 
I: I’d like to come back on that as well. 
 
R: That sounds inefficient but it’s not really, it’s the actual…the industry norm is 
about 40 percent, of actual value add.  
 
I: Because part of it, I also wondered whether that recorded transaction costs? 
So the costs of controlling work between companies. 
 
R: Explain that a bit more, sorry? 
 
I: So you’ve got the costs of your guy going in there and being self-contained, 
would it also have recorded the costs of where the previous trade has run 
over therefore you’re late, things like you having to build in other people 
increasing your waste? 
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R: Not enough. This is where we kind of price that value loss in our rates. So 
when I say it’s half an hour for a light fitting, in the nicest project where 
everything is clear it might take you 15 minutes, on a bad project it might 
take you 45. So it’s in with the rates, but not broken down. 
 
I: Probably not recorded? 
 
R: Not really no, only through that process, but then that’s not necessarily…the 
concern for us with that was let’s get it all broken down and then that means 
we can work out exactly how long it takes, and if you do that then you don’t 
cover off the inevitable inefficiencies of a project. 
 
I: Okay, yes. So you haven’t done any analysis of that but you are aware of it? 
 
R: Yeah. 
 
I: And it’s in the rates? 
 
R: It’s in the rates, really. Our rates include for those inefficiencies, but they 
don’t always cover them. It’s a nice thought that a construction project is a 
factory where…but it’s not, it’s not that, it’s not a car plant where you’ve got 
a box of bolts here and it’s always the same every time. The efficiency 
they’re up at 70, 80 percent, 90 percent value add, but we’re never going to 
be able to do that, that’s not how construction works. With far better 
planning, detailed planning, and coordination, it can increase, but that then 
comes into proper joined up planning with the main contractor. People 
getting things finished when they say they’re going to get them finished, no 
delays, no issues, no getting to site and then something on a drawing works 
but it doesn’t quite work.  
 
BIM is one thing but we’ve been 3D coordinating for years, for tens of years, 
so there would be a space in the corridor ceiling, we know how big a duct is, 
and the pipes, and the containment that we’ve got to put in there, and we 3D 
model that – and we’ve been doing that for a number of years – to make 
sure that it all fits, and then invert level drawings produced from that that we 
can install to and be comfortable that everything fits and is all coordinated. 
Which is what BIM does as well, as part of that element of BIM, but it still 
doesn’t stop the fact that that wall might be a day late in being built. The 
guys go over there to do something over there and then come back to there, 
and to analyse a project in that much detail, to actually track it properly, is a 
monstrous task to do. 
 
I: It is, yeah. This is a rhetorical question but I guess what I’m trying to get to 
is: are we costing what we need to manage? Those interfaces between 
different companies, they are a considerable amount of the cost within it, is 
there anything in there that cost information would help us with decision 
making? And I wonder whether, just to kind of illustrate that…what I was 
going to ask you about – we’ll come back and do these with David another 
time – was key relationships for your company, and how affect collaboration, 
and then what the main contractor could do to help you manage your work 
more effectively? How your company incentivises your own direct staff and 
subcontractors, to incentivise value and economy? But then the last 
question, which might be worth just spending the last five minutes on… 
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R: Yeah I’ve talked a lot, sorry. 
 
I: No, thank you. The last question that it leads up to is wondering 
whether…the question was going to be, have you ever worked on a project 
where there’s a third party whose incentive it is to achieve total profit 
maximisation? 
 
R: No, no I haven’t. 
 
I: That’s kind of the concept I’m trying to get to. 
 
R: Well, I say that…where did I… Hospital, I did a project there and that was on 
a pain gain – I can’t think of the contract terminology now – so the main 
contractor, the subcontractor and the M&E contractor and everybody would 
go in, and the project aim is £40,000,000, that’s what it’s been tendered at: if 
it comes in at 38 million then that two million is shared between the client 
and the main contractor, and everybody gets an allowance of that. The 
problem with that is that if it comes in at 42 then it’s still our problem. 
 
I: And did you find that altered behaviours, collaboration? 
 
R: It does actually, because everybody works together to get their own. But it 
has to be so open…it still promotes your own internal gains a bit as well, 
because it can…and also there’s an element of if you spend it all then 
actually you’re going to get 12 percent margin on it because it’s an agreed 
margin, and actually that’s pretty good. If I’m making 12 percent on that I’m 
happy anyway, so the benefit of the reduction is not actually a major benefit. 
 
I: Okay, so there is still a doubt of whether everyone is putting enough in or if 
anyone is taking too much out? 
 
R: I think so, yeah. I’m not overly experienced in that, but I would say that that’s 
probably the case. But those sort of collaborative pain gain projects and 
contracts are good, we like working on those. Also again normally they have 
an associated agreed margin on them which we get paid. Obviously if that 
took us over the 40 on that project then that would still be a risk and we’d 
lose out, but the margin has been agreed at a good margin – or the right 
margin if you like – as opposed to a project where we’ve got no pain gain 
but we’ve taken it on at five percent mark-up because we think we might get 
some betterment out of the supply chain, but we don’t know. 
 
I: Yeah, so that pain gain is overt in this situation whereas it isn’t in another. 
 
R: Yeah. We take a risk with those percentages that we knock off, so for 
example on phase two over there we took a view on the ductwork – we’ve 
talked about ductwork a few times – and we knocked a chunk of money off 
the ductwork because we thought we’d be able to reengineer that, make 
some money out of it, but we’ve ended up costing us a large chunk of 
money more than we included, so it’s costing us to install the ductwork over 
there and we’re supplementing the cost for it. But that was a risk we took to 
win the project on the competitive margin that we did, whereas in that type 
of contract we’d have just had: the ductwork costs 500,000 and we’ve got an 
agreed ten, 12 percent margin on it. So actually we’re quite happy with that, 
which works better than us trying to…on the off chance that we might knock 
£30,000 off the ductwork – that’s great – but we might also lose. There’s a 
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lot of risk with the general approach we take but a collaborative approach is 
far better for us, we much prefer that, and you get a lot more out of the 
supply chain in that type of approach. If everybody’s comfortable they’ve got 
a protected margin they will work to reduce things, they will work to it. 
Whether it’s a complete driver, whether it needs another mechanism in 
there, maybe, I’m not sure. Like I say if you can spend 40 million and make 
12 percent on 40 million why try and spend 38 unless there is some real 
gain out of it? 
 
I: Yeah, and I think it is the costs between companies, potentially there might 
be some leeway in there for…because everyone’s taken out as much inside 
companies as they possibly can, and will continue to do so. 
 
R: Yeah the intercompany relationships and efficiencies. The key one, the one 
we get most of, is the main contractor is not completely ready for us in areas 
and we work around…so they’ve managed to do most of this floorplan, but 
they’ve had an issue with this wall so we can’t quite finish there, so we have 
to go off somewhere else, and then come back, and why haven’t they done 
it? Because there was a bit of a design issue, or something was wrong, or 
when you got to site actually it didn’t quite look like everybody thought it was 
going to look like, and there’s an issue. Something it out of tolerance, some 
bloke had three days off because he was sick, you know, whatever it might 
be. And it’s never simple, it’s never that run of cars going along the line. If 
somebody is off sick there’s somebody else to step in his spot: if he’s off 
sick then oh God, it’s going to take me three or four days to get somebody 
back to do that. All those sorts of things make for inefficiencies, along with 
hundreds of other things, so. 
 
I: Yeah, makes for inefficiencies, but flexibility as well. 
 
R: Yeah, you do have to be flexible, otherwise you wouldn’t build the thing. 
 
I: Okay. I think we should probably leave that there for today otherwise you’re 
going to be very dry, aren’t you? 
 
R: No, that’s alright. 
 
I: But thanks ever so much for that. Is there anything else that you wanted to 
add at this point? 
 
R: No probably not, no, I’m quite happy with that, the information that we’re 
sharing is quite good, I’m more than happy with that. For me the whole 
process of BIM, it is potentially an issue for us as a business and also 
potentially an issue for consultants as well, in that actually involving the M&E 
contractor earlier in the contract – because traditionally you’ve got an M&E 
consultant who does the work up to stage E, and then he hands it over and 
we pick it up and do F and deliverable – so it’s either we come in earlier and 
work with the job throughout, or they come in and deliver it all. And then if 
they’re doing all the design then do you really need an M&E contractor? 
That could just be a main contractor, they could just go and employ the guys 
to build on those drawings. We like to think we bring a lot to the table so we 
like to be involved earlier in building it up. So the whole BIM process is 
great, but then you get the divisive costing issues. 
 
I: That’s right. 
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R: So brilliant bring us in earlier, but how are we going to work up the costs 
then if we’re involved? Are going to do it on an agreed overhead and profit 
margin, which is good, we like that, but the obvious bell that goes off in the 
client’s head is then is this going to cost us more money than we could 
actually get it for if we just went out competitively? But is it going to get you 
a better job? Well, yes it is: it’s going to get you a far more coordinated 
project, with a team that’s well involved, and everybody wants it to succeed, 
than it would. 
 
I: So the question is, can BIM create ways of trusting and sharing whilst trust 
that everyone is delivering value? 
 
R: Yeah, value is the key. But then you’d pay more for a Sony TV than you 
would for a Matsui, you know? You accept that if it’s in my budget I’m going 
to get the best I can. So if a client has got a budget, which he often has, if he 
can get that capped, and he’s happy that that’s all he’s going to spend, then 
why not get the team all involved, collaborating together, build up the cost to 
get to that and say right, it’s still within cost, that’s great. 
 
I: You can have that Mitsubishi, you don’t have to go to a… 
 
R: Yeah you can have that top-of-the-range, you don’t have to go out to the 
marketplace and band it around. And actually if you band it around the 
marketplace you might have got it for half a million pounds cheaper, or a 
million pounds cheaper, but have you got the best product out of that? Has 
everything gone well, has it gone smoothly, has everybody been working 
together? Probably not no, because it’s all been fought and everybody is 
fighting to make an extra couple of quid where they can because they’ve all 
taken it on at lower rates and had to do it competitively like that, so. I think if 
I was a client and I had 40 million to build a project I’d like to do it in a 
collaborative manner to get the best that I can out of it as opposed to I might 
get it for 39 million but actually…but obviously the money people see that 
don’t they and that’s a million pound…okay we’ve done it, well done, but in 
the long term you’re going to get the best project, you know, and is it going 
to cost you 39 and a half in the end? Probably, because of change and the 
issues that occur on site, because one of your subcontractors is going to go 
bust because he’s got no margin on it, and he’s losing money? Maybe: 
certainly in the market as it is now. I’d like to think that’s the right way to do 
it, and this drives that, so hopefully in the long term this becomes a more 
collaborative approach with costings as well. 
 
 
End of transcript 
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WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT (EXAMPLE IN EXTRACT FORM) 
TA: There were scheduling problems with regards to...it's what the guys call the wet 
trades, it's always the painters and the plasterers.  And those guys are often 
working on a price when the other trades aren't.  So they'll just come in on Phase 
2 here, you know the situation where the boarders would come in and they 
would board an entire flat wall, because it's quick to do that and get it boardered 
and plastered, and they'd bugger off and to another flat wall somewhere else, 
and they'd leave all the edges and all the difficult bits.  They'd just get it all 
closed up, the ceilings would get closed up, nothing like what was on the 
programme that they were scheduled to do.  And of course, all of our 
containment is behind those walls and ceilings.  And so then we have to try and 
get things cut out, get a hatch cut out.  These guys, they won't do it for you, you 
know.  I waited nearly two months to get hatch cut out in one place and needed 
to wire through.  So that's this issue with these jobs on a price, jobs on a day rate 
business, which, I don't know... 
TA: Whether that...I would hate to say to any guy like stop selling jobs on a price, 
because this is how they make their money.  It's certainly an issue with regards 
to screwing up the whole management of a large job.  Without a doubt, I think 
that's one of our biggest problems. 
AR: Would you be aware of that, would you say?  If that was going on? 
CH: Yes, I think very aware.  And that is a sense of reality of what happens on 
projects.  But there are other things behind that, that can make that situation 
clear, because we are sort of picking on a boarder at there, but there could be 
some issues where design doesn't show that access hatch there, because I 
know there was lost access hatches missing off the design.  So your level of 
payment and, you know, you're thinking what's going on, is actually, there could 
be a number of different scenarios rather than just a boarder going in there and 
boarding it and you walking...so it's about perceptions as well, you know, which 
is interesting to hear from my point of view. 
DB: Or a lack of transfer of information.  That's the opportunity... 
ML: A job's design information, that sequencing, design information, sequencing or it 
also comes back to money physically in point, if a job is going bad and the main 
contractor hasn't got any money in his job, and he's losing money then they need 
to throw a couple of guys at it, because for whatever reason, design, whatever, 
to get you an access hatch, this is my perception, and I don't know if it's true, 
nobody wants to invest, say right, the right thing for the job is to get an extra 
couple of guys in, put hatches in and go and do that, just throw...we need to 
push that in.  For whatever the reason is, we didn't plan it properly to start with, 
you know, whatever was done wrong to start with, that shouldn't have gone 
wrong. 
PB: From a builders point of view, do you sit there down with Baileys or your 
mechanical contractor and go two-week, four-week, look out in terms of we're 
in...I know there's a programme which says where you should be, but in reality, if 
you sit down, say where do we board in, that room, that room, that room, these 
guys know if they've got to get primary containment beforehand, they've got to 
be in and out of there in a timescale, rather than, as Tony says, a boarder turns 
up and goes, right, I can get more out of doing that wall today than I am going to 
do that bit there. 
CH: There's...yes, is the answer to that.  Sometimes you get 100 per cent buy in from 
people, sometimes, you know, that gets slightly diluted.  It depends how much 
you care and how much passion is into doing what you want to do.  But there is, 
you know, there are lots of other factors at play here.  And if we're looking at 
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[Client] too, particularly, there was probably the starting point in all of this is a 
very poor BIM model that was handed over to Matt.  So if you're looking for root 
causes, where the markets gone wrong, which then Matt's team reviewed it and 
quite rightly so, said we can't take this on.  We've got to develop it again 
ourselves. 
PB: It was a lots of design changes within the first three or four months. 
CH: Basically, rip it up and start again from scratch.  So there was a lag in 
information, and it was very much hand to mouth, wasn't it?  Which is what we 
were suffering from as a team.  The decision was the right decision that Matthew 
took to actually just...we could have just run with it and ended up with lots of 
really bad coordination. 
ML: Yes, I agree with that. 
CH: Which would have...yes, so I'm just sort of winding back to... 
CH: If you wind back to starting points rather than going through the information flows 
key, without the information flow, you're living from hand to mouth with things, 
and things are happening, and then rework happens, which is loss of 
productivity. 
DB: So the design was impracticable, the consultant design, and it won't go out from 
here, we're not taking anybody to court over it. 
CH: It's fine.  I would say that 
ML: That's fine, but then it's a design and built contract, so it's our responsibility. 
DB: Right, I see.  Because of the nature of the... 
ML: We were sold on the fact that that model would be fantastic and we could just do 
it like that and use that.  We couldn't.  A big improvement, by the way, this time, 
if we had it now, off the same consultant, it would probably be close to usable.  
So yes, there's root work.  But there should be time to do that.  We should be 
able to do that.  I'm trying to think back, to be honest, I can't remember as well 
as Chris, but some of the design information wouldn't always have got there 
straight away, we'll have trouble in our design processes, as with the architect, 
all that sort of stuff.  Not having enough time to design...part of this comes back 
to the contractor being involved in the consultant stage and, you know, you don't 
need to let the consultant take it that far.  We can come in earlier, and we can 
design a practical, deliverable job earlier in the stage than they are.  But yes, 
there are changes. 
But then there's also then the fact that you're trying to make some money in that 
process, so you get re-engineering things, so you hold off on decisions, so we 
might not...I don't know, a section of valves, we might not set the valves 
straightaway, because we might be negotiating with a couple of valve suppliers 
and what's the best solution before I change the valve arrangement?  So we 
might go from split talks about them on electricals.  So two valves into a new 
combined valve they're doing on the market because that's the cheapest 
solution.  We're going to go through a texting process to get that approved, gets 
approved, brilliant, we've made ourselves a few thousand pounds, but it's 
messed up the BMS control process and their designs, there's a change in that 
we don't always comprehend.  I can see all that, definitely, and why that would 
affect it.  That's because we're changing the designs and still designing too close 
to the delivery, I think. 
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TA: And then you throw a few more things into the mix in that, which is what you 
talked about, you agreed a lump sum, I'm guessing, on your work, whereas 
boarders are on the measure. So it's all about productivity.  Every day they're on 
site, it's about how much meterage they can put down to make their ends meet 
at the end of the week. 
DB: For cash flow. 
TA: That's what they care about.  You know, that's their cash flow to pay their 
mortgages and so on and so forth.  And sometimes you have to step back and 
have an appreciation of that. 
ML: Why, though?  Why do you let it like that?  I'd measure it, I don't get that.  I don't 
get that at all.  Because the impact of that, you talk about all the design stuff, the 
impact of that, we don't issue in that corner. 
CH: Yes, the problem that we've got is the levels you were talking about, where 
to...so we would negotiate with you, we've got a job this come in, it's a blank 
piece of paper, we'll invite our trusted M&E contractor to come and sit side-by-
side to us and negotiate that project.  What happens then, it gets diluted.  You 
talked about that layer by layer by layer.  So we enter into a lump sum with our 
dry lining contractor, which is essentially negotiated to a lump sum, and then 
they go away with their black book of names and sub it all out, and they sub it 
out, all to make money. 
ML: You're not talking them into finishing that wall and finishing things as opposed to 
meterage, because day-to-day, that's some of our major problems, is things not 
being properly finished, so they go all the way... they go and to do that, plus the 
hole where they won't box that column in, because that's not boxed in, we can't 
finish the dado round it and the lights.  And they won't come back to that, 
because the again the meterage, which is I guess what it's worth me talking 
about.  But we can't finish the dado... 
CH: Yes.  Just putting it into context, they don't go and do that around the whole job.  
There is a process, which is a first fix stage which we all know about.  The metal, 
they board it one side, we then as you guys come in, put your containment, put 
everything that you've got in the wall.  In an ideal world, we sign it off together, it 
gets back boarded, nothing is missed in there, and that's an ideal world. 
TA: Yes, that's the theory. 
CH: When you're under a lot of pressure time wise, things like the ideal world 
sometimes get forgotten about.  For whatever reason they do, and it creates 
more problems, to be honest with you.  And this is what I'm saying, if you truly 
believe in what you do, but sometimes that gets diluted by your management 
chain as well my side.  You know, and if all people then dilute it when it suits, 
when their costs are going up and what's coming in doesn't start in their costs, it 
then changes people's mentality. 
ML: Yes, I agree. 
CH: And it's all about driving back to how do you get to unlocking that, which is what 
you're here today to discuss. 
ML: Yes.  If you can get to...if you can get the building fully designed properly that's 
an easy...you know, we all know exactly what we're building, great, if we can get 
that point, but they're such complex beasts, it's not a car that you're putting the 
same thing on every time that were talking about.  So we can get to that stage in 
a BIM model, and you've had enough time with the constructors, with the guys 
who actually put it up, and that's the best way to do that, we're going to do it like 
 237 
that so you get to that stage, that's fantastic, and then it comes down to 
sequencing, and actually hitting your sequencing and doing your handovers, 
which do fall apart because if somebody hasn't quite finished something and I 
can't come in now.  I shouldn't come in there now, but I can do loads, but I can't 
quite do that.  So what happens is, we go in, we do loads.  By the time we get 
the end, it's still not done, so we don't finish either. 
So then you've got, so using that column as an example, the plasterwork, and 
the plasterboard is not round that, so we go in there, we do all the dado on there 
and we stop, because we've only got a bit to do.  And we leave, because the 
plasterboard didn't get done in the meantime either.  So then somebody's got to 
come down back and to the plasterboard.  Somebody has to come back and to 
the dado.  And actually then your wiring, and you get to there and you 
…because we still can't finish because the plasterboard...and that roll-on 
constantly, and it's all sequencing then.  So what we should do, really, is say no, 
we're not coming in.  We are not coming in until that plasterboard is finished.  
Then it's done, hundred percent... 
CH: Absolutely right. 
ML: The plasterboarding. 
CH: I suppose just putting that to you guys, so how many, at peak, general...genuine 
operatives we have, fixers, installers, electricians, plasterers, on this new place, 
what do you imagine the peak would be? 
AR: Numbers?.  Yes.  500. 
CH: Probably a little bit over, but not far from.  So you're looking at as it's absolutely, 
give us about 395 people, that's 395 people, and then how many managers from 
[MC] do you think were controlling 395 people? 
AR: Four.  One to 100. 
CH: Not far off.  Probably about five.  But there's a message there. 
ML: Sub managers.  As in industrial managers. 
TA: Yes, there's a message there.  That's cost driven. 
DB: But also, in a sense... 
TA: These processes that we're talking about... 
dB: Yes.  You can see why they get... 
TA: So you've got a building that's circa about 24,000 square, and you've got 390 
odd people in there, and it only takes that one person to come and see one of 
the managers and say, I've got a problem here, it takes an hour and a half of his 
time to sort it out.  He's got this to do, he's got that to do.  We talked about health 
and safety.  Health and safety is the absolute number one priority for these guys.  
And you think about their day job and what it looks like now, and it's fairly hectic.  
And that is because you're driven to a price, whereas in this, today's market, if 
we are pricing [Project x] again, we would put in double the amount of managers 
in there, and we wouldn't be afraid to do that, because if it's not on the right price 
and the right programme, we don't want that on our books.  We simply do not 
want that on our books. 
AR: You've worked through booms and busts.  Have you seen an appreciable...is 
there an appreciable difference to your work day-to-day in a boom or in a bust? 
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CH: In terms of...? 
AR: Does price solve all of these problems? 
CH: You mean are things better managed in a boom period? 
AR: Yes. 
CH: I don't remember the last boom period. 
ML: This one's been sort of... 
CH: I really can't say, I'm sorry.  I'm not sure. 
ML: That solves the fact that most of those problems come from the facts we've 
either not designed it effectively enough and co-ordinated it effectively enough or 
we've fallen out of sequence and we're not getting back on sequence.  Those 
are the two. 
There's a number of things that play.  But the money side deals with the fact that 
we haven't designed it well and we haven't contributed well.  So a job that might 
have made X amounts of percentage only makes this much percentage, but in a 
boom, that lower percentage is still acceptable.  And we've been there, and we 
look in jobs...I look back at jobs and think, oh, we made a good percentage 
margin on that, we did really well.  But actually, what should it have made?  And 
been more effective at design coordination and sequence. 
CH: If you look at using the two billions in comparison, Parkside and the Curzon 
building, the Parkside building is a good success in terms of design, the design 
was good, the design was handed over to you well, it certainly didn't have the 
issues that were going through it.  And yes, generally, if you were to take which 
one up to, Parkside, you know, we didn't make a lot of money out of it, but we 
made some money out of it, and I'm sure you made a little bit out of it. 
ML: We made more than we thought were going to lose.  It didn't lose as much as we 
thought it would. 
CH: The Parkside building, it was built during the recession, but it wasn't built in a 
rising market, and that's where we had the issues with the Curzon building.  So 
we won it at the bottom of the market and tried to construct it in a rising market. 
ML: We went in there ready to see their margin, and finished at an increased margin, 
but that was only because we went and beat you up, and you went and beat him 
up, and everybody beats everybody up... 
CH: That's the net effect. 
TA: Yes. 
ML: And then certainly didn't do as bad as we thought we were going to do, but we 
didn't clear overhead on Parkside. 
AR: They are.  And I think within all this, we are looking at...so you mentioned it 
earlier, Chris, about information flows.  So Tony is doing his task, you're trying to 
put something in, a riser, but everyone else has got a task to make Tony's task 
happen.  And all of those tasks come within a process.  So the process is 
interrelating it all.  So within that information is flowing.  So I wonder, perhaps 
starting with you, Tony, what...is there stuff that you know about your task, your 
situation kind of day-to-day, in fact you think others should know within the 
supply chain that would help you to a better job? 
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TA: Well, access to the area that needs work, work at, is essential, just to do the job.  
Which means that other trades can't be there in that area just doing their job 
around it, or trying to install contained it in a wall, that wall has to be there 
already.  But where that information comes from, you're asking...you can't just 
cut, you generally just have to figure it out for yourself on site.  Because there is 
a schedule board, and you can get to the floor and it's not... 
AR: Who's schedule would you see?  Would you see [MC’s]  
schedule? 
TA: I don't know exactly where it comes from... 
ML: Depending on how well coordinated we've been, it would be a combined 
services and build scheduled THB. 
PB: Tony's information flow is through two roots, there's the information coming from 
us saying you've got to get from Point A to Point B, and then there's the physical 
getting from Point A to Point B. 
TA: Yes. 
PB: I would imagine some of your productivity is to get to the far end of the building, 
you can't just walk straight across the floor when someone's putting a screen 
down three floors across the floor, back down... 
TA: And that's the nature of the job.  I mean, you can't expect everything, you know, 
is that there's 300-odd guys on there, and they're all different slightly jobs in 
slightly different places, so it's the nature of it being in construction that you have 
to work with that. 
DB: You were sort of saying you don't quite know where the information comes from, 
you know, the time you've got to do this job, presumably you're told something 
about that? 
PB: We'll say to Tony...we need to wire and HU number 6 from the panel.  That's 
where we... 
DB: So you specify tasks at that level? 
PB: So that would be his task for this day 
DB: And Tony has to decide how to do that?  So you need information about...? 
TA: Based on the other information I get from the builder, yes. 
DB: Yes.  You know what sort of air handling unit it is beforehand?  Would you 
prepare before, or do you just turn up, have a look to see what sort of wire you 
need, what sort of... 
TA: I get all that information from ABEC, yes, the specification, what's required, for 
the air handling unit. 
ML: So ABEC have been told which HU should buy it in, where the panel's going.  
The notice on the panel, that's on the cabling, et cetera should all be ordered, if 
everyone's done their jobs properly, and be on site ready for these guys to 
install.
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PB: We've got to make sure the panel arrives in time so that when Tony goes up 
there to deliver it, to install it, it's physically there for him to wire. 
ML: At that point, there's got to be a wall to put it on, we've got to...it's quite a good 
example, because there's less, actually left less build sequencing on a roof, 
because once the roof is ready to go, it's all services related.  So it's all comes 
into sort of our free realm... 
TA: There's no painters and plasterers up there.  It makes it simple. 
ML: It's simpler, but we still have problems, because the panel doesn't get 
manufactured in time and it's a bit late.  I then get my containment, so something 
happens, you know, there's so many influences, you know, we are buying bits 
from everywhere.  If suddenly the market for  contained basket trade, there's a 
shortage, oh no, we can't get any on site, so we can't finish the containment, so 
then we can't get the guy who's welding the brackets that's on the roof.... 
DB: You do quite short ordering of materials? 
ML: We can do.  For some bits we could do, yes.  We wouldn't have stuff just sat 
around waiting to go.  It's brought to site. 
DB: Do you order every week, or...? 
ML: It depends.  Containment, we will bulk order, as a containment, but it's kept with 
the wholesaler.  When I say it's kept with the wholesaler, it suggests that they've 
got it all on the shelf... 
DB: And you just call it down? 
ML: Yes.  But no, they tend to be somewhere else. 
DB: They use it as part of their stock? 
ML: They'll cast that off to somebody else.  So suddenly you go for your call off and it 
might not be there.  We get a delivery from site and it's missing. 
DB: Because on most jobs you purchase the materials? 
ML: Okay, yes, sorry.  So I'm talking general containment.  But then these guys 
purchase. 
DB: I'm just wondering what Tony...? 
ML: So we'll do primary containment, but then the BMS company will do their 
secondary containment as we described it.  So we do... 
PB: We would know the way the building's phased, we're going to do that HU this 
week, that one in two weeks' time, and that one in four weeks' time.  We would 
only have the panels built in readiness for being delivered.  We wouldn't get 
them all manufactured and stick them in a warehouse.  Tony then says, right, 
next week I'm doing that one, so I need to order materials X, Y, and Z so that it 
arrives on a Monday morning or whatever it is, so he's got enough materials to 
do that work. 
DB: So it's about a week ahead planning for this? 
TA: It usually is about that, yes. 
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ML: If we had a programme that was in-depth enough that covered all aspects of that 
sequencing, then...and we stuck to it and delivered on it, and you're planning to 
be six months ahead, when it's not... 
DB: You could order it to the programme rather than order it on request? 
ML: Manufacturing facilities, so you wouldn't...okay, so... 
TA: Yes, turn a construction site into a factory. 
ML: Yes, it's the dream world, isn't it?  It's got all of it attached to it and you can press 
sequence button and the stuff starts arriving because it's all gone to the 
manufacturing facility... 
DB: And obviously, we aren't there at the moment. 
ML: No. 
DB: And no one would trust us enough to do that, because you would have nowhere 
to store all this stuff arriving.  And it would get damaged, and all that sort of thing. 
PB: The issue is not with deliveries of materials, is it?  It's actually getting them 
physically installed. 
ML: Yes, normally. 
DB: That's interesting, actually.  So materials are sort of okay? 
ML: They can be a problem, but...yes, normally the issue is associated with, for us, is 
the fact that a work face is not available or not available in its 100 per cent... 
TA: Yes, that's my comment. 
ML: So taking it both from Chris a little bit at the moment, another project we'll 
working on at the moment, they can't get the block work walls ready.  So block 
work walls are supposed to go up and then we come through with our services, 
so you look down the corridor, on any of the corridors of the moment or any of 
the walls, and they're 90 per cent complete.  So we can only do 90 per cent of 
our services.  So we go home, we stock, and we have to go, we go somewhere 
else.  So the immediate knock on, on that particular job there's a bit of concrete 
that they haven't made up, that bit of concrete that they haven't completed is the 
bit between the riser and the floor boards.  So I can contain the riser, I can 
contain there, but I can't link the two.   
TA: I had trouble like that as well today. 
ML: No, mine's in Birmingham.  But those sorts of sequencing issues are extremely 
common.  And I think generally the M&E, we kind of...I would say this, I know, 
and I'm ready to be shot down, but I think we know pretty well what we've got to 
install and how long it takes to install it.  I think we are better at that, if we think 
something is going to take two weeks, we'll do it in two weeks, by hook or by 
crook.  I think the problems come with plaster boarders and bricklayers.  I don't 
know if that's purely because of availability of people and bricklayers are 
notoriously hard to get hold of, or whatever that is, but we always have a 
programme that's got three weeks in for a brick wall, and they're still doing it after 
five weeks.  And I don't know what the fundamentals that are, but those are the 
key issues that we have.  And I'm putting that back to you now, Chris. 
CH: I think you're working on unknown, if that makes sense.  You've got a set of 
drawings, you've got the corridor, you've got rooms, you know, providing those 
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walls and things are there, you're absolutely right, you've got an unknown 
quantity of what you can to and how quickly you can do it.  When you start 
dealing with complex groundworks solutions and things like that, you're opening 
up to find a lot of unknowns, and throw in a bit of bad weather with that, poor 
performance of a subcontractor, or poor design, and it's very difficult during 
those stages.  And then you've got to put a frame on top of that and then start 
unlocking these work faces for you.  And there's a lot of...yes, we deal with a lot 
of unknowns, that is probably what I'm getting at, before we get to you guys and 
we go, ta-dah, there you go. 
PB: The boarding and the block work one for me is always in confusion.  Because 
that's pretty known, if you like.  And I wonder if we don't think through the 
sequencing of that enough.  And I'll give you another example in a job, and it 
came from [Client] actually.  I talked to the builder about sequence for a room, he 
says right, okay, what we're going to do, we going to get the plasterboard in, blah 
blah blah, we'll put the lights up, okay, yeah, brilliant.  Then we'll get the chippie 
in, and I was like, okay, we've got to be careful with the dust after lights.  And he 
says yeah, yeah, that's fine though, it's only a bit of architrave round the door 
and that, that's fine, we'll do the door.  So we'll do the chippie afterwards.  I said, 
okay, right, fine. 
So concrete slab with plasterboard walls.  I said, well, you know when you 
plasterboard walls, the slab, what do you do with that?  Oh, we'll probably need a 
bit of a skirt round that to hide it.  Okay, I says, but how are you going to do that?  
Oh, probably a bit of timber.  Okay, so at this point now your chippie comes in 
after all our lights up and all our chilled beams are up, how are you going to get 
up to that?  Oh yeah, we need to do that before, aren't we?  And they just hadn't 
thought through that process, and they never would have.  They never would 
think that through, and it wouldn't get...gets to the plan on site, what of it? 
CH: Was that one or two? 
PB: Sorry? 
CH: Is that on one or two? 
PB: No this wasn't...it didn't happen with [Client].  I know, because we caught it early.  
We picked it up.  But on this job they hadn't.  So I took that learning to that job 
and they wouldn't have thought it through until we came to install the lights and 
they'd go, well, hang on, stop.  But with one programme to install the...no, no, no, 
stop, because we need to do the skirting, and we haven't got the chippie on 
board yet.  So a week, two weeks... 
AR: Would the skirting beyond the design, or would it not be in the BIM model? 
PB: It may be, I don't know.  Sometimes they're not, are they, those sorts of details. 
AR: Stuff that wouldn't be there anyway? 
CH: Yes, it's called the deflection head that runs round the room, and you've got an 
option of doing like a timber trim, which we've sort of moved away from on the 
Curzon building.  We've got a much more need to detail and less...so it avoided 
another trade having to go back up there, so we created the detail without the 
trim, lessons learned, moving things along.  But yes, you're absolutely right, they 
don't consider... 
PB: The contemplation of all of that sequencing, so the right people haven't been in a 
room together at the start of the job to do that sequencing.  So you haven't been 
sat in a room saying hang on, I can't be doing that work whilst the painter's still 
painting the doors.  But actually, I do need the doors on, because I'm going to 
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have electrical power in there, so I need to be able to lock it, which it needs to be 
controlled.  So nobody sat down and done that sequencing in enough detail, 
because we're still focused on, you know, securing our packages at the best 
price because we've all been driven on cost.  And nobody has actually sat down 
doing the most important thing, which is making sure we can build it in good 
buildable sequence, we don't make too many mistakes.  And if you've got a 
decent sequence, then the odd problem that you come across, you can deal 
with.  But we have so many of them, I think, from what I see, so many issues that 
it becomes unmanageable, and then the whole job sort of becomes just a case 
of everybody crack on and see how far you can get it done. 
CH: I mean, I've got to leave now, but the one thing...we've talked about unlocking 
how things could be made better and the way that procurement routes and 
things like that.  Effectively negotiating a better value for all of us.  But the 
problem we're seeing now in the marketplace now, particularly in Birmingham for 
us, it's because of the activity in Birmingham, the quality and resource levels are 
dropping significantly.  So people are supplementing that... 
ML: These sort of problems are only going to get worse, aren't they? 
CH: So you're almost like in reflection, we've come out of the bad times, you know, 
so it's really for me now, if we are going to suffer with resource levels and things 
like that now going forward, which is a matter of fact, we should start to look to 
pre-fabricate things off-site. 
TA: Resource of labour, skills and...? 
CH: Massively, yes.  It's only going to get worse. 
TA: I couldn't believe it. 
ML: I could shock you at the moment. 
CH: It's going to be horrendous.  It's almost like, you know, when a design now 
comes with this fancy, lovely design, you switch them off and say, no.  
Because... 
DB: They can't deliver it?  No. 
CH: Let's think about how you can actually module eyes that. 
TA: It's terrible, it's a massive cultural problem, isn't it?  We're just all becoming 
idiots. 
AR: Can I ask you, Chris, before you go, we've talked about design and what 
information is needed in there. 
CA: Yes. 
AR: What about method statements?  Do you use them at all?  And could they be 
used for planning sequencing better? 
CA: Yes.  Method statements we talked about, there's what we all know on a daily 
basis, method statements, risk assessments for health and safety, which are, 
you know, they can be...if they're done properly and thought through, they can 
be, you know, almost like your task tool to make sure it's carefully thought out.  
And that's the whole purpose of them.  Unfortunately, what has come with it, is 
you get a minority of people who are doing really well, and they actually come to 
site, look at what they've got to do, write their method statement and work plan 
for the guys, and they tell their stakeholder they're going to go up this, that and 
 244 
the other.  And then the generic rubbish, which is just to tick a box.  But I would 
say, I mean, method statements from me are about...are really getting round the 
table and really discussing sequencing with your key supply chain, really looking 
at the project, getting into the design.  Matt talked about it, I mean, we sat round 
the table for hours.  We built rooms in our mind, drew them and built the 
programme around that.  Then we built the bigger programme.  The more that 
you do that, the more chance you have of getting it right.  We suffered a lot 
of...we suffered problems on [Client] too.  But I can absolutely assure you that if 
we done all of that at the beginning, those problems would have been horrific, 
and would have, you know, for everyone involved would have been a lot worse. 
ML: I think even with the amount that we did, which I think was far more than the 
engagements you get with a lot of main contractors, you still hit problems. 
CH: Yes. 
ML: And we'd have been in a far worse position. 
CH: It would have been, yes.  So for me, that... 
ML: We still didn't do enough. 
CH: That upfront engagement, and we did involve...but this time on Phase 2 we 
involved all the engineers, didn't we? 
ML: Yes. 
CH: We brought those in, whereas before on Phase 1, it was more of high-level 
involvement around the table.  But we dropped it down layers to make sure that 
we actually understood from the guys that were going to...the engineers, what 
they wanted.  And so... 
AR: And Tony, would you have and use those method statements? 
TA: I've never been involved in drafting a method statement. 
TA: Yes, but it doesn't have...the method statement that I sign don't have...well, they 
have barely any level of detail about specific job emerging there. 
ML: The method statements you're talking about there, what we're talking about of 
the method statement of how we are pretty much going to install some conduits.  
So were going to screw to the wall using a drill, then this is the equipment that 
we use.  It doesn't say that I need to get in there at this period of time, this is how 
long it's going to take, or anything like that.  It's just.  It's a safety statement 
really. 
AR: Linking the method statement and the sequence. 
CH: The method statements now, what we use in industry, we've turned that into 
what we call task briefings So the SSS supervisor, which we are now heavily 
reliant upon to effectively coordinate the workforce with other workforce with us, 
they do, and should be doing, good SSS supervisors should be doing task 
briefings every day and say, this is linking that information flow about the 
builders screeding that floor so now the route is there.  And you're going to do 
some cabling to ASU number 6 next week.  While we can't get the cable in that 
route, because they're shipping of that, so were actually going to bring in that, so 
it's avoiding wastage, and that is absolutely critical.  And providing they're good, 
and they understand their role properly... 
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TA: So what are they for then?  Are those briefings supposed to be go somewhere 
and it will be co-ordinated? 
CH: Yes.  In the ideal world.  Yes. 
TA: How it works over there. 
CH: This is what I'm saying.  This is about what they really should be doing, it's the 
idea of an SSS supervisor is about being able to coordinate, right?  And this is 
where... 
TA: What it's for? 
CH: This is where people just put bums on seats to tick a box, and that's where it all 
falls over.  So I'm just painting a picture of, you know, you've got five managers, 
one with Dixon, 300-odd people on that job, and then there's a layer of SSS 
supervises that should be delivering messages, bringing messages back up, 
coordinating the work in the ideal world. 
TA: So that's the model. 
CH: But you see how it would work, if we doing it properly, though. 
DB: Yes, and that would be their role as coordination? 
CH: Yes.  And funnily enough, if you read an SSS supervisor's role, that is what they 
have...they don't realise it, but that's what they have an obligation for under the 
CDM rates. 
ML: Two weeks of failure of organising turns into the remainder of the job firefighting. 
DB: Yes. 
AR: Yes.  How are you going to keep on top of it? 
ML: Yes, once you sequence, then that's it.  If you don't stay on top of it, that's what 
happens. 
PB: So we've used something similar to that on other Bailey's jobs down in Bristol, 
where admittedly our supervisor first thing in the morning briefs his team.  And it 
works.  And that task sheet goes to Bailey's, so they know exactly what we're 
doing, where we're working, and at the end of the day, get signed off. 
CH: If it's put into it at every level, it actually does work.  I've seen it work... 
ML: If you sequence, and it's fixed and it's working... 
CH: But even if your sequences and fits, something goes wrong, that's 
communication... 
ML: Yes, you should be able to alter it and that. 
CH: And it's key to making things better, to avoid the confusion.  And that link 
between...and the problem that you have is the cross.  Because you guys know, 
what you generally go on from job to job to job to job, and you know each other, 
and you know how each other work, but then we put you guys in with some 
decorator SSS, plasterer SSS, you've never seen him before in your lives, you're 
sitting next door to him and either you engage with them or you don't, and you're 
just there just to tick a box for 25 minutes.  You don't want to bring anything to 
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the table and say anything, and you just want to walk away and go and do your 
job and hope that that's it. 
PB: That's probably because you see him as the person that's going to stop you 
doing your job. 
CH: Whereas the way it works is the people form a relationship and they start to talk 
to each other, that's where you find you'll go and find that person on the project 
and they'll talk to him, and they will unlock problems together very quickly.  
Because they know how to unlock them.  And that's how it works well.  The way 
it doesn't work is all these people just in their own little silos... 
DB: And communication, isn't it? 
CH: It's communication, and it's being able to do that, and sometimes, you know, put 
people are putting SSS supervisors in a position that they just...they're doing it 
because their boss says, I need one of them on that job. 
AR: Just one...before you go, Chris, is there any...to think you've got information that 
you could input into the method statement?  Do think there's stuff that people 
never ask you but you know that could work through that process?  Because 
you're saying... 
CH: Yes, I imagine if I was involved in...do you mean if I was involved at the sort of 
planning and design level then?  Yes, without a doubt, yes.  Because... 
DB: Have you got an example of something that might... 
CH: I've really got to...  So thank you very much, thanks everyone, nice to meet you 
all. 
AR: Cheers, Chris.  I'll be in touch. 
DB: Thanks so much, Chris.  So I may see you tomorrow, if you...? 
CH: Yes, I'll try and get across to that.  Excellent. 
ML: We'll wait till you've gone, Chris.  Don't give him this recording! 
CH: David will share it with me tomorrow, so.... 
AR: Chris has left the room. 
PB: I'll record from now onwards. 
CH: Right, see you later. 
DB: Have you got an example of where, you know, you feel, could I...if I taught these 
people...? 
AR: Because you fill them in, and you know what's missing from them in terms of the 
method statements.  Do you think? 
DB: Probably more about this operational organisation, not just the health and safety 
aspect. 
ML: Not to talk for you, but do you think...I think a lot of it comes from the fact that I 
don't think it's always not been thought about, I think it's all been...a lot of it's 
been thought about, like the sequencing they were talking about there with Chris.  
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That had been thought about, but it's fallen apart by the time you're there.  And 
actually, the advice that you would give is that you need to be in there on your 
own.  You can't have these trades around you and feed into all of that sequence, 
I'll tell you that.  But we kind of know that already. 
TA: Yes. 
PB: But that's doesn't get the job done, does it? 
ML: No.  Yes, exactly, you're at that point, and that's the way...those are the words 
that come out, we'll just go and get the job done now.  And those in three 
months' time, we just need to get the job done, handover's tomorrow, we just 
need to get the job done. 
TA: And then your health and safety gets compromised, because of those pressures 
that come down. 
ML: Do you know what?  I don't think it did so much over there.  Are you thinking of 
Phase 2?  Because it can do.  But I didn't think...I didn't feel as though it did. 
TA: There was this situation with the masks that I was talking to you about, which 
was a bit of a farcical situation where at a certain point during the job, we were 
told that we weren't allowed to drill in any concrete without wearing a specific 
type of face kit and that's with the particular type of filter.  So my boss had to go 
out and buy all these masks.  And we all had to have a toolbox talk... 
ML: Training, yes. 
TA: Basic bit of training, that was it, certain guys.  One guy was only there for one or 
two days, and he got face kits trains, took a mask, that had been paid for, took it 
off and disappeared.  We never saw him again.  And like I said, this was like a 
fab that lasted about two weeks, threw everyone into more turmoil because you 
only had so many people face kit trained, so if you wanted a hole drilling, to fit a 
raw plug, you'd have to call some guy, and if he wasn't busy, he would come 
down and drill a hole for you.  I mean, it was a total farce.  And then when 
everyone realised it was a farce, the whole thing was dropped and guys just 
came and... 
ML: It was never dropped. 
TA: Well, you weren't on the job. 
ML: It shouldn't have been dropped.  That's a bit of...the problem with that one, just a 
quick summary, is that silicon dust suddenly... 
TA: Oh sure.  We know the reasons. 
ML: As soon as you start hearing that then you have to implement it and you have 
the meaning immediate remaining process. 
TA: No, we know the reasons. 
ML: But that shouldn't have been... 
TA: Even a massive problem of us to installing... 
DB: In a sense, the problem was identified, but the solution... 
ML: There was no solution straightaway in that. 
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DB: …was just... 
ML: What can we do?  We know about it, [it’s like asbestos 61:46] so we've got 
to...we can't be seen to be not implementing something, because as soon as we 
know about it... 
TA: Of course not, I know. 
ML: It shouldn't have... 
TA: I was telling you what happened. 
ML: It's got into a farce.  You should still be doing it as well. 
DB: And that was an issue of materials that wasn't discovered till...? 
ML: We were on it during the contracts, regarding silica dust in concrete, drilling 
concrete, so once that came to light, that that could be a respiratory issue, as an 
employer, we've got to recommend that people are protected from it. 
DB: Yes. 
ML: And it certainly wasn't rolled out very effectively. 
PB: Clearly there wasn't contact.  I can remember talking to the guys about it. 
ML: Yes. 
TA: You know the big issue for me I think, Chris talked about this resource problem.  
It's been so difficult getting hold of people who are trustworthy and have the skills 
to do the job.  Like I said at the start, so you employ guys to come in and they 
don't have...some guys turn up, and they don't even drive, and they'll come with 
their tools in a carrier bag, and then you've got them from an agency, and they're 
supposed to have qualifications and they're supposed to have been vetted 
already, so that brings massive problems with the guys, so quality and then cost 
as well and all that sort of thing. 
AR: So they could be within your own company? 
TA: Well, they're not.  They wouldn't work direct for our company. 
AR: But they're doing the work that B&W are doing, yes.  So that's not a... 
ML: As far as we are...as far as a BEC are concerned, they are B&W, and it's why we 
are concerned.  We don't really deal with B&W.  We deal with a Beck.  So 
when...if a quality issue came up, we need to speak to those guys and say, well, 
I don't really care what the issue is, it's your issue, you need to sort it.  And if you 
don't, it'll be B&W  
PB: Which comes back down to when they would have originally closed that job for 
us, you would have said only X amount of labour... 
ML: I can resource that... 
PB: We can resource that internally based on a programme of X. 
ML: And that program went like that, and then it went a bit like that, and a bit more 
like that... 
 249 
TA: That is literally what...you suddenly find guys and I'm like... 
ML: Six for every job. 
TA: That's a big cultural problem. 
DB: Because he would just go out to an agency to get them, because that's the only 
thing you can do. 
ML: You carry a base of labour, and you can't carry any more, because when your 
workloads lower, you'd have to pay them anyway.  So you carry a base and you 
supplement it with agency guys or subcontractors that you know, and you bring 
them in when you need to.  That's what we do as a business.  We have a base 
electrical resource, and then when we can't cope, we go out to subcontractors. 
TA: Do you have the same sort of problem with quality?  Because I think the 
whole...these agencies don't know anything about them, but I don't know, that 
industry needs looking at. 
DB: Yes. 
ML: The job I've gasped just come from, the agency are on site with the project 
manager because he's not happy with the resource, the quality of the resource 
has been becoming...exactly the same conversations... 
TA: There's a lot of gangsters and sharks going on. 
ML: They turn up, and the impact of them turning up, they turn up for a day, decide 
they don't like the job and don't want to work there, so they sod off, so you've lost 
two days.  They turn up for the day, you decide that they're not what you wanted, 
through a quality issue, and having to get rid of them.  By the time you get 
somebody else, nobody starts till the Monday, so then you've lost a week.  But 
when you're carrying a workforce of five or six guys as well, that's must impact 
you massively.  It's like 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 15 per cent of your workforce 
sometimes that might be agency. 
TA: Of course, and then that means you need greater supervision as well, because 
they are dross.  That eats into more of your own time supervising. 
ML: But you've been forced into that position by the position of the project, because 
you've not been able to plan properly, because the job has moved.  So your start 
date has moved because we've not given it to you at the right time.  Then what 
we've... 
TA: We've been forced into it, a massive pressure. 
ML: Yes, you're forced into it, and you're always under pressure, and then, you know, 
I could keep going back to that, that's inevitably because of the other...the 
trades, they're not sequenced well enough or they're not on board early enough, 
or whatever the issues are, they never get done.  They never get done in time.  
Any job, any main contractor you go and work with, they never seem to want to 
talk too much.  I know we were talking about Chris, and he won't mind me tell 
you anyway, but they don't seem to want to talk about why they put 
plasterboarders on prices.  Why don't they get them to do the lot, and you have 
to do the lot before you leave the room. 
AR: Yes, he's saying they don't do it.  And I... 
ML: No, they did it, they're responsible, they are the managing contract, and they're 
the people who... 
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AR: I mean, they had to stipulate it on, wouldn't it?  Because all of the plasterwork 
that I've spoken to do do that.  They say, oh, now...that we then let on a either a 
metre squared or a price per room. 
ML: They do, yes.  So nobody wants to do the... 
TA: You and us, we are on fixed price contracts. 
ML: Yes, we are, yes.  So we have two... 
TA: What's the difference? 
ML: Yes, it's interesting. 
ML: I don't see it like that. go...go up onto the first floor and do a bit up there, or finish 
off. 
DB: And it is interesting that those sort of trades to work on a quantity basis.  And this 
is why I think there's a mistake in bills of quantity about it, because oh yes, I've 
done that quantity of work, whereas yours doesn't.  It needs those runs of work, 
and therefore there is almost a contradiction in the way it's costed. 
ML: So the good contracts are where the main contractor understands that, and 
understands the implications on the M&E impact have, and when the man is 
asking, we didn't get back to the answer on your question of why do I have to 
wait two months for an access hatch, whether or not the design was good or 
bad, and whether it was on the drawing to start with... 
DB: It shouldn't take two months. 
ML: It shouldn't take two months.  If it takes two months, because they haven't got 
enough money to pay for the plaster borders, because they're already in a delay 
situation, an argument with plaster borders... 
TA: Yes, this is what we come back to doing. 
ML: The borders won't do it, taking in, their bosses said, don't take any more 
instructions of them, just to your contract works.  And it's all fallen apart, really, 
because they were delayed because of the plasterers, because of the blocked 
layers, because of the ground workers, because of whatever. 
TA: There's a guy stood there under it with his [pad saw 67:47] I know the 
plasterboard as well, because I'm I've been working with them for months.  I'm 
sorry, mate, I can't...I said, I've drawn it out for you on the ceiling.  I can't do it, I 
need an instruction. 
ML: I've been told not to cut it.  Whereas...so you report that to our manager, our 
manager talks to the manager over here, and he says, oh yeah, I'll get it done, 
so he goes to his QS and says, I mean, seriously, Chris, I'm not given any more 
instructions, we are in dispute on the accounts.  So by the time then that's come 
down to the plasterboard and tease...oh, hang on.  All for 20 quid's worth of 
hatch or 50 quid's worth of hatch. 
PB: Mack the Knife. 
DB: That's what happens. 
ML: And then I get damage costs levied at me, because our subcontractors have 
damaged plasterboard. 
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TA: Yes, same thing when they put it... 
ML: Why did you block the wall? 
TA: And they board over our conduit boxes, or whatever.  They start drilling holes 
through the wall to find it, because these guys are meant to board it, and they're 
meant to put the whole lot up for us, but because that takes more time, so they 
don't bother.  So we end up drilling a hole...oh, it's not there. 
AR: Just to find it? 
TA: It's three inches to the right, you know?  So then damage costs as well. 
ML: You're getting all the M&E side and I'd think there was more to it, but I think this 
is the majority of it.  And the amount of times you get to a situation where you 
talk about...don't put that sink there, we've got services to finish up over there.  
I've been told I've got to get it up.  Don't get it up, I'll I'm putting it up.  I was told 
this morning if I don't everything put it up, I'm off the job and I'm not going to get 
paid.  So I'm putting the ceiling on.  But you're going to have to take it down.  I 
don't care, I've been told to put it up.  So the ceiling goes up, and guess what?  It 
has to come down, somebody has to cut some holes in it, or whatever, and 
you're stood around for God knows how many hours waiting for it, and then you 
end up sodding...and I don't know what the drivers for some of that are, it's just 
some of it is the...sorry, going back to the start of that, and that was about the 
good ones are the main contractors that understand the impact of not getting the 
M&E complete fit.  And they go, okay, I understand that, and actually, I won't put 
my ceiling up, I'll sacrifice the fact that I've got to pay him the day rate because 
he's on standing time, he's on a day rate, so he has to stand there for 20 quid 
whilst you finish your services, and then I'll pay that 20 quid for him to put it up.  
Because I understand that, because of the impact of that is far greater.  But the 
contractors that don't, and a lot of the build managers, they'll forget that the M&E 
is part of their package of works, because it is, it's all one build.  And they get 
focused so much on finishing the plasterboard, finishing the ceilings, it doesn't 
matter if the servicing is not done.  I don't know... 
TA: You can't see them anyway.  They're not there. 
ML: I don't get it.  Because I've sat in meetings as well where you get the main 
contract are going, oh well, we'll do them, but the M&E is not finished.  Well, we 
subcontract to you.  We are you.  If we haven't finished, we haven't finished.  It 
doesn't matter, you can't...you know, I've...it's your problem is much as it is ours.  
So...anyway, that's...yes, it is.  For me, it's all sequencing and sticking to the 
sequence.  But to get that right, you've got to have engaged all parties at the 
start to ensure that your sequence can work, and can work effectively.  So again, 
good ones are where you sit down, you do your program, and the plaster 
boarding contractor has already been appointed, so he comes along, and so 
does the ceiling contractor, so does the BMS contractor, so we get the pipe fitter 
there, and we get the inductor there, and it's not just Chris and me sat there 
going, take about two minutes, that will.  No, no, no, that's going to take four 
weeks, guys. 
DB: There are jobs where the people to get all the four men together to actually do 
the planning. 
ML: Yes, oh yes, it does happen.  It would never get down to you though, that's the 
problem, because you... 
TA: Or even Dave  
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ML: Or even Dave, no.  Because...no, not necessarily, no.  Not at that...we're 
probably sat there thinking, so we know enough about electrical installs and how 
long that would take in some respects.   
TA: When all our guys would say would be in a boiler house saying, why wasn't 
this...why haven't we consulted the pipefitters before they came in here?  And 
we're trying to get our trunking round there. 
AR: Is that about space, Tony? 
TA: the Yes, about space and coordination of the layout in some.  And we always 
say, it really would have benefited from somebody planning.  Sometimes you do 
get these little 3-D drawings of where all the pipe works going. 
ML: They're starting to do it more and more for the trunking. 
DB: Does that help? 
TA: It hasn't helped so far.  Because they don't tend to go according to the drawing, 
but maybe it's an early start. 
DB: Don't they?  And I think there's an interesting point here, because people can 
create these drawings.  If they're not of value... 
TA: Yes, who creates? 
DB: You know, and that's... 
ML: Someone said the exact same thing, everyone did say they make sure it fits 
spatially, and it was describing it...yes, okay then, they work, it fits, and the 
model works.  But it's not practical... 
DB: You can't get it up there? 
ML: They built them all, and they're building it slightly differently.  So it's as good as 
the models. 
DB: Fascinating, yes. 
ML: That's because...well, again, we were like that, and you imagine the guy, the 
right guy not being involved in the drawing.  For the guy drawing is a CAD 
technician that's, you know... 
DB: Yes.  Of course, never actually installed anything in his life. 
TA: Rarely. 
ML: Rarely.  Then you get the right guys that really understand how it's built. 
DB: And I think these are the sorts of issues that I think maybe we could resolve by 
getting information to flow better.  But it needs to be at the right time.  And 
whether...there's this idea of look ahead, planning, you know, at what point does 
everybody meet together to plan this job?  And at what level?  And there's 
probably a sequence of levels of planning.  There is a large-scale level on 
your...you know, we'll do it in this order, and then, you know, let's look ahead, 
whether it's one month ahead, so I can start ordering my materials, getting the 
labour force in.  And then there's a week ahead, you know, we’re actually going 
to...this is what we're going to do.  This is how we going to do it.  This is how we 
are going to get the materials there. 
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PB: I think the 3-D modelling is fine from a coordination point of view.  But what tends 
to happen between us and the likes of [Baileys 73:53], if you take a plant where 
you've got to read the model, eight inch pipe work going up here, or you might 
have a bit of two inch trunking there, or flush to install our trunking before they 
put their eight inch pipe in, is never going to happen.  So we tend to wait until 
they're 80 per cent complete of all the heavy stuff, and then we go in afterwards.  
But again, Baileys, having the trust in us that yes, we are going to be late, but we 
are going to get it done on time. 
DB: And you've got a way of working around the already installed pipework?  
Because you've got more flexibility in there? 
ML: Not everybody.  Just Tony. 
TA: And that could be one of the problems that comes from this idea of designing 
everything completely 1st to the stage where in the future and algorithm could 
bang out a complete building.  You're going to end up turning the construction 
site into a factory, and the people who are actually responsible for putting the 
stuff in, they're going to be more and more kind of unskilled, in a way.  They're 
not going to need to have to come up with creative solutions and problem-
solving, because it's all meant to have been figured out first.  So then you get a 
sort of unskilled... 
ML: Does that not just move there, positioning this in the chain?  So your skill and 
experience there then should be introduced earlier in the algorithm building and 
the model building. 
TA: Well, it's not just me.  I mean, anyone who's actually working on the coalface 
really needs to have a degree in problem solving. 
ML: Yes, sorry, yes, but the more you influence earlier, the less problems should 
occur later on. 
TA: Yes, should, yes. 
ML: So instead of having the CAD operator, but a lot of that comes to appointments, 
doesn't it?  So we're getting...we've talked about this before, about the current 
way that we engage the supply chain doesn't think to be because we are not 
employed until potentially two weeks before you actually start installing.  By that 
time, the planning phase is well and truly... 
TA: Over, yes. 
ML: Completed and done. 
TA: Exactly. 
PB: How does BIM...if you want to design and build, and obviously your designers... 
ML: Yes, BIM is not overly... 
PB: ...first time, whereas if you're not a BIM designer, where it's not designing 
building work and sending out a spec, and the BIM design then, you will probably 
have a different way of installing it to what they decide. 
ML: Yes.  That's why that whole process needs all the right people at the very start. 
Which is massively difficult, yes. 
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Abigail Robson M.Sc. and David Boyd Ph.D. and Niraj Thurairajah Ph.D. 
Birmingham City University 
Birmingham, UK 
 
The UK construction industry is facing a challenge to improve productivity. It is argued that this 
challenge can be met though the adoption of Building Information Modeling (BIM) which would 
improve efficiency by integrating the sequence of processes and activities encompassing all 
organizations involved in a construction project. Construction projects operate in an environment 
that is characterized by fragmentation and uncertainty and the companies that make up the 
construction supply chain possess dynamic capabilities in order to survive in this operating 
environment. This research study investigated the nature of the environment that subcontractors 
in the UK construction supply chains operate in, the aims of BIM solutions and the attitudes of 
subcontractors in the supply chain of a national UK main contractor to BIM solutions. The study 
focused on determining the supply chains’ views on the key opportunities of BIM and the key 
challenges involved. The study was performed by surveys carried out with practitioners in 
subcontracting companies in the supply chain of a national UK main contractor.   
 
Keywords: Building Information Modeling, Supply Chain Management, Dynamic 
Capabilities. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is almost 20 years since the UK construction industry was called on to improve productivity firstly through a focus 
on efficiency using improved integration, teamwork and partnerships (Latham, 1994), then through reengineering 
overall delivery (Egan, 1998) as a remedy to its endemic problems. Since then government, through its client and 
regulatory role, has further driven the industry to achieve greater efficiency through the uptake of benchmarking 
(Strategic Forum, 1998). Again, recently the construction industry has been specifically challenged to reduce 
construction costs for government contracts by 15 – 20% by 2015, from the baseline of 2012 (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
At a time of rising costs and the continuing financial crisis the cumulative saving required on construction cost is 
greater than 15 – 20%. Building Information Modeling (BIM) is being proposed as a solution to this, which 
enhances information sharing and collaboration across multiple firms in construction projects (Succar, 2009). BIM 
is seen to have the potential to improve productivity through efficiency gains (Cabinet Office, 2011) achieved 
through new modeling techniques that allow centralization of design information and improved communication 
through a central hub. The search for opportunities for productivity improvement through BIM is therefore of great 
concern to the industry. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
The adoption of BIM in the construction industry is seen as a journey through four levels of ‘maturity’ from two 
dimensional design practices at level 0, to fully integrated three dimensional modeling of design, time and cost at 
level 3 and the UK government requires all public projects to be delivered to level 2 by 2016 (BIS, 2011). Level 2 
requires project teams to be working collaboratively in 3D modeling of design.  Many subcontractors have design 
input and the concept of collaboration in design is therefore intertwined with the main contractors’ supply chain. In 
addition, Tier 2 (subcontractor) firms generate 80% of the production costs of UK buildings, therefore for BIM to be 
successful in reducing costs it needs to involve tier 2 subcontractors. 
 
The technological certainty of BIM camouflages the essential vagueness of BIM’s aim to achieve efficiencies 
through collaboration. BIM is perhaps better understood in the same way that Childerhouse (2003) argued that 
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Supply Chain Management (SCM ) is best understood, namely as a sub-theme within a broader discourse that 
promotes ‘new ways of working’ to the construction industry from other sectors. When promoting initiatives from 
one sector to another, differences in the operating environment between sectors will have an impact. Green et al 
(2005) argued that the construction industry tends to introduce ‘new ways of working’ from other sectors at project 
level without any critical appraisal of the impact of the contextual differences (structural characteristics, differing 
relationships with government and relative degrees of global consolidation) that shape the ‘new ways of working’ in 
different sectors. 
 
Understanding the particular context of the construction industry was spearheaded by Lansley (1987) who 
recognized that construction firms need to be able to respond to changing environments due to the boom and bust, 
cyclical nature of demand in the construction market and also Cannon and Hillebrant (1990) who recognized that 
construction firms often develop strategies organically in order to cope with the uncertainty inherent in temporary, 
short term relationships that result from this ever changing environment.  These works remain seminal and the 
construction industry is still characterized by localized, temporary supply chains producing a one-off product for 
many clients. The construction supply chain is made up of tier 1 firms (main contractors, also known as general 
contractors) and tier 2 firms (subcontractors, also known as specialist or trade contractors or manufacturers who 
have a direct contractual relationship with the main contractor). Tier 2 and tier 3 of the construction supply chain is 
typified by fragmentation into a large number of small, labor intensive companies and business relationships typified 
by competition and an adversarial inter-organisational culture.  
 
The achievement of collaboration through BIM faces the same challenges that have faced previous SCM initiatives 
involving ‘new ways of working’ that have been imported from other sectors at a project level, with an operational 
perspective. These include constructability with its focus on designing for assembly (O'Connor et al., 1987); lean 
production with its focus on identifying value, eliminating waste and the smooth flow of information and activities 
(Ohno, 1998);  agile construction with its focus on increased flexibility and responsiveness in project based work to 
reduce the risks associated with complexity (Christopher and Towill, 1983); and partnering that advocates greater 
interdependence between firms  (Latham, 1994) however  in practice is primarily operational, project based change.  
In these four initiatives the structure of inter-organizational networks remains unchanged (Green, Fernie et al., 
2005). A common argument is that better collaboration is difficult to achieve through these initiatives because the 
construction sector is so fragmented with low interdependency and short-term relationships between firms. 
 
A few SCM initiatives have taken a strategic perspective in which the structure of inter-organizational networks has 
been consolidated from previously fragmented supply chain structures.  The first of these came in the field of 
logistics though co-operation between suppliers and contractors for improving the total flow of materials by strategic 
procurement (Johnston, 1981). This was followed by co-operation in specific supply chains such as elevators 
(Luhtala et al., 1999). A further strategic initiative that has brought change under the banner of SCM is platform 
assembly, which focuses on increased modularization and off-site prefabrication to decrease the impact of varying 
site conditions (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997).  However such strategic SCM initiatives in the construction industry that 
have emulated the secure, long term supply chain relationships of other industries are relatively isolated examples 
and Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000) concluded that such initiatives have been minimal and have had only limited 
impact on the traditional fragmented and adversarial structure of the construction industry. The introduction of BIM 
into this environment of fragmentation and inter-organizational conflict does not guarantee the desired 
improvement. BIM therefore needs to be able to work in a climate of fragmentation and inter-organizational 
conflict. 
 
Others have taken the view that the climate of fragmentation, low interdependency and short-term relationships has 
resulted in positive benefits for construction companies in their adoption of dynamic practices to cope with 
uncertainty, which set companies in the construction industry apart from those in other industries, in their degree of 
flexibility to respond to changes in the environment. Cannon and Hillebrandt (1990) highlighted the fact that the 
nature of construction companies as labor intensive, rather than capital intensive, means that business planning is a 
dynamic process of matching resources to projects over time whilst ensuring a positive cash flow. Green et al, 
(2008) concluded that the ‘dynamic capabilities’ employed by construction companies means that strategic decision-
making is a dynamic process. The theory of dynamic capabilities views organizations as set of interdependent 
routines, which are flexible in order to respond to changing circumstances in accordance with feedback (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Green et al (2008) use Teece et al.’s (1997) framework of dynamic capabilities to argue that 
flexibility, through learning and transformation, is key to success in construction companies. In this light, better 
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collaboration in the supply chain through BIM needs to consider the current reality of the construction sector 
because that brings dynamic, flexible practices.  
 
The use of BIM in construction projects has been discussed by many researchers (Eastman et al., 2011) (Mihindu 
and Arayici, 2008) however, there is a scarcity of reports into supply chain and BIM in research literature 
(Khosrowshahi and Arayici, 2012). This motivated Willmott Dixon, a national UK main contractor, to collaborate 
with Open BIM Network and Birmingham City University in a survey to find out their subcontractors’ views on the 
adoption of BIM. Construction involves supply chains that converge on the construction site. Main contractors in 
tier 1 of the supply chain therefore play a key role in integrating tier 2 of the supply chain in a project and in 
promoting the use of BIM by tier 2 subcontractors.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The views of the supply chain members’ on their adoption and use of BIM were collected by an online survey. The 
survey questionnaire was designed through a review of literature on BIM, discussions with the main contractor’s 
central BIM implementation team and the Open BIM Network, and by internal discussions of academics with 
special interest in BIM in Birmingham City University. The survey was aimed at the tier 2 supply chain members of 
the main contractor. The second tier supply chain firms comprised of three different company types who are 
suppliers to the main contractor: supply and fix specialist contractors, manufacturers and design consultants 
(architects and engineer designers). 
 
The survey went out to a total 305 directors of these companies. 177 respondents returned the completed survey, a 
response rate of 58%. The extracted survey findings are based on these 177 responses.  The survey questionnaire 
was divided into four sections: (i) benefits of adopting BIM (ii) barriers to adopting BIM (iii) readiness for adopting 
BIM (iv) priorities for support in adopting BIM. The survey also included questions on company type and size to 
allow for analysis. The nature of the sample is presented in Figures 1 and 2, and findings from the survey are 
explained below. Only descriptive statistics were used in the analysis. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that 48% of respondents were sub-contractors with design input, 23% were design consultants, 
16% were sub-contractors without design input and 13% were ‘other’. All companies who described themselves as 
‘other’ were manufacturers. This means that subcontractors who have design input dominate the survey.  
 
Figure 1: Responses by Company Type 
 
Figure 2 shows that less than 5% of respondents were involved in companies of less than 10 employees. Nearly half, 
were involved in companies with between 10 and 50 employees, a third, 33%, were involved in companies with 
between 50 and 250 employees. This profile broadly reflects this highly fragmented structure of the UK construction 
sector, with its concentration of small firms (DTI, 2012). According to the Small Business Survey of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (i.e. companies with between 1 and 250 employees) construction sector companies 
tend to have fewer employees than other sectors and account for 12% of SMEs in the UK. The profile of 
respondents in this survey therefore broadly reflects the UK construction industry as a whole. 
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Figure 2: Responses by Company Size by Number of Employees 
 
 
Results 
 
Company Awareness and Levels of Collaboration in BIM 
 
The survey asked respondents how they would describe their awareness of BIM. Figure 3 shows that a third of 
companies had already implemented BIM on projects and 38%, said their company had an early awareness of BIM. 
The remainder fell between these two extremes. Further analysis showed that early adoption of BIM varied 
significantly between company types, with design consultants nearly twice as likely to have already used BIM on 
projects, than sub-contractors with design input or manufacturers.  No subcontractors without design input had 
already used BIM on projects. Company size influenced BIM awareness to a much lesser degree than company type. 
These survey findings reflect the early adoption of BIM amongst design consultants within the UK construction 
industry as a whole as BIM is step change in design information, replacing 2D drawings with data rich models 
(Eastman, Teicholz et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 3: Companies awareness of BIM to date 
 
Responses to questions about the level to which respondents had used BIM on projects (Figure 4) showed that a 
quarter of respondents had used BIM in collaboration to level 2 maturity.  13% had used BIM internally, 7% were 
identifying projects on which to implement BIM and 44% were not currently using BIM. Further analysis showed 
that level of adoption of BIM was less dependent on company size than early adoption; however company type was 
again a significant determining factor. Design consultants were five times more likely to have adopted BIM in 
collaboration to government level 2 than sub-contractors with design input and over seven times more likely than 
manufacturers. No subcontractors without design input had already used BIM in collaboration to government level 2 
on projects. This late adoption of BIM by subcontractors with design input potentially presents a problem as 
Government requires all public projects to be delivered to level 2 (supplying design information across the whole 
supply chain)  by 2016 (BIS, 2011).  These results have significant implications for those second tier supply chain 
companies with design input. 
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Figure 4: Companies use of BIM to date 
 
Benefits and barriers in adopting BIM 
 
Figure 5 shows that a clear consensus emerged amongst respondents about the issues that can potentially be 
overcome by the adoption of BIM in the supply chain. Respondents selected BIM’s potential to (a) improve design 
coordination, (b) reduce risk through identifying potential problems early on, and (c) facilitate better communication 
of project data, as the main benefits of BIM, based on the weighting identified through the number of selections 
checked (but not weighted) by respondents. These priorities all concur with the aim of BIM in its widest and most 
ambitious sense, to enhance information sharing and collaboration across multiple firms in construction projects 
(Succar, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5: Companies’ views on the benefits of adopting BIM 
 
Whilst respondents priorities on the benefits of adopting BIM show a desire for greater collaboration through BIM, 
it is see in Figure 6 that the primary barriers to adopting BIM in their business centered on (a) vulnerability to the 
weakest link (where poor performance by one of the subcontractors becomes a limiting force in a set of supply chain 
relationships) (b) set up costs and (c) cultural change, based on the weighting identified by the number of selections 
by the respondents.  These identified barriers show that the respondents have a desire for construction supply chains 
to emulate the secure, long-term supply chains of other industries, that are conducive to investment for innovation 
and show high levels of trust that make them open to cultural change. 
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Figure 6: Companies’ Views on the Barriers to Adopting BIM 
 
Companies’ priorities for support 
 
Finally, the survey explored respondents’ priorities for the type of support they would most welcome from the main 
contractor to help them in adopting BIM on projects. Figure 7 shows the order of supply chain members’ priorities 
for support. It can be seen that commitment to a secure supply chain topped the list of priorities. This concurs with 
the finding on the barriers to adopting BIM, and shows that the respondents have a desire for construction to emulate 
other industries with secure, long-term supply chains. This concurs with literature on SCM that argues that 
collaboration is difficult to implement in construction because the industry is fragmented. Clear consistent protocols 
and BIM guidelines for the supply chain were second and third priorities in the list. This shows that supply chain 
members cannot wait for the construction industry to emulate other industries with secure, long term supply chains 
and are already grappling with the process changes involved in BIM within the construction industry’s fragmented 
environment.  
 
Figure 7: Priorities for Support from the Main Contractor 
 
 
Discussion 
 
It is promising that, in an industry that is traditionally locked in the mindset of competition between supply chain 
members, respondents views on the benefits of adopting BIM show the desire to achieve efficiencies through greater 
collaboration facilitated by BIM. However, the low levels of trust in the construction industry present challenges to 
achieving this. The findings show that the issue of trust is central to subcontractors’ views on both the barriers to 
adopting BIM and the main priorities for support from the main contractor. Both point to a desire for collaboration 
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to be achieved by consolidating the structure of supply chain networks. There is a desire for strategic change in the 
main contractor’s supply chain management from the current short-term supply chain arrangements, in which firms 
seek access to the supply chain on a project-by-project basis, to longer term arrangements. Subcontractors can thus 
be said to desire the type of stable, long-term supply chains present in other industries that share efficiency gains and 
provide a workplace culture of trust. But this may be unrealistic. 
 
The literature on SCM shows that to date ‘new ways of working’ through SCM initiatives that have taken an 
operational perspective overwhelmingly outweigh strategic initiatives that result in longer-term supply chain 
arrangements. This leads to a question about the realism of the subcontractors’ desire for the supply chains in the 
construction industry to emulate other industries to any significant degree. The literature on ‘dynamic capabilities’ 
that points to the positive characteristics that construction companies possess as a result of the fragmented, short 
term, project based nature of the industry, identifies the problem of the degree of change in operation necessary for 
the construction supply chain to emulate other industries’ supply chain practices. There is therefore a conflict 
between the aspirations of the supply chain and the reality of the construction industry. This needs to be resolved 
before the advantages of BIM can spread down the supply chain. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the survey has provided insight into the understanding by sub-contractors that the development of 
collaborative working is an imperative, nonetheless an imperative that cannot be seen irrespective of context. BIM is 
new and rapidly developing and has the potential to deliver great benefits, but doing so requires a consideration of 
current ways of working which itself requires a consideration of the climate of the UK construction industry. As 
BIM develops it needs to accommodate these dynamic capabilities, or the industry needs to consolidate its supply 
chains. If the rhetoric of collaboration is imposed on the supply chain members without reference to the nature of the 
industry, it will struggle to deliver its potential benefits for the supply chain. 
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ARE CONTRACTORS’ COST ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICES UP TO THE JOB OF ESTABLISHING 
IMPROVEMENT IN SITE OPERATIONS? 
Abigail Robson1, David Boyd and Niraj Thurairajah 
Birmingham School of the Built Environment, Birmingham City University, Birmingham B4 7XG, UK 
Construction industry clients and regulators repeatedly call for the industry to reduce 
the cost of construction projects. Real cost reduction requires improvement in site 
operations. However, much of the industry expends effort in merely buying more 
cheaply. If a main contractor is looking to a subcontractor to undertake improvement 
for the sake of the supply chain, they need to be able to assess this and motivate it by 
a payment process that passes on the reward. Research is described that explores 
whether current costing methods could account for improvements in work processes. 
It considers cost as information and explores how contractors derive and use it. A case 
study of a major main contractor and two subcontractors is described that involved 
semi-structured interviews and document reviews. The results show that firms 
recognised that the costing practices they were using had unintended negative 
strategic and operational consequences. The research concludes that information 
about cost, that would be useful in a programme that seeks to improve site operations, 
is hidden in layers of commercial assumptions and lost when it does not cross the 
boundaries between organisations. A key finding is that automation of current cost 
management methods in BIM will not improve construction site operations. It will 
only produce more convoluted details that do not reflect what people actually do. 
Keywords: building information modelling, contractor, cost accounting, 
improvement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The role that cost information plays in a construction project is a central one. 
Construction is always being challenged on cost by government who, through its 
client and regulatory role, has continually pressed the industry to reduce the costs of 
projects (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2014; Egan 1998). The 
catalyst for cost reduction most recently proposed is the adoption of Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2013).  
Through BIM the cost of collection, storage and manipulation of information is 
reducing dramatically and consequently it should be easy to access integrated 
information that can be used to change the industry. 
It is BIM’s ability to automate the creation of information and communicate it 
efficiently through a central hub that drives the construction industry’s interest in 
developing cost information in BIM. Academic and industry research and software 
development in the area of cost BIM has, to date, focused on BIM’s ability to 
automate current estimating and tendering practices. Montierio (2013) showed that the 
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most well developed software uses knowledge-based systems to extract dimensions 
from Computer Aided Design (CAD) models. Meanwhile, current software for 
Computer Aided Estimating (CAE) uses library-based systems to manipulate 
historical cost data to create project related data. It is now timely to explore cost as 
information to establish its meaningfulness prior to the move to more integrated 
decision making via knowledge-based CAE decision support systems in BIM.  
This paper therefore explores cost as information and asks what sorts of cost 
information contractors currently hold? To understand this, the research explored 
estimating and tendering practices and narratives in a national UK main contractor and 
two subcontractors from their supply chain. The study analysed the derivations and 
uses of cost information by different people. The exploration of contractor and 
subcontractor cost information in this pilot study is part of a wider project to make 
cost information more relevant to site operation decisions through the use of BIM. 
Results suggest that current approaches to contractor costing struggle to provide 
information that is meaningful for establishing how site operations influence 
construction costs and hence how site operations can be improved.  It is suggested that 
further work is needed, to look at how different costing processes from manufacturing 
could be applied with benefit in construction. 
LITERATURE 
The challenge of pricing one-off projects in construction has led to industry and 
country specific standard practices for project estimating and tendering (Kirkham, 
2007). Regardless of the type of procurement route (such as competitive tendering, 
negotiation, two–stage tendering) or contract (such as lump sum, measure and value, 
or cost reimbursement) and regardless of the final format of the price information 
(formal bills of quantities, informal bills of quantities, schedules of rates, or lump 
sums), contractors and subcontractors all have the task of creating a project cost from 
three distinct types of information, namely, estimates of the cost of their own 
resources, quotations for work from subcontractors and the overarching strategic 
tendering decisions. 
Greenhalgh, (2013) explains that cost estimates for work directly carried out by a 
contractor are often built up from ‘first principles’; that is from the activities that 
consume internal resources of labour, materials and plant. The internal resource costs 
are allocated to either site overheads (preliminaries) or measured items. The estimator 
uses a combination of calculation and judgement to create the unit costs of measured 
items. For example, the ‘measured item’ of a brick wall has a quantity and a 
specification that both influence the resources required. The materials required are 
calculated by a simple mathematical relationship.  The labour and plant required 
depends on judgements to optimise labour and plant productivity rates and minimise 
material waste. Greenhalgh (2013) argues that how a contractor makes best use of 
their internal resources is the main competitive differential between competing 
contractors. Ross and Williams (2013) identify that it is unlikely that this information 
on how a subcontractor makes best use of their internal resources will pass up the 
supply chain. Hence a contractor will not have a detailed understanding of their 
subcontractors’ estimating processes and the decisions involved. 
The second type of information used in costing is quotations from subcontractors. 
Fryer et al., (2004) explain that subcontractor quotes make up the majority of a main 
contractor’s costs as a main contractor typically subcontracts over 80% of their work. 
Ross and Williams (2013) argue that this change in the industry means the 
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contractor’s skill in managing the subcontractor input into estimates is now a 
significant competitive differential between competing contractors. The process of 
managing the subcontractor needs unpacking. For instance Ross and Williams (2013) 
throw light on the usually hidden practice of price discounting. They describe the 
discounting ‘spiral’ in which the originally benign practice of expecting ‘trade’ 
discounts from subcontractors escalates in a project to the dis-benefit of 
subcontractors. In contrast to Greenhalgh’s (2013) assertion that contractors main 
competitive advantage lies in how they make best use of their internal resources, 
Zimina et al. (2012) contend that the skill in commercial purchasing is a primary 
contributor to project profit. 
The third type of information used in costing is the overarching strategic tendering 
decisions that convert an estimate into a tender. Greenhalgh (2013) shows that 
contractors make judgments about allowances for design and other risk contingencies, 
and the required margin to recover company overheads and earn a profit. This type of 
information relies heavily on an understanding of project uncertainties and market 
conditions. Ross and Williams (2013) point out that many contractors are guarded 
when it comes to conversations about margins. Others have shown how discussions 
about margins are clouded by decisions made through self-interest and opportunism. 
For example, Cattell (2012) identifies that firms may adopt weighting strategies to 
manipulate cashflow in their favour and Rooke et al. (2004) show there is a culture of 
planning for claims.  
Two alternative procurement methods seeking to reward cost savings have been 
recently applied in UK contracting. The first is ‘supply chain cost management’ 
(Constructing Excellence, 2004), which is used in conjunction with early involvement 
in design, and seeks design savings by rewarding contractors and key subcontractors 
with a guaranteed total margin upfront. It achieves this by decoupling margin from 
each unit item in the cost model so that design savings can be made without eroding 
margin. Another alternative method is ‘target costing’ (NEDO, 1982), used when 
building to budget. This again requires early involvement in design, and seeks 
efficiency savings by rewarding contractors and key subcontractors with a pain/gain 
share. It achieves this by using a ‘cost plus incentive fee’ method that uses open book 
accounting to establish cost and shares the difference between target cost and actual 
cost. These alternatives are re-presentations of current project costing practices for 
budgeting and control, not new, analytical costing practices.  
Construction project costing practices exist alongside costing practices in other 
industries, within the broader field of management accounting. Management 
accounting emerged to facilitate financial budgeting and control and broadened over 
time to encompass analytical measurement and evaluation of financial performance 
(Chapman et al., 2007)). The main approach in this shift has been the theoretically 
based model of transaction cost economics (TCE), which has sought to compensate 
for flaws in the market-orientated view of perfect competition by focusing on how 
organisations can avoid dependence and deal with opportunism (Williamson, 1985).  
In manufacturing and retail sectors, new analytical tools for costing that reflect 
transactions in supply chains emerged alongside TCE during the 1990s. LaLonde and 
Pohlen (1996) compared the main four tools that account for the cost of transactions in 
supply chains. Activity based costing (ABC) (Kaplan and Cooper, 1988) as a method 
of assigning accurate costs to products or services based on the resources they 
consume. Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) (Carr and Christopher, 1992) that looks at 
Robson, Boyd and Thurairajah 
826 
 
the total costs between two neighbouring firms in a supply chain. Direct Product 
Profitability (DPP) (Kurt Salmon Associates, 1993) that considers the logistics of 
moving items between supply chain firms. And Efficient Customer Response (ECR) 
(Weeks and Crawford, 1994) that focuses on reducing whole supply chain costs 
through a better transfer of information, automating administration processes and 
unifying replenishment cycles. LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) argue that a hybrid of 
these techniques offers a new costing system that reflects supply chain relationships. 
Despite the shift in cost accounting in the manufacturing and retail sectors and the 
pressure to embrace learning from other sectors such as aerospace (Green et al., 2005) 
and automotive (Egan, 1998), project cost accounting in construction has remained 
largely within the realm of budgeting and control with few exceptions. Staub-French 
et al. (2003) applied ABC to account more explicitly for the cost of design features in 
construction projects. They created a prototype tool using the methodology of activity 
based costing to help estimators customise early stage construction cost information 
based on design features. O’Brien and Fisher (2000) applied ABC to calculate the 
capacity costs in the construction supply chain.  
The literature shows that construction is embedded in its own costing practice and that 
this is challenged for accuracy, but not for efficacy. It keeps on doing the job it has 
always done because the industry works around the inadequacies. What is needed is a 
closer study of the thinking behind these construction cost practices so that their 
success in developing efficacy in decision making can be evaluated. The potential for 
different approaches to costing needs also to be assessed on this basis.  
METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
The research is grounded in the interpretivist tradition. It explores the narrative around 
actions and decisions in order to know what organisations and individuals do and why 
they act as they do (Walliam, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The research adopts 
a position of 'cost as information' then sought to challenge the basis and practicalities 
of this by treating it as merely a representation of purchasing possibilities and 
resources. Cost information is made problematic when it is given wider meaning by 
people and becomes a fixed reference point in construction projects. This research did 
not therefore start from the hard propositional knowledge of current practices, but 
rather looked at where cost information is derived from and how it is used, seeking to 
better understand what cost information means to different people. The research did 
use some hard propositional knowledge from costing documents and reports but 
explored this from an experiential and performative perspective. The overall objective 
was to explain current approaches to costing and explore the potential for making 
better decisions.  
The research involved collaboration with a UK national contractor. This allowed 
access to data in a case study approach to their costing practices with a view to 
establishing what was needed for them to apply BIM successfully. This also involved 
two subcontractors, a mechanical and electrical subcontractor and a suspended ceiling, 
partitions and dry-lining subcontractor, who entered into the research willingly, as 
they saw opportunities for better payment. The conflicts of interest and ethical 
decisions that the study involves have been managed with care so as to be sensitive to 
their position and gain full access to the reality of their situation. The study was 
undertaken using interrupted involvement to follow decisions and their consequences 
at intervals through projects. The research adopted an inductive approach to provide 
description, understanding and explanation of the sources and uses of cost information 
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in estimating and tendering. The study also used documentary evidence of cost 
processes and written cost reports as well as narratives from semi-structured 
interviews with key participants from pre-construction and site operation teams to 
establish how they source and use cost information. In the middle of the study a 
reflective group discussion took place with key participants from the main contractor. 
To maintain confidentiality, the study used a different project for each organisation. 
However each project involved a similarly large, complex, one-off construction in 
which the contractor did not control the design phase. Interviews established that the 
same project costing processes and written cost reports were used on all projects. In 
general what people do is similar on all projects.  
COSTING PRACTICE DATA 
The empirical research aimed to establish whether the cost information collected by 
main and subcontractors during estimating and tendering was useful for promoting 
and accounting for improvements in site operations.  The investigation sought to 
determine the reasoning behind the derivation and use of cost information and, 
importantly, what information was not created. 
Based on the documents and narratives provided by the participants it was seen that, 
once a contractor or subcontractor had decided to submit a tender, their estimating, 
planning and buying functions face the task of building up project costs from a 
number of constituent parts while their commercial function faces the task of 
synthesising the information into a tender.  It was seen that because subcontractors 
themselves subcontract work, there is no distinction between main contractor (MC) 
and subcontractor (SC1 and SC2) in terms of their costing process. In order to 
describe, understand and explain the costing processes and compare this with the 
literature, the investigation was structured around the same three distinct types of 
information categories as established in the literature review: estimates of the use of 
internal resources, quotations for work from subcontractors and overarching strategic 
tendering decisions. 
Estimates of use of resources 
An estimator creates ‘first principle cost information’ to forecast the price to pass on 
for work that will be carried out using their company’s internal resources. They check, 
and hence improve, information received on quantities and specifications for 
‘measured items’ then customise these for work that is under or over measured, or 
under or over specified. They create good information on their company’s costs for 
directly employed labour using annually updated company information on salaries that 
are based on national wage agreements and salary on-costs. They also create good 
information on their company’s costs for materials and plant, using regularly updated 
schedules of negotiated prices from suppliers. They then forecast the activities, 
resources and resource productivity rates for measured items. Company standard 
calculations that are derived from previous project experience are created. However 
the study found that the ‘accuracy’ of this information in representing site operations 
is made opaque by commercial practices. 
“There are industry standard resource and productivity rates for activities but we 
create our own. We reviewed our labour productivity four years ago with our site 
operatives. We identified efficiencies, but then we didn’t change our productivity rates 
because we were in a rising market and all costs were going up” SC1 
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“We have a standard productivity rate for our labour-only subcontractor who are 
required to work to a price. In a market upturn we have to use less productive labour 
but they take the hit” SC2 
Quotations for work from subcontractors 
For the main contractor, as much of 80% of the price passed on to the client comes 
from prices received from subcontractors. For a tier 1 subcontractor in one of the 
major trades, this can also be as much as 60% to 70%. The estimating and purchasing 
teams obtain and compare bids on the basis of price and technical issues and select a 
subcontract price to use in their tender. The selected subcontract price comes with a 
stipulated level of ‘standard trading discount’ that recognises trade business. The 
estimator creates a new figure by assuming a level of ‘additional trading discount’ on 
top of the standard. The risk is taken that the ‘additional trading discount’, or more, 
will be realised in further negotiations if and when the site operations team later place 
an order with subcontractor who’s price has been selected at this stage.  
 “Quite often it's pre-discounted so already the client has had the benefit. The person 
carrying the risk [that the additional discount will be realised when an order is placed 
for the subcontract] is us.” MC 
“Sub-contractors never give the best price first. We pre-discount our price when we 
put our price in. So we take a discount off their prices so you add all these subbie 
costs. We'll pre-discount ours before we sell it.” SC1 
Overarching strategic tendering decisions 
An analysis of estimated direct costs and subcontract prices is passed from the 
estimating and purchasing teams to an adjudicating group, who review the information 
and establish the project mark up. The ‘mark up’ is made up of judgements on (i) 
anticipated cost of ‘design contingencies’ for uncertainty and level of risk and (ii) a 
‘margin’ to recover general, non project specific, overheads and a level of profit 
expected to be earned from the project.  
“We've had some vigorous debates about what the correct level of risk contingency 
should be on those jobs. We’ve had similar debates on every single job and it's the 
most subjective point that you could take.” MC  
This establishes information on the total cost and is passed on as the going rate. The 
going rate is used as a target to budget and control costs within cost envelopes. 
“We apply risk costs, OH&P as agreed in settlement meeting with directors and this 
form becomes the financial record of our tender. If successful this passes to the 
project delivery team and particularly procurement as a record of decisions made at 
tender stage to come to our offer” SC1 
When the price is presented in a standardised format, such as a bill of quantities or 
schedule of rates, the contractor decides a gross price to put against each cost item in 
the model. The gross price is made up from the net price of measured items plus a 
share of the ‘mark up’. Both the net and gross prices can be manipulated across cost 
items in the model.  
“We like to have overvalue in our orders. So we get paid more than we pay out every 
month and that generates a surplus for our business.” MC 
Interviews established that participants recognised that the cost information that is 
created and the price information that is passed on throughout the supply chain has 
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many forces acting on it from operational and strategic decisions made throughout the 
supply chain. Participants saw project costing as a process that results in firms in the 
supply chain winning and losing on projects at each other’s expense. 
“There's two layers. Some people might take a few bob off to win a job but the figure 
they take that from is a figure which people have already made assumptions on.” MC 
“Some contractors will make double the margin they expected to make and other 
contractors that'll make half the margin they expect to make. You can guarantee only 
one of them is going to bang your door.” MC 
Participants understood that the project cost information created is obscured by layers 
of commercial decisions that remove cost information from a good representation of 
work processes, site activities and the resources that are consumed by those activities. 
They also recognised that as a buyer, their line of visibility into their subcontractors’ 
cost information is shallow.  
DISCUSSION 
This research sought to understand the problem of costing in a way that allows the 
industry to move on and account for improvements in work processes rather than rely 
on gains obtained through commercial buying practices and opportunism. Discussion 
on costing in the UK construction industry focuses a lot on reaffirming established 
methods currently used by practitioners and so, (with exception of Zimina et al. 
(2012) and Ross and Williams (2013)), does not ask important questions of efficacy 
for assessing work processes across the supply chain. This questioning needs to go 
beyond the concept of improving productivity (e.g. Sezer and Bröchner, 2013). As 
participants in this case study revealed, in their explanation of ‘working to a price’, the 
concept of productivity has the connotation of how much labour you can get out of 
someone. This privileges self-interest over improving wider processes.  
If a contractor is looking to a subcontractor to undertake improvement for the sake of 
the supply chain, they need to be able to assess this and reflect it in their payment 
process (i.e. pass on the reward). Zimina et al. (2012) looked at target costing and 
concluded that UK commercial and cost management practices are a major barrier to 
rewarding efficiencies through a pain/gain sharing payment process. Ross and 
Williams (2013) look at supply chain cost management and conclude that lack of 
transparency is a major barrier to rewarding cost and waste reduction through a 
payment process that protects each company’s margin. This study supports the 
conclusions of Zimina et al. (2012) and Ross and Williams (2013) that it is very 
difficult for the construction industry to get good cost information that reflects the 
different work processes across the supply chain. Without such cost information, the 
industry can only enter into buying decisions on the assumption that what is being 
brought is already fixed. This does not achieve improvement. In a wider critique of 
improvement in the construction industry, Green (2011) demonstrates the fallacy of 
the argument that in a market where costs are driven down, subcontractors will be 
forced to innovate to survive. 
The problem of costing needs to be understood in a different way as current practice 
does not contain the information needed for achieving improvements. What is 
required then is for the construction industry to look more carefully at alternative 
accounting practices. Accounting practices that reflect transactions in supply chains 
may be useful as these were adopted by other industries through the 1990s in response 
to increased competition and alongside the emergence of TCE. The most developed of 
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the four main tools that account for the cost of transactions in supply chains, as 
compared by LaLonde and Pohlen (1996), was Activity Based Costing (ABC), which 
assigns accurate costs to products or services based on the resources they consume 
(Kaplan and Cooper, 1988). Tsai (1998) gave a framework for measuring costs under 
ABC in a two dimensional model adapted from Tsai (1998) as shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Two-dimensional model of ABC. Source: adapted from Tsai (1998)  
The first dimension, the resource assignment view, includes information on labour, 
plant and materials but does not contain information on work processes (other than in 
labour which only assumes a measure of productivity). Without information on work 
processes the resource assignment view does not represent improvement well. 
However the second dimension, the process view, adds information on method in the 
form of ‘cost drivers’ that explain why activities are performed and ‘performance 
measures’ that explain how well activities are performed. Information on cost drivers 
can quantify improvements in work processes and information on performance 
measures can be used to fairly reward those improvements.  
One barrier to accessing information on cost drivers and performance measures is the 
shift to larger supply chains in which both main contractors and subcontractors 
predominantly undertake to buying rather than making. Thus information is lost from 
the supply chain whenever information created about use of resources is missing as it 
is passed on as quotations for work. This is illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The flow of cost information through the supply chain. 
 
The problem of information loss is exacerbated by different people interpreting the 
cost information that flows through the supply chain differently. Each of these people 
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has a different use for the information and this dictates how the costs are interpreted. 
Most of the cost information in construction has been created for buying, payment and 
accounting purposes. So when it is used for other purposes it is inadequate. Because of 
this, getting even more of the current cost information, in no way improves the 
industry’s ability to arrive at decisions that improve processes, or reward better site 
practice. Even worse, current cost information actually discriminates against 
improvement by driving perverse incentives and creating unintended consequences 
following cost information being wrongly used or underused.  
BIM offers an immense amount of information that can be extracted from digital 
models into BIM based costing applications. Currently, digital costing applications are 
based on either simplistic object quantity take offs or the complexities of current 
approaches to quantity surveying. This sort of cost information does not adequately 
represent the reality of site operations; thus, automating this further or exploiting the 
greater level of detail of information offered by BIM cannot improve site operations 
as the cost information is at best constrained and at worst provides misleading 
information. To advance this situation, the construction industry needs to understand 
its costing processes better and to tie these more clearly to the purpose for which the 
costs are being used. In particular, the connection between site operations, the purpose 
for which costs are used, and the method of producing costs needs to be explored in 
much more detail to devise an alternative to current costing techniques. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research has produced unique knowledge about costing by a main contractor and 
subcontractors. It has established how current costing practices lose information about 
site operations and methods, as it is transferred during a tendering situation. At each 
transfer, participants want different information from the costs; however, the ability to 
do this is limited by the original purpose of the cost. Current cost information is 
produced for buying, payment and accounting purposes. Thus, using the current 
costing methods in BIM is not helpful for use for a different purpose, such as 
evaluating and rewarding improved site practices and supply chain operation. It could, 
in fact, make things worse by producing more convoluted details that appear accurate 
but are not linked to what people do. If the industry needs BIM to deliver information 
that is useful for improving site operations, then this requires understanding cost 
information better and using costing methods that are tied to that aim. It is only this 
that will provide real benefits from BIM in relation to cost and improvement.  
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Contractors throughout the construction supply chain develop and use cost information. By treating ‘cost as
information’, insights are generated into how cost information is created and flows from work carried out to a
client cost. A case study of a main contractor’s supply chain involved semi-structured interviews, workshops
and document reviews. We considered whether contractors’ current costing practices used for the purpose of
pricing and cost control could support decision-making about improvements through the supply chain. The
results show that firms recognize that current costing practices do not provide a good representation of work car-
ried out. Cost information that is useful in a narrative that seeks to improve site operations is either not created or
hidden in layers of assumptions and lost as it does not cross the boundaries between organizations. This implies
that the implementation of current practices of costing in building information modelling will not increase the
effectiveness of modelling construction costs for the purpose of improvements. However, cost information that
is useful in decision-making about improvements could be created. This could be achieved but requires a sys-
temic change, where new representations of cost are tied to work processes used within more stable procurement
relationships.
Keywords: Building information modelling, contractor, cost information.
Introduction
The authority of costs appears everywhere in everyday
life and cost information plays a central role in con-
struction projects. The industry is challenged to inno-
vate and reduce costs around the globe (Best and
Meikle, 2015) and the digital representation and
exchange of building information through building
information modelling (BIM) is advocated across the
world as an enabling technology to meet this aim
(Eastman et al., 2008). In the UK, the Cabinet Office
(2011) called for a reduction of construction costs by
20% and the Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills (2014) additionally called for a reduction in con-
struction times and whole life costs. Both reports pro-
pose the uptake of BIM to enable change to meet
their cost reduction targets. A review of international
guidelines on the definition and expected outcomes of
BIM undertaken by Succar (2009) included the poten-
tial for the adoption of BIM to reduce construction
costs. Succar (2009) suggested that through BIM the
cost of collection, storage and manipulation of informa-
tion is reducing dramatically and consequently it
should be easy to exchange integrated information that
can be used to change the industry. However, a better
understanding is needed of the type and purpose of
contractors’ cost information in current use in the
UK and an assessment of its relevance for use in more
integrated decision-making that will be possible in BIM
to support change.
In this empirical study, the perspective of ‘cost as
information’ is taken to seek to uncover the types of
information that are behind the ‘representations of
costs’ used in everyday practice. The findings reflect
on the methods of calculation and the interpretations
people put on the everyday representations of cost, in
order to describe the actual praxis of cost reporting.
The findings are then analysed to ask whether the rep-
resentations of cost in everyday use by contractors and
subcontractors are suitable to evaluate and reward
improvements in subcontracting organization and prac-
tice? In seeking to understand the meaningfulness of
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: abigail.robson@mail.bcu.ac.uk
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cost information against its uses, the findings from cur-
rent practice are analysed using the terms of Dean
(1993) who, working in the aerospace and space indus-
try at NASA and looking into firms’ ability to compete
in emerging world markets, describes the ‘variables
behind cost information’ and the ‘types of information
the cost of those variables are derived from’ and ‘the
judgements people make’ as cost information flows
through their supply chain. Interviews, workshops and
document reviews explore contractors’ estimating, ten-
dering and post-contract cost control practices and nar-
ratives in a case study of a supply chain involving a
national UK main building contractor and five subcon-
tractors from across three tiers of the supply chain. The
findings suggest that cost information that flows up the
supply chain consists of accepted representations of
cost for the purposes of establishing market price, pay-
ment and budgeting. But potentially valuable cost
information that is tied to the physical work carried
out and useful for the purpose of evaluating and
rewarding improvements in subcontracting organiza-
tion and practice is either not created, or obscured
and lost as cost information passes between organiza-
tions in the supply chain. Developments in manage-
ment accounting show that this is not just a problem
in construction, but in all industries (Chapman et al.,
2007). It will be shown that understanding how con-
tractors derive and use ‘cost as information’ is key to
developing cost information in BIM to support
improvements across the supply chain. The study dis-
cusses the need to look at other practices of costing,
e.g. from manufacturing, that have potential to be
applied in construction in order to uncover cost infor-
mation that is tied to physical work. In addition, the
study explores how the complex nature of costing and
procurement practices makes improvements difficult.
Cost as information
Cost models in construction
Cost is one type of information used in the construction
industry. The costing practices that produce this infor-
mation differ around the world; however, construction
everywhere is criticized for its high cost and low pre-
dictability (Best and Meikle, 2015). The practices used
by contractors to establish price and to control costs in
construction projects fall within the general sphere of
management accounting. Johnson and Kaplan (1987)
in their seminal management accounting textbook
in the US, drew attention to the shortcomings of
management accounting arguing that it had become
disinterested in direct measures of activities in the firm,
relying instead on what they call ‘surrogate’ financial
numbers, and thus reducing the instrumental value of
cost information in providing management with a tool
to better manage a business. This problem of ‘surro-
gate’ financial numbers, where there is a gap between
the representation of cost and its meaning for activities,
has been little addressed in construction research, even
in the UK and its many Commonwealth countries that
share a detailed and specialized costing process.
Formal costing models proposed by researchers for
UK contractors’ estimating, tendering and post-
contract cost control practices reside substantially in
quantity surveying textbooks. In the sphere of estimat-
ing and tendering, these textbooks (Kirkham, 2007;
Towey, 2012; Greenhalgh, 2013) draw on the Char-
tered Institute of Building’s (2009) code of estimating
practice. All the texts identify the same cost model with
three categories of cost as described by Kirkham
(2007): estimates of the use of their own resources,
quotations for work from subcontractors and overarch-
ing strategic tendering decisions. Kirkham (2007) con-
tends that regardless of the project delivery method
main contractors and subcontractors have the same
task of building up a tender price from these three dis-
tinct categories of cost information.
Even as these formal cost models proposed in text-
books work on the detail, the gap between the represen-
tations of cost created and their meaning for practice is
not acknowledged. For example, Greenhalgh (2013)
analyses the three categories of cost in the model. Firstly
in terms of a firm’s estimates of the use of their own
resources: he explains that cost estimates for work
directly carried out by a contracting firm can be built
up from ‘first principles’; that is from the activities that
consume internal resources of labour, materials and
plant. These internal resource costs can be allocated to
either site overheads (in preliminaries) or ‘end items’
(in unit costs). He explains that an ‘end item’, such as
a brick wall, has a measured quantity and specification
that influences the resources required. The materials
required can be calculated by a simple mathematical
relationship that includes allowances for material waste.
The labour and plant required can be based on standard-
ized rates for labour and plant productivity that are either
captured in awork study or published in price books, and
the estimator’s expert judgement to adjust these for pro-
ject factors. He argues that how contractors make best
use of their internal resources is themain competitive dif-
ferential between competing contractors.
The second type of cost information in the model
described by Greenhalgh (2013) is quotations for pack-
ages of work obtained from subcontractors in competi-
tion. Here, the calculation and interpretation of the use
of labour, material, plant in activities and the appor-
tionment of risk contingencies, overheads and profit
are usually all hidden from the receiving buyer who
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can only compare subcontractor quotations, negotiate
and include the most favourable quotation on the basis
of either lowest price or best value. In other words, the
cost information available is based on comparative
prices received.
Greenhalgh (2013) describes the third type of cost
information in the model: the overarching strategic ten-
dering decisions that convert an estimate into a tender.
He describes how contractors must make expert judge-
ments and best guesses about allowances for design and
other risk contingencies and about the required margin
to recover company overheads and earn a profit that the
market will bear. The allocation of company overheads
in the model is based on the use of internal resources
allocated to the project using a calculation based on
predicted company annual turnover. The allowance
for design and other risk contingencies in the model
is based on thinking about the degree of project uncer-
tainty. The allowance for profit in the model is based
on thinking about competition within the complex
and dynamic project market. In other words, with the
exception of company overheads, the costs in this cate-
gory are based on expert judgement and best guesses.
The models proposed by academic researchers have
sought to prescribe how project costs are built up to
bidding price. However, even as the models describe
the types of information that costs are derived from,
the meaning of this for practice is not clearly docu-
mented and the transition in thinking made by Johnson
and Kaplan (1987) towards a recognition that account-
ing uses ‘surrogate’ numbers rather than a direct mea-
sure of activities is not reflected.
Effects of commercial management on cost
models
Researchers who have documented contractors’ com-
mercial management practices see the world differently
and better recognize the problem of how the use of ‘sur-
rogate’ numbers, based on expert judgement, compara-
tive prices and best guesses, reduces the efficacy of cost
information for accounting for improvements. Brooke
(2008) documents his experience of how contractors’
standard estimating guidelines are used in practice and
argues that ‘sometimes contractors have difficulty find-
ing time to apply “first principle” costing to tenders’.
Ross and Williams (2013), draw on their experience
and past research on commercial accounting in con-
struction firms, to look at the flow of cost information
up the supply chain from the firm that will do the
physical work. They identify that it is unlikely that
‘first-principle’ cost information that shows how sub-
contractors make best use of their internal resources will
pass up the supply chain, so contractors may not have a
detailed understanding of their subcontractors’ costing
basis and decision-making. They also point out that as
cost information flows up the supply chain many con-
tractors are guarded when it comes to conversations
about risk and margins so information on assumptions
about contingencies, overheads and profit may be
obscured in the allocation of costs in a cost model.
Others have shown that as information flows up the
supply chain, information about use of resources may
be obscured when the allocation of costs is treated as
an opportunity to manage risk or maximize income or
cash flow. For example, Laryea and Hughes (2011) in
research into the actual process of how contractors
price risk, show that different individuals and teams
might influence pricing levels at different stages of
bid. This may obscure information about the use of
resources. Kenley (2003) and Cattell (2012) in empir-
ical studies found that many contractors implement
tactical pricing using weighting strategies to manipulate
cash flow in their favour. Rooke et al. (2004), in an
ethnographic study of contractors across seven con-
struction projects, found a culture of planning for
claims. In extreme instances, illegal practices may be
used to distort cost models; such as ‘bid shopping’ in
which the lowest price is disclosed to competitors
who are invited to beat it (Vee and Skitmore, 2003)
or overpricing, also known as ‘cover pricing’, an
extreme instance of which is collusion (Lowe and
Skitmore, 2006). These examples show how cost infor-
mation that is tied to activities may be lost when it is
obscured before it is passed across the boundaries
between organizations.
The increase in the extent of subcontracting
increases information loss across the boundaries
between organizations. In a review of specialist trade
contracting Hughes et al. (1997) explain that main
contractors’ general reduction in directly employed
workforce and general increase in the level of subcon-
tracting has been driven by technological, political,
social and economic change since the 1970s. In a
review of the construction industry structure from gov-
ernment statistics, Abdel-Razek and McCaffer (1987)
suggest that success in obtaining tighter and tighter
quotations from subcontractors during the recession
of the early 1980s is amongst these factors contributing
to the increase in the extent of subcontracting. Fryer
et al. (2004) found that subcontractor quotes made
up the majority of a main contractor’s costs with main
contractors typically subcontracting over 80% of their
work. Ross and Williams (2013) argue that this funda-
mental change in the industry’s structure means that
the contractor’s skill in negotiating quotations with
subcontractors is now ‘a significant competitive differ-
ential between competing contractors’. However,
Hughes et al. (2006) suggest that the imperfect market,
420 Robson et al.
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in which main contractors negotiate within a limited
pool of subcontractors, acts as a limit to the competitive
differential between main contractors. This, and the
work of Ross and Williams (2013), contrasts with
Greenhalgh’s (2013) assertion that ‘contractors main
competitive advantage lies in how they make best use
of their internal resources’. However, the increased
use of subcontracting acts as a limit to this source of
competitive advantage.
Ross and Williams (2013) describe how once the
estimators have won a project the site team has the
job of post-contract cost control to build the project
within the budget they have been given. They describe
how the site team will often get new material and sub-
contractor prices and compare these to the budget.
This opportunistic, but standard, practice of undertak-
ing a secondary competitive process with subcontrac-
tors near the commencement of the works often
requires subcontractors to give an ‘additional’ trading
discount on top of the standard trading discount
offered in the first competitive process. As new prices
are obtained, the site team carries out regular reconcil-
iation of costs to completion against the budget
allowance in a ‘cost value reconciliation’. Ross and
Hugill (2006), in an empirical study that involved a
detailed examination of contractors’ post-contract cost
reporting processes in practice, found that the effective-
ness of modelling ‘true’ construction costs during the
post-contract stage is reduced due to ‘entanglement
of cost and price data’. They further argue that few
organizations have formalized systems for capturing
and analysing data from site to refresh standard ‘surro-
gate’ numbers in estimating.
Thus researchers who have documented contrac-
tors’ commercial management practices from empirical
studies about what contractors actually do have recog-
nized that representations of the costs of activities that
would help to prescribe improvements may not be cre-
ated due to lack of time, or may be obscured by strate-
gies to recover the cost of risks, maximize cash flow or
maximize income post contract.
Moves to costing that accounts for improvements
Within the debate on construction improvement there
is a move towards building financial incentives for
improvements into construction delivery models. Tar-
get costing became a widespread strategic management
tool in manufacturing (Ansari et al., 1997) and has been
adapted to construction through ‘target value design’
(TVD) (Zimina et al., 2012). This requires early
involvement in design, and seeks efficiency savings by
rewarding contractors and key subcontractors with a
financial pain/gain share. It achieves this using a ‘cost
plus incentive fee’ method that uses open book
accounting to establish cost and share the difference
between target cost and actual cost. Amongst the body
of research into target costing in construction (Ansari
et al., 2007; Ballard, 2011) there is a small strand of
empirical research into the application of target costing
from the contractors’ perspective. These empirical
studies from contractors’ viewpoints report significant
limitations. Nicolini et al. (2000), in a study of two
demonstration projects that used target costing and
allowed praxis to become available for analytical
description and critical account, conclude that UK
commercial and cost management practices are a major
barrier to rewarding efficiencies through a pain/gain
sharing payment process. Pennanen et al. (2011) looked
at TVD in theory and conclude that more transparency
of information is needed to gain commitment, but do
not address specifically the problem of cost information.
Zimina et al. (2012) looked at TVD in practice and con-
clude its application is limited by factors including the
cost information available for setting a target cost. Only
Nicolini et al. (2000) focus specifically on limitations
due to the type of cost information available.
A simpler way to build financial incentives into a
construction delivery model is the decoupling of profit
margins from savings in a lump sum contract through
supply chain cost management (Pryke, 2009). Used
in conjunction with early involvement in design, this
facilitates design savings by decoupling margin from
each unit cost in the cost model so that design savings
can be made without eroding margin. This would mean
that contractors and key subcontractors are guaranteed
a total margin upfront. Ross and Williams (2013) argue
that this alternative way to reduce costs directly
addresses the disincentive to make savings created by
the predominant business model adopted by contrac-
tors, to maximize cash flow. However, they conclude
that lack of transparency in UK costing practices is a
major barrier to rewarding cost and waste reduction
through a payment process that protects each com-
pany’s margin. Thus, studies of the use of cost informa-
tion in practice have shown that the improvement aims
of these two new delivery methods are compromized by
the representations of cost in current use that rely on
‘surrogate’ financial numbers.
Better information on costs is promoted as an end
point for developments in BIM. But this is a fallacy,
as it does not address the problem of ‘surrogate’ finan-
cial numbers. Literature on cost information in BIM,
such as Monteiro and Poc¸as Martins (2013), shows
that academic and industry research and software
development in costing applications in BIM have to
date focused on BIM’s ability to automate the current
practices in estimating, tendering and post-contract
cost control. Monteiro and Poc¸as Martins (2013) show
that software is most developed for automating the
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process of measuring quantities using rules-based
systems to extract dimensions from computer-aided
design models. Wu et al. (2014) show that computer-
aided estimating (CAE) software that uses rules-based
systems to manipulate historical cost data on unit costs
to create project related data, has been slower to
develop. Lawrence et al. (2014) argue that develop-
ment of CAE software that reproduces current repre-
sentations of cost and do not challenge the way that
cost information is interpreted will not lend itself well
to automation.
Researchers who have looked at the cost information
available to support the types of cost models proposed in
incentive contracts, have recognized the current repre-
sentations of cost may be inadequate for motivating
improvements. Thus, the use of current representations
of cost in BIM will not motivate improvements.
Alternative cost models from other industries
Addressing the accounting problem in other industries
researchers Chapman et al. (2007), explain in a man-
agement accounting textbook that the field of manage-
ment accounting emerged to facilitate financial
budgeting and control but broadened over time to
encompass new types of analytical cost reduction prac-
tices. The main source for these analytical costing prac-
tices has been Williamson’s (1981) analytical research
that produced a theoretical model of transaction cost
economics (TCE), which sought to compensate for
flaws in the market-oriented view of perfect competi-
tion by focusing on how organizations can avoid depen-
dence and deal with opportunism. TCE has been
criticized for sticking to the limited solutions of make
or buy, ignoring the possibility of intermediate solu-
tions based on relational contracts (Ghoshal and
Moran, 1996). Nevertheless, the new analytical tools
for costing that emerged in manufacturing and retail
sectors alongside TCE during the 1990s provide an
array of analytical tools that span different levels of
accounting, but nevertheless have the potential to
uncover some models for cost information that are tied
more closely to physical work as advocated by Johnson
and Kaplan (1987). LaLonde and Pohlen (1996) com-
pared four such models: (i) Kaplan and Cooper’s
(1988) activity-based costing (ABC) method of assign-
ing accurate costs to products or services based on the
resources they consume; (ii) Carr and Christopher’s
(1992) total cost of ownership method that looks at
the total costs between two neighbouring firms in a
supply chain; (iii) Kurt Salmon Associates’, (1993)
direct product profitability method that considers the
logistics of moving items between supply chain firms
and (iv) Weeks and Crawford’s (1994) efficient
customer response method that focuses on reducing
whole supply chain costs through a better transfer of
information, automating administration processes and
unifying replenishment cycles. LaLonde and Pohlen
(1996) argue that a hybrid of these tools offers a new
costing system that reflects the several different facets
of supply chain relationships that need to be accounted.
Of these analytical tools ABC has been most researched
and applied in practice as a means of providing costs
that are a good representation of work carried out.
Dean (1993) also took a similar position to Johnson
and Kaplan (1987) concluding that project cost infor-
mation has little relationship to the work carried out
and advocated ABC as a way of better representing
work carried out. However, he also described the
accounting ‘noise’ inherent in even the most detailed
ABC costing tools. He described the competent estima-
tor as someone who uses a combination of calculation
(data), standard rates (analogy) and judgement (expert
opinion) to create predicted costs. He identified the
variables that are included in a project cost that obscure
costs from a good representation of work such as the
cost basis of a firm’s resources, the buyer a firm will
buy from, the existence of trading discounts, the per-
sonal skills of negotiation, inflation and market condi-
tions and risk evaluation. Thus, alternative cost
models from other industries offer new analytical tools
but a realistic assessment is required of the representa-
tions of cost they provide.
Despite this shift in cost accounting in manufactur-
ing, retail and aerospace industries and the pressure for
the construction industry to embrace learning from
other sectors such as the automotive industry as advo-
cated by Egan (1998) and the aerospace industry as
advocated by Green et al. (2005), construction project
cost accounting literature has remained largely within
the realm of establishing representations of cost for
the purpose of pricing and budgeting. The few excep-
tions include O’Brien and Fischer (2000) who used a
practice-based case example and applied ABC to calcu-
late the capacity costs to account explicitly for the cost
of fixed expenses within firms in the construction sup-
ply chain. Also Staub-French et al. (2003), who carried
out a practice-based case study and applied ABC to
account more explicitly for the cost of design features
in construction projects based on the preferences esti-
mators had for when to adjust standard costs. This
aimed to help estimators customize early stage con-
struction cost information based on design features.
Lawrence et al. (2014) subsequently developed this
approach, enabling this in BIM. However, even with
major changes in delivery methods, e.g. early contrac-
tor involvement and relational contracts, and in tech-
nology, e.g. BIM, the industry is still largely locked
into its current practices of costing and the basis of this
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and its consequences needs investigating further in
order for it to benefit from the changes. Understanding
how contractors derive and use cost as information is
key to developing cost information in BIM for the pur-
pose of supporting decision-making on improvements
across the supply chain.
Method and methodology
Methodology
The research is grounded in the interpretivist tradition
and explores the narrative around cost and costing, in
order to know what organizations and individuals
do and why they act as they do (Walliman, 2006;
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The research uses the
concept of ‘cost as information’ to challenge the basis
and practicalities of costing practices. Cost, then, is
merely a representation of resources, purchasing possi-
bilities and risk, but this is made problematic when unit
costs are given meaning by people and become fixed
reference points in construction projects. This research
did not therefore start from propositional knowledge of
current practices, but rather looked at the variables
behind cost information, where that cost information
is derived from and how it is used, seeking to better
understand what cost information means to different
people. The research did use propositional knowledge
from costing documents and reports but explored this
from an experiential and performative perspective. This
allowed the study to explore narratives from the calcu-
lative world of costing. Its objective was to explain cur-
rent approaches to costing and explore the potential for
accounting for improvements. The research questions
addressed were: How does cost accounting currently
work in relation to work processes in the supply chain?;
How do subcontractor accounting processes facilitate
knowledge transfer, integration and management of
the supply chain?; and How can information infrastruc-
ture and platforms such as BIM more accurately repre-
sent net supply chain benefits through accounting?
Research method
To address these research questions this study used a
case study of a supply chain involving a UK main con-
tractor and two links of their supply chain. The main
contractor (tier 1) is a large, national organization
with an annual turnover of over £1 bn of which
around 70% is spent in a supply chain of around
3000 firms. The subcontractor (tier 2) in link A is a
large, national mechanical and electrical subcontractor
with an annual turnover of over £350 m of which
60–70% is spent in their supply chain. This subcon-
tractor facilitated access to one of their subcontractors
(tier 3), who in turn facilitated access to one of their
subcontractors (tier 4). The subcontractor (tier 2) in
link B is a small, regional suspended ceilings, parti-
tions and dry-lining subcontractor with an annual
turnover of under £10 m. This subcontractor facili-
tated access to one of their subcontractors (tier 3).
The relationships between the organizations is shown
in Figure 1 where the main contractor is notated as
MC and the subcontractors are notated as SCA1,
SCA2, SCA3, SCB1, SCB2 to reflect links A and B
and the tiers in the supply chain.
TIER 4
SCA3A
A
B
B
SCA2
SCB2
SCA1
SCB1
MC
TIER 3
Mechanical & electrical work package
Suspended ceilings, partitions and drylining work package
TIER 2 TIER 1
Figure 1 The relationships between organizations in the case study
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The sample represents two typical links of a main
contractor’s supply chain in the UK. The two trades
studied are similarly subservient to the same financial,
contractual and procedural control of the main con-
tractor. The major difference between the two trades
is that the mechanical and electrical subcontractor has
significant design contribution, which adds vulnerabil-
ity to the main contractors design programme. This dif-
ference has been taken into account in the analysis of
the findings.
This case study involved the main researcher as a
non-participant observer, observing, listening and
following decisions through projects as part of the main
contractor’s organization and carrying out semi-
structured interviews and workshops with the main
contractor and subcontractors involved. This allowed
access to detailed data on each company’s costing prac-
tices in a case study of a supply chain. A contractor’s
supply chain is an ephemeral, temporary organizational
relationship and as such it is difficult to investigate the
problems of construction supply chains. The conflicts
of interest and the ethics that the study involved were
carefully managed to be sensitive to the contractors’
positions so as to gain full access to the reality of their
situation. To maintain confidentiality, the study used
a different project for each organization. However, each
project involved the construction of a similarly large,
complex, one-off building in which the contractor did
not control the design phase. Interviews established
that similar processes are carried out on all similarly
large, complex, one-off projects.
Data collection and analysis
The researcher observed 10 of the main contractor’s
site meetings over two projects in order to follow
decisions. Data collection with the main contractor
and tier 2 subcontractors then involved semi-structured
interviews to evidence what people do when sourcing
and using cost information and document collection
to evidence cost processes through written cost reports.
The interviews firstly asked questions about how the
company goes about putting a price together for a pro-
ject and controlling costs once a project has been won.
This aimed to find out what cost information is created
and how methods of costing reach through the supply
chain. The interviews then asked questions about how
key relationships work to find out about organizational
behaviour and decision-making in relation to the supply
chain. The interviews gave the researcher the
opportunity to get participants ideas, thoughts and
intentions on current practice and on changes to cur-
rent practice. The documents collected consisted of
the full estimating build-ups, priced tender documents
and post-contract cost control documents for a com-
pleted project from the main contractor and the two
tier 2 subcontractors. Access to this confidential data
was provided on the basis of confidentiality conditions
being met.
Two workshops were held during the course of the
project. In the middle of the project a reflective group
discussion took place with five key participants in the
main contractor’s pre-construction and site operation
teams. Towards the end of the project participants
from each of the four tiers of the mechanical and elec-
trical supply chain were brought together for a reflective
group discussion. These discussions gave the researcher
the opportunity to help the participants explore the use
and implications of cost information across the firms
and in projects.
The interviews and workshops were recorded and
transcribed by a member of the research team. In order
to describe, understand and explain contractors’ prac-
tices of costing and compare these to literature the-
matic coding was used in alignment with the four
main themes established in the literature review: esti-
mates of use of internal resources, quotations for work
from subcontractors, overarching strategic tendering
decisions and post-contract cost control. Through
focused coding each main theme was further catego-
rized to identify examples of methods of costing, orga-
nizational behaviour and decision-making, help or
hindrance to improvements in site operations. The
work of Dean (1993) was used as a framework to anal-
yse the cost information that contractors create to
determine, in Dean’s (1993) terms, the variables
behind cost information used in the practice of costing,
the types of information the costs of those variables
were derived from (which might be data, analogies,
expert opinion, best guesses, comparative prices) and
the flow of cost information through the supply chain.
Real practices of costing: empirical findings
This empirical research aimed to establish whether the
cost information created by a main contractor and
subcontractors during estimating, tendering and post-
contract cost control is useful for assessing improve-
ments in site operations. In these findings the main
contractor is notated as MC and the subcontractors
are notated as SCA1, SCA2, SCA3, SCB1, SCB2 to
reflect links A and B and the tiers in the supply chain.
Documents and interviews established that, once the
main contractor or subcontractor had decided to sub-
mit a tender, their estimating and buying functions face
the task of building up project costs from a number of
constituent parts and their commercial function has the
task of synthesizing the information into a commercial
424 Robson et al.
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tender. Once a project has been won the site team
has the job of building to the budget. It was seen that
because subcontractors themselves subcontract work,
the distinction between main contractor and the
subcontractors falls away in terms of their practices
of costing. The practices of costing described in these
results therefore show no distinction between those of
the main contractor and the five subcontractors.
The only exception is SCB2, the labour-only
subcontractor at the end of link B.
Estimates of use of internal resources
Participants explained that the estimator creates ‘first
principle’ cost information to forecast their direct costs
for work that will be carried out using their company’s
internal resources. To establish the scope of these works
the estimator checks, and hence improves, data received
on quantities and specifications for ‘end items’ of work
and customizes these for work that is under or over mea-
sured, or under or over specified. Once the scope of the
works has been established, the estimator sets about cre-
ating project cost information based on, in Dean’s
(1993) terms, variables in ‘the cost basis of the firm’s
resources’. The cost basis for directly employed labour
is derived from annually updated company schedules
on salaries that are based on national wage agreements
and salary on-costs. The cost basis for directly owned
plant comes from company schedules. The cost basis
of regularly used materials and hired plant is derived
from regularly updated company schedules of negoti-
ated prices from suppliers. The estimator’s information
about the supply cost of direct labour, material and
plant was thus found to be derived from, in Dean’s
(1993) terms, a high level of detailed cost ‘data’ closely
related to final cost.
The estimator then forecasts the activities, resources
and resource productivity rates for ‘end items’. The
cost basis of labour productivity rates, plant utilization
rates and materials wastage are derived from either
company or industry standard rates based on previous
project experience. One contractor explained how
feedback on company standard productivity rates from
colleagues working on site was treated as a way to build
in contingencies, so that the relationship between
productivity rates used to the actual work done was
obscured.
There are industry standard resource and productivity
rates for activities but we create our own. We reviewed
our labour productivity four years ago with our site
operatives. We identified efficiencies, but then we didn’t
change our productivity rates because we were in a ris-
ing market and all costs were going up. (SCA1)
The estimator’s information about the productivity of
direct labour, material and plant was thus found to be
derived from, in Dean’s (1993) terms, a high level of
detailed cost ‘analogies’. It was found the original
industry or company standard analogies were based
on detailed data from site operations, but the context
of any particular project and sometimes a layer of com-
mercial decisions, somewhat lowered the relationship
of this type of cost information created to the actual
work done and thus became ‘surrogate’ numbers to
represent activities.
Quotations from subcontractors
For the main contractor, 70% of the price information
building up to the cost to the client comes from quota-
tions received from subcontractors. SCA1 and SCB1
also subcontract as much as 60–70% of their work.
Within the main contractor and subcontractors, the
buyer, sets about creating project cost information
knowing that the variables include their judgements
about the firm they are buying from, their skill at nego-
tiating and the existence of discounts.
Participants explained that the existence of dis-
counts has a unique hold on the construction industry.
One of the features of subcontracting is a two-stage
competitive tendering process, where competition is
imposed on subcontractors both before a bid is placed
and again before an order is placed. The secondary
competitive process takes place much nearer to the
commencement of the subcontract works. Participants
explained that it is standard practice that a selected
subcontract price comes with a stipulated level of ‘stan-
dard trading discount’ that recognizes trade business.
On top of this, the buyer often assumes a further level
of ‘additional trading discount’. The discount is usually
passed down the supply chain to the dis-benefit of the
subcontractor at the bottom. However, participants
explained how knowledge of additional trade discounts
were treated as a way to obtain competitive advantage
before the discount was secured from a subcontractor
through the secondary competitive process. Two con-
tractors explained that they usually take the risk that
an additional trading discount, or more, will be realized
in further negotiations if and when an order is placed.
Thus, participants recognized that trade discounts are
part of the ‘noise’ in the accounting system that may
or may not make cost information closer to the ‘real’
cost of work carried out.
Subcontractors never give their best price first. We pre-
discount our price when we put our price in. So we take
a discount off their prices so you add all these subbie
costs. We’ll pre-discount ours before we sell it. (SCA1)
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Quite often it’s pre-discounted so already the client has
had the benefit. The person carrying the risk [that the
additional discount will be realised when an order is
placed for the subcontract] is us. (MC)
As explained by one contractor, the relationship
between the buyer’s information on cost obtained
through quotations and the final work carried out is lar-
gely unknown.
Some contractors will make double the margin they
expected to make and other contractors, they’ll make
half the margin they expect to make. You can guarantee
only one of them is going to bang your door. (MC)
SCB1 explained they subcontract all their site labour to
labour-only subcontractors, such as SCB2. They
engage SCB2 on an output related incentive scheme.
A daily price is set based on an expected output and
SCB2, the end of the supply chain, takes the full risk
of exceeding or falling short of the expected output
rate. Tier 2 does not need an accurate output rate as
they pass the risk on to tier 3. When the risk of poor
productivity is passed on in this way the ‘real’ produc-
tivity on site remains largely unknown.
All the labour instead of being paid on day rate is paid
on price. The more they put up the more they earn. It
gives them an incentive. If they bust a gut they will earn
more than on a day rate. But if they slack off, it doesn’t
hit our pockets, it hits them. (SCB1)
The buyer’s information about the cost of subcon-
tracted works was thus found to be derived from com-
parative prices, in Dean’s (1993) terms, costs of
‘perceived purchases’. It was found that the layers of
commercial decisions in subcontract prices effectively
hid the status of the relationship between cost informa-
tion created and the actual work done, becoming ‘sur-
rogate’ numbers to represent activities as cost
information was passed between firms in the supply
chain.
Strategic tendering decisions
Within the main contractor and subcontractors, an
analysis of estimated direct costs and subcontract prices
is passed from the estimators and buyers to the com-
mercial managers, who review the information and
establish the project mark up. The mark up is made
up of expert opinion on (i) anticipated cost of ‘design
contingencies’ for uncertainty and level of risk (ii) a
margin to recover head office overheads and a level of
profit that is expected to be earned from the project
and (iii) desire to win the project to deliver cash flow.
One contractor explained how mark up information
relies heavily on risk analysis and market intelligence
to come to a figure that best accounts for project uncer-
tainties and what the market will bear.
We’ve had some vigorous debates about what the cor-
rect level of risk contingency should be on those jobs.
We’ve had similar debates on every single job and it’s
the most subjective point that you could take. (MC)
The commercial manager’s information about the cost
of the project was thus found to be derived from, in
Dean’s (1993) terms, costs based on ‘expert opinion’
and sometimes ‘best guesses’. It was found that com-
mercial decisions about mark up, even at the lowest
level of the supply chain, impart a weak relationship
of this type of cost information created to the actual
work done. The commercial manager reports to the
director’s team, who establish the total price to be ten-
dered for the work in question.
When a tender is presented in a standardized for-
mat, such as a bill of quantities or schedule of rates,
the contractor decides a gross price to be passed up
in the unit cost for each ‘end item’ in the cost model.
The gross price is made up of the net price of the mea-
sured item plus a share of the ‘mark up’. Both the net
and gross prices can be manipulated across cost items
in a model.
We like to have overvalue in our orders. So we get paid
more than we pay out every month and that generates a
surplus for our business. (MC)
The interviews establish that participants recognized
that the cost information that is created and the price
information that is passed on throughout the supply
chain has many forces acting on it. Participants saw
project costing as a process in which the relationship
between cost information and work carried out can be
slim and one that results in firms in the supply chain
winning and losing on projects at each other’s expense.
There are two layers. Some people might take a few bob
off to win a job but the figure they take that from is a fig-
ure which people have already made assumptions on.
(MC)
We usually list our clarifications and assumptions. Most
people ignore that. (SCA2)
There is a lot of manipulation in bills and a lot of game
playing. So to try and get the truth we’d love to see what
the true net costs are. There are so many people playing
different versions of the same game it’s really difficult to
strike a line through and say, that’s reality. Because we
know that it’s the rough with the smooth you don’t
really entertain that because their opportunity is in the
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next job too. So that’s the drive for the game playing you
get. (MC)
One participant described the limitations of current
cost data in supporting improvements through value
engineering exercises that are superimposed on tradi-
tional procurement models based on transactional
forms of contract and competitive tenders.
When you get involved in the value engineering process,
you start off with the job that’s been well considered,
but then we embark upon this period when we undo
all that work and we pick at all the edges of it. So that
the coordinated piece of design now has got different
assumptions. (MC)
Post-contract cost control on site
Participants explained how a successful tender becomes
a target for the site team to budget and control costs
against, providing cost envelopes for the post-contract
project phase on site.
We apply risk costs, overheads and profit, as agreed in
the settlement meeting with directors and this form
becomes the financial record of our tender. If successful
this passes to the project delivery team and particularly
procurement as a record of decisions made at tender
stage to come to our offer. (SCA1)
Participants showed that information on variances from
the budget comes from records of internal resources
and records of buying losses or gains for subcontracted
work. The focus is on overall predicted profit on the
job.
I look back at jobs and think, oh, we made a good per-
centage margin on that, we did really well. But actually,
what should we have made if we had been more effec-
tive at design coordination and sequencing? (SCA1)
When we get invoices in, we record the invoice date,
who its from, and the value and each month we do an
application to the main contractor that goes in the sales
figure rather than purchases and we keep a running tally
which will give us our profit at the end of a job. (SCB1)
Participants recognized that firms across the supply
chain each hold their own version of project cost and
even the cost information held by the firm that carries
out the physical work has many factors acting on it.
The result is so much accounting ‘noise’ that a ‘true’
project cost that is an accurate representation of the
costs of production and useful for discussions about
improvements, remains unknown.
Discussion
The problem of current practises of costing
The literature on construction costing substantively fails
to ask important questions about the efficacy of cost
information for assessing work processes across the sup-
ply chain and (with exception of Nicolini et al. (2000)
and Ross and Williams (2013)) instead focuses on reaf-
firming established practices of costing. Participants
showed how, as cost information flows through the
supply chain, information about the use of resources is
either not created by the subcontractor who will actually
do the physical work, or obscured as it is passed on
simply as quotations for work in a tendering situation.
Participants talked openly about the layers of commer-
cial decisions that remove cost information from a good
representation of use of resources and result in
‘surrogate’ numbers from the bottom of the supply
chain upwards build up to the cost to the client. This
information loss has increased as the industry’s struc-
ture has shifted to an increasingly multi-tiered system
of subcontracts in which each subcontractor in turn
parcels out smaller and smaller packages of work as
illustrated in Figure 2.
This information loss is not a problem when merely
using cost information for client reporting, buying, pay-
ment and budgeting purposes, but when cost informa-
tion is used for the purpose of reflecting improvements
across the supply chain, the information loss matters
because the cost information available does not ade-
quately reflect the work carried out. Because of this,
getting more of this current cost information in no
way improves the industry’s ability to inform decisions
that improve processes across the supply chain. Even
worse, current cost information discriminates against
improvement by driving perverse incentives and creat-
ing unintended consequences through cost information
being wrongly used or underused.
The construction world is currently dominated by
the advent of BIM, which presents an opportunity to
handle a greater volume of information more meaning-
fully. BIM may therefore be the opportunity to use cost
information that has a strong relationship to work car-
ried out as an analytical tool. However, the main soft-
ware applications for costing in BIM, such as BIM
Measure, Cost X and QTO, all connect costs to
objects. This limits the possibility of connecting costs
to work methods. Thus, the introduction of BIM that
will facilitate, and in some cases automate, information
analysis will not meet a purpose of improving construc-
tion site operations if it only reproduces current cost
information. Incorporating current practices of costing
in BIM is in fact dangerous as more detailed informa-
tion is assumed to be more ‘accurate’ and more
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‘valuable’ but will only produce more convoluted
details that are not tied to what people do.
Different accounting practices
This being the case, then efforts to consider alternative
costing practices that better represent work done are
required. The problems of costing in construction can
be illustrated by considering work from management
accounting practices on process costs of transactions
in supply chains, as adopted by other industries
through the 1990s in response to increased competition
and alongside the emergence of TCE. Of the four main
tools that account for transaction costs in supply chains
compared by LaLonde and Pohlen (1996), ABC is the
most developed method of assigning accurate costs to
products or services based on the resources they con-
sume (Kaplan and Cooper, 1988). Tsai (1998) pre-
sented a conceptual framework for measuring quality
costs under ABC in a two-dimensional model, which
can be adapted for construction as in Figure 3.
The first dimension, the cost assignment view as rep-
resented in a bill of quantities or schedule of rates,
incorporates information on labour, plant and materials
that is related to the volume of work done in an activity
(such as building a brick wall) but does not contain
information onmethod (other than in labour which only
assumes a measure of productivity). Without informa-
tion on method the cost assignment view does not rep-
resent improvements in work processes well. However,
the second dimension, the process view, adds informa-
tion on method, in the form of cost drivers that explain
why activities are performed and performance measures
that explain how well activities are performed. Tsai
(1998) defines a process as ‘a series of activities that
are linked to perform a specific objective’. Although this
is a careful perception, this overlooks the fact that there
is an important difference in the meaning of ‘activities’
between the resource and process views. For example,
a typical activity in a resource assignment view would
be ‘building a brick wall’. An activity in a process assign-
ment view would in fact be series of linked activities,
which are themselves part of an overall system that
brings about the brick wall. Dean (1993) recognized
that systemic costs can be derived from ‘measurable
characteristics’ of either the ‘product’ or the ‘system to
develop the product’ and that both need to be con-
trolled and managed. If the product and the system to
develop the product are described, then the ‘measurable
characteristics’ that drive cost can also be described:
such as company standards, the degree to which partic-
ipative management is used, requirements in method
statements, the degree and type of training and contrac-
tual obligations. This difference between discrete ‘activ-
ities’ related to volume and systemic linked ‘activities’
unrelated to volume and part of an overall system is lost
in Tsai’s (1998) two-dimensional model, where the
‘activities’ appear to be common between the resource
assignment and process views.
Thus, promotion of new procurement models in
construction that include new models of pricing, such
as supply chain cost management and target costing
practices, will struggle to support improvement because
continued use of ‘surrogate’ cost information does not
represent a good understanding of work done. Thus,
this study supports the conclusions of Nicolini et al.
(2000) and Ross and Williams (2013) that these
accounting practices are not immediately transferrable
to the construction industry.
TIER 3
Subcontractor
Quotations for work from subcontractors
Estimates of use of own resources
E
E
E
E
TIER 2
Subcontractor
TIER 1
Main contractor
TIER 0
Client
Q
Q
Q
Q
Figure 2 The flow of cost information through the supply chain
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Future opportunities
The complexity of the situation of costing must also be
seen in relation to the operation of the industry. Green
(2011) shows that the continued problems of the con-
struction industry demonstrate the fallaciousness of
merely adopting a different management tool (or cost-
ing practice) and to argue that solutions are ‘just round
the corner’. The solutions are not ‘just round the cor-
ner’ by adopting the rhetoric of supply chain costing
or target costing. This study argues that the solution
needs to be much more meaningful for the purpose of
assessing improvement in site operations and that this
needs to be rewarded in procurement and displayed
in BIM if this is to be useful in improving supply chain
practices.
Robson et al. (2014) undertook work on the atti-
tudes of construction subcontractors to the advent of
BIM. They found that BIM and new forms of cost
information were attractive only in more stable supply
chains. However, they used evidence from Green
et al. (2008) that the industry works effectively and sus-
tainably because of its dynamic capabilities, i.e. the
flexibility to form short-term project supply chains
associated with the fragmented structure of the indus-
try. Thus, this research contends that the challenge
for costing is to find a model where multi-layered
supply chains can see the value in, and be rewarded
for, working differently. If a new cost accounting sys-
tem is to have any impact, it needs to be applicable to
one–off, project-based supply chains as well as longer
term supply chains.
The implication from this is that future opportuni-
ties in costing that can account for improvements lie
in better understanding the realities of construction
projects. The ability of systems thinking to comprehend
and address the whole (people, processes, information
and structures) offers a way forward through taking
an information approach to learning to improve within
the supply chain. Thus, information on ‘measurable
characteristics’ of both the product, and the system to
create the product, needs to be used to account for
improvements in construction projects. For example,
as participants in this study revealed there is the expec-
tation that some subcontractors doing the physical work
will cover the costs of poor collaboration and others will
side step these costs, but the costs of this are currently
unacknowledged, so at the moment costing is not fit
for the purpose of accounting for improvements in work
processes. BIMmay offer the opportunity to implement
change but only if it can work with more transparent
cost information that has not just a strong relationship
to the product, but also to the system that brings about
the product. A future system of cost accounting that ties
costs to both the product in the BIM design model and
the system that brings about the product in connected
BIMmodels would be a powerful tool for implementing
change. This requires a systemic change in which new
costing tools are an aid to an information approach to
learning that is set within new supply chain relation-
ships (including procurement practices and payment
practices), which can deliver improvement in the
delivery of work.
Resources
Cost drivers
PROCESS VIEW
RESOURCE ASSIGNMENT
VIEW
Why activities
are performed?
Cost item
Activities Performancemeasures
How well activities
are performed?
-  Quality
-  Productivity
-  Plant utilisation
Figure 3 Two-dimensional model of ABC.
Source: Adapted from Tsai (1998).
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Conclusions
This research has produced unique knowledge about
the real costing practices of a main contractor and sub-
contractors. The empirical research ascertained what a
main contractor and two of their subcontracting trades
at tiers 1 and 2, and in one case tier 3, actually do about
costing across the estimating, tendering and post-
contract cost control processes. This was achieved
through a case study with a comprehensive method
for observing and reflecting on what participants do
when they produce and use cost information. Whilst
the case study is of a single contractor’s supply chain,
and variations certainly occur in other contractors and
internationally, the parties reiterated that these prac-
tices were universal in the projects they work on. This
might not be the case elsewhere but, other studies, in
both construction and other industries, have found that
the same problem of ‘surrogate’ numbers is a barrier to
implementing improvements. The findings establish
how current costing practices both may not create
information about site operations and methods and
may lose this information as it is transferred during a
tendering situation. Current cost information is pro-
duced, really only, for buying, payment and budgeting
purposes. The industry faces a problem for achieving
improvements in supply chain practices, as costing
tools, such as target costing with open book account-
ing, are inadequate for the job when based on current
representations of cost. The problems with costing
and the actual management practices in the industry
require a systemic change to effect improvement
involving not just new templates, but new cost informa-
tion and changed supply chain relationships. The
advent of BIM has been presented as enabling more
accurate information in formal analytical models.
BIM could be part of this; but if BIM is used to merely
reproduce current cost information, BIM will not pro-
duce any better information for improvements. Indeed,
the automation of current costing practices in BIM
could make things worse by producing more convo-
luted details that are not tied to what people do. This
requires more research into ‘cost as information’. If
the industry needs BIM to deliver information that is
useful for improving practice then this requires under-
standing cost information better and using different
costing practices that are tied to this purpose. It is only
through this that it is possible to have better informa-
tion for decisions about real improvement in supply
chain practices.
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